L. A. THIERS. (From a Photograph by E. Appert, Paris.)
After the repulse of Ducrot on the 19th of September, the investment of Paris, which could not be considered final till the quality of the troops composing the active army had been ascertained, was regularly completed. Its salient points were Stains on the north, Chelles on the east, Sceaux on the south, and Garches on the west. On the 30th of September General Vinoy headed a grand sortie against the 6th Corps (Tümpling), which guarded that portion of the Prussian lines which lay south of Villejuif, with the intention of driving the Germans out of Choisy-le-Roi, and destroying the bridge over the Seine at that point, so as to make a break in the German communications. It was hoped that the enemy would have been surprised; but a delay of twenty-four hours required by Trochu, in order that a larger force might be got ready to share in the operation, and the vigilance of the German Intelligence Department, caused that expectation to fail; and the German troops at Choisy, being reinforced and prepared for the attack, could not be dislodged. The French loss was considerable, amounting to nearly 2,000 men; but the troops fought well and the retreat was effected in good order.
About this time, M. Thiers, at the request of the Government of the National Defence, visited all the principal Courts of Europe, everywhere eloquently pleading the cause of his country. Nowhere, not even in Russia, did his words fail to awaken interest and sympathy; but when M. Thiers hinted at active intervention, he was met by a general indisposition to interfere at the present stage of the struggle.
On the 7th of October Gambetta made his escape from Paris in a balloon, and landed safely in the neighbourhood of Rouen. He at once repaired to Tours, where a delegation from the Government of Paris had been for some time established, though it was entirely unequal to its task. He lost no time in issuing a proclamation, to be circulated through France, describing in highly coloured language the patriotic exertions which the Parisians were making, and urging the inhabitants of the unoccupied provinces to rise and hasten to their succour. He then superseded Crémieux in the Ministry of War, and appointed himself to the office, in addition to that of Minister of the Interior. Gambetta evidently thought himself another Carnot, about to "organise victory." The real nature and scope of his abilities, which were undoubtedly great, appear to have been seized by a keen-eyed newspaper correspondent, who said that Gambetta reminded him of an "energetic traffic-manager" on an English railway. But his activity and hopefulness were inexhaustible, and he certainly did contrive to conjure up, as it were out of the earth, armies of some sort or other, and to find arms and accoutrements for them; though the first were not uniform and the second miserably insufficient. Nevertheless he did the best he could with the materials at his hand. Of his military arrangements it is enough to say that he put an end to the disorders in the great cities that attempted to rival the central power.
Meanwhile the days crept on and the time came when famine forced the defenders of Metz to drop their arms. Already Strasburg had fallen (September 28th) after a gallant defence by General Uhrich, and the Germans had established a civil government in Alsace. When last we spoke of Bazaine, it was to mention that after the battle of Gravelotte he withdrew the Army of the Rhine under cover of the fortifications of Metz. Nothing of moment occurred for some days; Prince Frederick Charles was engaged in hutting the German army round Metz and entrenching his position; while Bazaine was busily preparing for another attempt. A messenger from MacMahon, passing safely through the German lines, brought word to Bazaine that the Army of Châlons had commenced its march to his relief on the 21st of August. In order to co-operate with it, Bazaine planned a great sortie for the 31st, about which day he calculated that MacMahon would have arrived in the neighbourhood of the fortress. But he delayed the attack till the afternoon, for reasons which, even upon his own showing, appear insufficient; and through the indecision of subordinate commanders, another delay supervened, so that the advance was not made till four o'clock. The Germans had time to concentrate a sufficient mass of troops in the rear of Noisseville and Servigny to repel the French attack, which was made with no great vigour. Bivouacking on the ground, the French resumed the action on the next day; but their efforts were ill planned and ill united; the Germans brought up an overpowering artillery to crush the French right; and between two and three o'clock, Bazaine, who had heard nothing of the approach of MacMahon's army, gave the order for retreat. For the next weeks he confined himself to foraging for provisions, and even in a sortie on the 7th of October only 40,000 of his troops were employed.
