The Pope having refused the terms offered through the Count Ponza di San Martino, the following arrangements were made by the Italian Government, with the sanction of the Parliament, without consulting him. He was confirmed in the possession of his sovereign rights, allowed to retain his guards, and provided with an income of 3,255,000 francs (which, however, Pius IX. never consented to accept). He was to keep the Vatican Palace (the Quirinal Palace being appropriated for the use of the King of Italy), the Church of Santa Maria Maggiore, his residence at Castel Gandolfo, and their dependencies. Various provisions were added for the purpose of securing the freedom and inviolability of the Papal correspondence. The seminaries and other Roman Catholic institutions were to derive their authority from the Holy See alone, without any interference from the Italian educational authorities, and the Pope was left an entire fulness of authority in the appointment of bishops and the general government of the Church. In fact, the Guarantees, had Pius IX. chosen to accept them, would have given him a power such as he possessed in no other European country.
Spain, the unlucky cause of the deadly war that had broken out between France and Germany, though striving after repose and a settled government, failed to obtain it. In May the names of Espartero and Montpensier were formally before the Cortes as candidates for the Throne. But Espartero soon afterwards retired on the ground of his advanced age; and Prim, whose influence was predominant in the Government, would not hear of the election of the Duke of Montpensier. In June Queen Isabella abdicated in favour of her son Alfonso, the Prince of Asturias. The next month witnessed Prim's unsuccessful attempt to secure the elevation to the Throne of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. Not daunted by so many failures, Prim now turned his eyes again to the House of Savoy, and prevailed on the King of Italy to consent to the acceptance of the Spanish Crown by his second son, the Duke of Aosta. In October this arrangement was given out as completed, subject to the approval of the Cortes. On the 16th of November a formal vote was taken in the Cortes, and there appeared—for the Duke of Aosta, 191 votes; for the Federal Republic, 60; for Montpensier, 27; for a Unitarian Republic, 3. Supported by this decisive majority, Prim proceeded to make the necessary preparations for the fitting reception of the new Sovereign. The Duke and Duchess of Aosta embarked at Leghorn and landed at Cartagena on the 30th of December. They were received by Admiral Topete, and informed by him of a terrible crime that had just occurred in Madrid. On the 28th of December, Marshal Prim, while going in his carriage from the Cortes to the Ministry of War, was fired at by some assassins (supposed to be Republican fanatics, to whom Prim was odious as the supporter of monarchy) and severely wounded in the arm and hand. The assassins made their escape. The wounds were at first not believed to be dangerous, but inflammation set in and Prim expired on the night of the 30th of December. If he had erred through ambition, the brave Prim was yet a true lover of his country and a wise, courageous, and sagacious ruler; at this critical juncture of her affairs, his death was to Spain an unspeakable and irreparable loss.
It will be remembered that the narrative of the Franco-German War has been brought down to the capitulation of Sedan and the Revolution of the 4th of September. Of the gallant struggle made by the French nation after the fall of the Empire, when the men who had installed themselves in the seats of power vainly tried to bring back to the standards of the raw Mobiles that victory which had deserted the eagles of the veterans of the Crimea, it does not fall within the scope of this work to speak at length.
M. Jules Favre, Gambetta, Crémieux, and the rest (always excepting Trochu), believing in democracy with an implicit and absolute faith, seem to have been honestly convinced that what the French, or rather the Parisian, populace were determined should be or should not be, would in some way or other be arranged to suit their wishes. How else could the foolish and presumptuous language—falsified so miserably by the event—of M. Favre's circular of the 6th of September have escaped from the pen of any man of common sense or common prudence? The Empire, he said, sought to divide the nation from the army, but misfortune and duty have brought them together again; "this alliance renders us invincible." He then proceeded to misrepresent what the King of Prussia had said in his proclamation upon entering French territory, as if he had declared that he made war, "not against France, but against the Imperial dynasty;" whereas the King merely announced that he was making war against the armies of France, not against the civil population—a very different thing. But if Prussia was so ill advised as to continue the war, the new Government would accept the challenge. "We will not cede either an inch of our territory or a stone of our fortresses."
