FRANCO-GERMAN WAR: SKETCH-MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN IN THE RHINE COUNTRY.
Accordingly by an Imperial order of the 12th of August Bazaine was appointed generalissimo of the Army of the Rhine, with Colonel Jarras as his chief of the staff. Nevertheless, Napoleon, afraid to return to Paris, unwilling even to trust himself at the camp of Châlons, remained with the army and was the cause of much embarrassment and delay. Bazaine had now under his command the Imperial Guard, the 4th, 3rd, 2nd, and part of the 6th Corps, making a total of about 140,000 men. Finding that with his utmost efforts he could not bring together a force capable of coping with the First and Second German Armies in the field, Bazaine resolved to leave Metz for a time to the protection of its encircling forts and powerful garrison, and fall back towards Verdun and Châlons. The movements within the French lines, caused by the preparations for complying with this order, attracted the attention of General Steinmetz and brought on the battle of Borny. Prince Frederic Charles had moved with the Second Army to the southward, intending to cross the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson and other places above Metz, and then seize the roads leading to Verdun and Paris. Steinmetz seems to have intended only a reconnaissance in force, but the eagerness of the German troops brought on an engagement along the whole line, some miles to the east of Metz, in which (August 14th) neither side gained a decided advantage, but a part of the French army was detained at Metz on the following day; which was the very thing that Steinmetz had desired. The German armies had but to cross the Moselle and Bazaine was caught in a trap.
On the morning of the 16th, no movement having been made that day by the French troops massed in front of Gravelotte on account of the non-arrival of the 3rd and 4th Corps, the heads of the German columns, appearing from the southward about 10 A.M., pushed back Forton's cavalry division, which had bivouacked to the south of the lower Verdun road, and occupied Mars-la-Tour. At first the Germans were in no great force, but their numbers kept increasing and their artillery fire became more and more deadly. At noon Bazaine was compelled to bring up the Guard and place them in line. It was not till two o'clock that the 3rd and 4th Corps came into action on the right of the French line, which then extended in a north-westerly and south-easterly direction across both the Verdun roads, facing the Prussians who were coming up from the south and west. The battle raged all day with great violence; at nightfall the French held their positions and had taken a Prussian flag. But their loss, apparently owing to the superiority of the German artillery, was fearfully heavy; and the Germans were masters of the road to Vionville.
The French bivouacked on the battle-field. On the next day Bazaine found that it was impossible to continue his retreat on Verdun for several reasons. The enemy held the lower road in great force, so that an attempt to break through them would only have brought on another battle against augmented numbers; and almost the same might be said of the upper road, which for a long distance is only separated from the lower by a narrow tract of level or undulating country. Provisions also had fallen short and ammunition still more; and these could only be replenished from the Government establishments in Metz. On the 17th, therefore, the French were engaged all day in falling back to, and strengthening themselves upon a commanding position extending from Amanvillers on the north to Rozerieulles on the south.
In advance of the right front of this position is the village of Verneville, round which Bazaine stationed the 6th Corps under Canrobert. But observing that there was a strong position at the village of St. Privat, commanding the road to Briey, the occupation of which would extend northwards the line already taken up, and make a turning movement on the part of the enemy more difficult, Marshal Canrobert asked permission to move his corps to St. Privat. Bazaine gave his consent; the 6th Corps occupied St. Privat; and the symmetry and defensive strength of the French line were doubtless improved by the change. As in previous engagements the rashness of divisional commanders, particularly Steinmetz, caused the loss of whole brigades before the battle was won by the Germans. Thus a great combined attack of cavalry and artillery was ordered by Steinmetz between four and five. The batteries of the 8th Corps, and three reserve batteries of the 7th Corps, supported by a large body of horse, were pushed across the defile. But they fared no better than their predecessors. The 4th Light Battery, trotting up the hill to the right of St. Hubert, "suffered so severely that, after firing ten rounds, it was put hors de combat, and obliged to retire down the hill." The attack failed and both cavalry and artillery fell back by degrees on their original positions. But gradually the superiority of the Prussian artillery fire told, and Bazaine persisted in keeping his reserves, amounting to a third of his forces, out of the field of action. Finally the Saxon Corps, after a long détour, delivered their attack on the north flank. After several unsuccessful attempts, in which a great many men fell, a combined assault by the Prussian Guards and the Saxon Corps, simultaneously directed on St. Privat from three sides, the north, the west, and the south, forced the brave defenders, soon after seven, to relinquish their hold. The right of Canrobert's corps was then thrown back, but still faced the enemy, and darkness soon terminated the contest. The result was that the French had held their ground everywhere except on the extreme right, but that all the roads leading to Verdun had been taken from them. On the following day Bazaine withdrew his whole army from the plateau and brought them down to within the shelter of the guns of Metz. Only the half-trained levies at Châlons remained to bar the march of the invader upon the brilliant capital of France.