The Revolution of the 4th of September occurred and the news was received by Bazaine with unmitigated disgust. The master whom he had served long, and who had rewarded him well, was the Emperor; if the Emperor was a prisoner and could give him no orders, then his obedience was due to the Empress as Regent. He determined not to recognise and to hold no communications with the men who had supplanted a regular Government under favour of a street riot and the Republican cry. So far, if Bazaine's antecedents are considered, it is impossible to blame him; he did not become culpable till he made the interest of France—which had a more sacred claim on his allegiance than any form of government—subordinate to political aims and personal ambition. Count von Moltke, however, in his "History of the Franco-German War," maintained that he was not a traitor.
In the course of September a strange incident occurred. There was an individual of the name of Regnier, much attached to the Empire, who was said to have held some appointment in the household of the Empress. M. Regnier appears to have been a fanciful and vain personage; and the notion came into his head that he might become the humble but serviceable instrument of liberating the Emperor, re-establishing the Imperial system, and terminating the misfortunes of France. For this, it seemed to him, three things were necessary: the consent of the Imperial family; the negotiation of a treaty of peace between them and the Germans; and the liberation of Bazaine and his army in consequence of that treaty, who should act as an "Army of Order," put down the Republic and the men of the 4th of September, and replace the Emperor on the throne. Regnier first went to Chislehurst and propounded his views to the Empress, begging that she would furnish him with some kind of credentials. The Empress, it is plain, put little faith either in the man or in his project; however, after much importunity, she gave him the credentials he desired. Having obtained these, Regnier repaired to Ferrières, where the King and Bismarck were then quartered. He obtained an interview with the Chancellor and unfolded his plan. Bismarck was at first inclined to treat him as a dreamer and a meddler, but eventually thought the scheme of Regnier might be worth a trial. He accordingly gave him a general pass, which would allow of his passing through the lines of any German army that he might meet with, in order that he might go to Metz and sound Bazaine with reference to the project. Passing in this way through the lines of Prince Frederick Charles, Regnier entered Metz and sought an interview with Bazaine (September 23rd). The marshal, though he expressed himself cautiously, did not disguise the feelings of aversion and contempt with which he regarded the Government of the National Defence; and in consequence of Regnier's visit he sent Bourbaki, the commander of the Imperial Guard, that same evening out of Metz on a mission to Chislehurst. The emissary—Prince Frederick Charles being doubtless cognisant of the whole intrigue—found no difficulty in passing through the investing lines. Up to this point Regnier's little plan had apparently prospered, but now the bubble burst. The Empress was not a woman of that strength and sternness of character which, in the pursuit of an object of ambition, would lead her to brave obloquy and play high for a mighty stake. If she signed a treaty of peace as Regent, providing for the cession of Strasburg and Metz to Germany, the name of the Napoleonic dynasty, she thought, would be eternally execrated in France; and, after all, it was not certain that Bazaine could restore the Empire, or that his army, as a body, would support him in the attempt. She therefore absolutely declined to be a party to the scheme and it fell through. Bourbaki returned to France; but, instead of re-entering Metz, placed his sword at the disposal of the Government of Tours.
In October, the only description of food that remained abundant in Metz was horse-flesh and this was obtained at the cost of the efficiency of the cavalry and artillery. On the day after the sortie of the 7th Bazaine caused a meeting of divisional generals to be held, to consider the situation. However distasteful the thought of a capitulation might be, yet the fast diminishing supplies of food compelled the officers to face it; they were of opinion that a capitulation should be arranged on terms that would allow of the army retiring, without laying down its arms, to the south of France, under a pledge not to serve against Germany during the continuance of war. If, however, these conditions were not acceded to by the German leaders, it was the understanding of most of the divisional generals and of the mass of the officers under them, that a desperate effort must and would be made to cut a way, sword in hand, through the investing forces.