Bismarck, upon receiving a copy of Jules Favre's circular, despatched a counter-manifesto to the Prussian diplomatic agents. "The demand," he remarked, "that we should conclude an armistice without any guarantee for our conditions of peace, could be founded only on the erroneous supposition that we lack military and political judgment, or are indifferent to the interests of Germany." Germany cared nothing about the dynasty; but whatever permanent Government might be established in France must be prepared to give to Germany solid guarantees for the maintenance of peace. "We are far from any inclination to mix in the internal affairs of France. It is immaterial to us what kind of government the French people shall formally establish for themselves. The Government of the Emperor Napoleon has hitherto been the only one recognised by us; but our conditions of peace with whatever Government, legitimate for the purpose, we may have to negotiate are wholly independent of the question how or by whom France is governed. They are prescribed to us by the nature of things, and by the law of self-defence against a violent and hostile neighbour. The unanimous voice of the German Governments and German people demands that Germany shall be protected by better boundaries than we have had hitherto against the dangers and violence that we have experienced from all French Governments for centuries. As long as France remains in possession of Strasburg and Metz, so long is its offensive strategically stronger than our defensive power, so far as all South Germany, and North Germany on the left bank of the Rhine, are concerned. Strasburg, in the possession of France, is a gate always wide open for attack on South Germany. In the hands of Germany, Strasburg and Metz obtain a defensive character." It is now known that Bismarck would have been content with the acquisition of Strasburg, but the military authorities insisted upon Metz as well.
With views so divergent, the inutility of a conference between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prussian Chancellor would seem to be obvious. Nevertheless, the pressure of circumstances brought about such a conference, and for this reason—the Government of the 4th of September, though it probably continued to regard itself as a "heaven-born Ministry," had become alive to the fact that its earthly title to legitimacy was but slender; it therefore desired to bring about the convocation of a National Constituent Assembly, which might, as it saw fit, either confirm them in their offices or choose another Government. On the other hand, it was to the Germans also a matter of prime importance that a regular Government should be established in France, in order that negotiations might be opened with it for peace. But in order that the elections from which such an Assembly was to result might be held, there must be a temporary cessation of hostilities; and this was a matter that could only be arranged by means of an interview. Through the exertions of Lord Lyons, the consent of the King of Prussia to a meeting between Bismarck and Jules Favre, to settle the terms of an armistice, was obtained. Several interviews between the two took place at Ferrières, near Meaux (September 19th and 20th), but no accommodation could be arrived at. As a military equivalent for the consent to a cessation of hostilities, Bismarck demanded the surrender of Toul, Phalsburg, and Strasburg; but to this Jules Favre would not listen, and became violently agitated at the suggestion that the garrison of Strasburg should give themselves up as prisoners of war. Again, the subject of an armistice was discussed in connection with the re-provisioning of Paris. During the three weeks that would be required for the election and first meeting of a National Assembly, if an armistice were to prevail, Paris would naturally seek to augment the stock of provisions within the walls; but, in that case, Bismarck said, Germany must have a military equivalent to compensate her for the long delay, and, as such an equivalent, he demanded the surrender of the fortress of Mont Valérien. Favre was again much excited; he said, and certainly with reason, that Bismarck might as well ask for Paris at once. The conferences were broken off without result and Jules Favre returned to Paris.
SIEGE OF PARIS: MAP OF THE FORTIFICATIONS.
The remainder of the events of the war to the end of 1870 we propose to sketch briefly in the following order:—(1) The siege of Paris (noticing in connection therewith the sieges of Strasburg and Metz); (2) Other sieges and stormings of fortresses; (3) The operations on the Loire; (4) The operations in the east of France. Our object will be to keep the chief current of action before the reader in avoidance of details.
The main defence of Paris consisted in the outer ring of forts, heavily armed, by which the lines of investment of a besieging army were kept at such a distance that the bombardment and destruction of the city were rendered impossible until the forts themselves had been reduced. On the south side the forts were not sufficiently distant from the city to make it unattainable by shells, with the modern range of artillery, to an enemy who had seized the heights of Meudon and Clamart, and the plateau of Villejuif; secondly, the interval left between the fort of Issy and Mont Valérien was far too great; and, again, the interval between Mont Valérien and the forts of St. Denis was dangerously large. To remedy these defects a system of earthworks was planned and partly executed, after Trochu had charge of the defence. The disastrous issue of the sortie of the 19th of September, made by General Ducrot in the direction of Chatîllon, when the redoubt at that place fell into the hands of the Prussians, and the 14th Corps, yielding to a disgraceful panic, fled in disorder to the city gates, not only, in General Vinoy's opinion, exercised a baneful influence over all the subsequent defence, but led to the evacuation by the French of the whole of the redoubts above described. Two of them, however, one to the west, the other to the east of Villejuif, were re-taken by General Vinoy, with little loss, on the 23rd of September; and being immediately repaired and put in the best condition of defence, were held by the French during the remainder of the siege, throwing back the Prussian line of investment at this point considerably and making the bombardment of the city, on all the eastern half of the southern face, impossible. Had equal energy been shown in holding, or recovering, the redoubts of Meudon and Chatîllon, Paris could not have been bombarded to any purpose on this side. Of this there can be no question.