The intelligence of the great battles fought near Metz reached England in various conflicting forms. But it was clear that a French army was cooped up in Metz; that thousands of men were lying, disabled by sickness or wounds, in hospitals, many of which were of a provisional and inadequate character; and that great distress must infallibly fall upon the poor inhabitants of the north-east region of France, which formed the theatre of war. The reckless way in which the French Government began the war had aroused feelings of deep and indignant disapproval among all classes and parties in Great Britain; but now that it was a question of suffering to be alleviated, human needs to be supplied, the warm hearts of British men and women forgot all but the urgency and the duty of charity. Associations for the relief of the sick and wounded were formed in every direction, and received overflowing support; and numbers both of men and women volunteered to tend the wounded of both armies under the protection of the red cross of the Geneva Convention. The German authorities, whose arrangements in view of these and other accidents of war admitted of little improvement, declined to avail themselves of the zeal of foreign volunteers; but by the French, whom overwhelming misfortune had surprised in a state of unreadiness that only brings out the rashness of their Government into stronger relief, all such services were thankfully accepted. Later a very useful organisation was set on foot by the Daily News newspaper for the special purpose of relieving the wants of the peasantry and others in the country round Sedan, whom the devastating fury of the war had left houseless and penniless.
As soon as a clear notion of what had occurred near Metz was obtained by the French Government, it became a matter of very anxious deliberation what course should be adopted. For some days Marshal MacMahon had been actively engaged in forming a new army at the camp of Châlons out of the heterogeneous materials that he had at his disposal. Altogether a force had been collected of 135,000 men. What was to be done with it? Made wise by the event, critics and historians without number have condemned MacMahon's flank march through the Argonne for the purpose of relieving Bazaine, and have written as if it was absurd and incapable of achievement from the first. Then, as it must have been undertaken from some motive, they have seen in the enterprise the reckless and desperate resolve of the Government of the Emperor to sacrifice the interests of France, which would have dictated MacMahon's retirement towards Paris, to the interests of the dynasty, and stake everything on the success of a most hazardous combination, the failure of which, while it was fatal to the Empire, involved France also in its ruin. The Empress and Palikao, so it is commonly said, forced MacMahon to march towards Sedan against his better judgment, they being influenced by purely dynastic considerations. Count Palikao replied to these critics in a book published after the war was over, and it is impossible to deny that his assertions seem to be of great weight. Was the scheme practicable? Count Palikao maintains that it was; and Colonel Rüstow, an independent witness, appears to be of the same opinion. The gist of their argument is that had MacMahon started at once and pursued a direct march, he would have eluded the Crown Prince and relieved Bazaine after a battle with the small force commanded by the Prince of Saxony.
MacMahon, however, when, after long resistance, he acceded to the policy of endeavouring to relieve Bazaine, considered that he would be exposing his right flank too much if he were to lead his army on the line indicated by Palikao: he preferred a more circuitous course which would take his army close to the Belgian frontier and bring it by way of Montmédy and Briey upon Metz. On the 23rd he marched northwards from Rheims, where he had delayed for two days. Even by this route he had sufficient start, in the opinion of Palikao, to have outmarched the Crown Prince, had he given way to no indecision, and made long marches every day without troubling himself about the number of stragglers whom he might leave behind him. He might, it is said, have reached Montmédy on the 25th of August, on the evening of which day the Crown Prince of Prussia first heard of his northward march. "On the 29th, or, at the latest, on the 30th, he could have united with Bazaine before Metz—that is, if the latter broke through the investing lines—and have fought a battle with Prince Frederick Charles, who would then have been no longer able to oppose him with equal forces." But instead of this, the head of MacMahon's army only reached Mouzon on the 28th of August, and he was therefore unable to bring his whole army across the Meuse before it was struck by the Crown Prince.
