At a meeting of the corps commanders, called by Bazaine on the 10th of October, it was resolved that no new sorties should be attempted, but that efforts should be made to obtain a military convention by negotiation with the enemy. The use of the term "military convention" shows that something different from an ordinary capitulation—something political—was in view. At all events, General Boyer arrived at Versailles on the 13th of October to talk over the situation. The course of the negotiation that ensued was curiously similar to that which the Regnier incident had occasioned. "You ask," said Bismarck, "that the army in Metz may be allowed to retire to the south of France, pledged not to bear arms against Germany during the continuance of the war. But who is to guarantee the convention under which such an arrangement would be executed? Whom does Bazaine obey? What is the Government that he serves? If the Government of the National Defence,—that is an authority that we Germans do not recognise, at any rate until a Constituent Assembly shall have met and validated their powers. If the Emperor,—he is a helpless prisoner in Germany. If the Empress and the Regency,—that may perhaps be satisfactory, but her sanction must be obtained; she must sign a treaty that will give us what we want; and the Army of the Rhine, besides the pledge not to bear arms against Germany, must proclaim the Regency as the legitimate Government of France, and Bazaine must undertake to play the part of Monk in an Imperial restoration." Boyer returned to Metz with this answer on the 18th of October, and thence was sent to Chislehurst. The result was the same as before; the Empress, after much wavering, refused to sign any treaty of peace by which French territory would be ceded to the invader. General Boyer communicated to the King on the 23rd the ill-success of his mission, and Prince Frederick Charles was immediately instructed to inform Bazaine that all hope of arriving at any result by political negotiation was abandoned at the royal headquarters. On the 27th the capitulation was signed and the fortress with an army of 170,000 men passed into the hands of the Germans.
The confirmation of the news of the capitulation of Bazaine, and the rumour that an armistice was under consideration, caused a great ferment in the anarchical or communist element of the Parisian population. Bands of armed men marched (October 31st) from Belleville to the Hôtel de Ville, placed Trochu and other members of the Government under arrest, declared the independence of the Commune of Paris and undertook its government. The leaders were Flourens, Félix Pyat, Blanqui, etc. Fortunately, Ernest Picard, the Minister of Finance, contrived to escape, and before the day closed he brought a Breton battalion of the Gardes Mobiles to the Hôtel de Ville, who soon rescued their countryman Trochu and dispersed the revolutionists. The utmost forbearance was shown to the rioters by the partisans of order. Trochu and his colleagues, after this émeute, thought it desirable to submit the question of their remaining in power to the suffrages of the people of Paris. The votes were taken accordingly; nearly 558,000 were favourable to the Government, while 62,638 were dissentient.
M. Thiers, on his return from his unsuccessful journey to the foreign Courts, was requested by the Government to re-open negotiations with Count Bismarck, with a view to a cessation of hostilities and the election of a Constituent Assembly. But the project again foundered on the question of re-victualling Paris, to which the military authorities at the Prussian headquarters would not allow Bismarck to consent, unless on condition of the surrender of one, if not two, of the forts round Paris—a concession that Thiers could not make.
Sad and dull was life in Paris during the month of November, cheered only by one gleam of better fortune, when news came that the Army of the Loire had gained a victory at Coulmiers. At the end of the month a grand sortie was resolved upon, in order to facilitate the flanking operations of General d'Aurelle de Paladines' army, which Gambetta hoped to impel upon Paris at the same time. Great preparations were made and several demonstrations against various points of the German lines concerted, in order to deceive the enemy as to the object of the main attack, which was the peninsula of Champigny, beyond Charenton. Breaking through the Prussian lines at this point, Trochu hoped to push forward into the district of Brie, and march onwards till he fell in with the advancing army of De Paladines. Ducrot was appointed to the command of the troops destined for the operation, which numbered about 60,000 men. Bridges were thrown across the Marne, and on the morning of the 30th the Saxons and Würtembergers who guarded this part of the line were vigorously attacked and the villages of Brie and Champigny wrested from them. Still no great progress was made, and on the night of the 30th it became suddenly cold, and the French soldiers unused to the hardships of campaigning suffered terribly from exposure. The 1st of December was employed by Trochu and Ducrot in strengthening the line, Brie-Champigny, which they had seized. On the 2nd the Germans brought up fresh forces, and severe fighting took place, at the end of which the French retained all their positions, except the eastern end of the village of Champigny. On the 3rd Trochu resolved to retreat, moved to do so by the absence of any news of De Paladines and the increasing severity of the weather. The retreat was covered by the guns of the forts and was effected with little loss. Another great sortie was made on the 21st of December, with some vague hope of co-operating with a northern army, supposed to be at that time advancing towards Paris. The attack was directed against the Prussian Guard at Stains and the Saxons more to the east. It was repelled with little difficulty, the French losing considerably and showing in this sortie a lack of spirit and endurance, naturally to be accounted for by want of food, severe cold, and the depressing circumstances of the siege.
Besides Metz and Strasburg, eight other fortified places were compelled to surrender before the close of the year. In the case of Laon, the surrender on the 9th of September of a citadel and a position remarkably strong by nature, was rendered necessary by the weakness of the garrison. Toul, after a savage bombardment for several days, by which the town was set on fire in several places, surrendered to the Duke of Mecklenburg on the 23rd of September. Soissons, Verdun, La Fère, and Thionville were reduced in the course of October and November. Phalsburg (the fortress at which is laid the scene of Erckmann-Chatrian's famous novel, "Le Blocus"), after its brave commandant, General Talhouet, and its no less brave inhabitants, had endured a bombardment and blockade—the first intermittent, the second continuous—during four months, was compelled to surrender, by failure of provisions, on the 12th of December.
EVACUATION OF METZ. (See p. [584].)
The narrative of the formation of the Army of the Loire, of its successes and its reverses, is one of the most striking and instructive chapters in the history of the war. All that will be here attempted is to give an outline of the course of events, as it may be clearly traced in the works of the two French generals who had most share in them, General d'Aurelle de Paladines and General Chanzy. Soon after the Revolution of the 4th of September, it being apparent that France must either raise fresh armies or submit to whatever terms the victors of Sedan might impose, the formation of a new army corps, the 15th, was commenced at Bourges, under the command of General Motterouge. By the beginning of October its organisation was nearly complete. Then came the advance of Von der Tann towards Orleans, the defeat of Motterouge at Artenay and the first German occupation of Orleans; the 15th Corps being driven over the Loire, and falling back as far as Ferte St. Aubin. On the 11th of October General d'Aurelle de Paladines, an officer on the retired list, who had offered his services and his experience to the new Government, was appointed to supersede General Motterouge. By the end of October came the disastrous news of the fall of Metz. Prince Frederick Charles was now free to march southward with 100,000 victorious troops and break up the nascent organisation of the Army of the Loire. Several weeks, however, must elapse before he could reach the Loire, and in that time the force which d'Aurelle's energy had rendered formidable might still be able to strike a blow. On the 25th of October the general concerted with the Minister of War, Gambetta, and his delegate, M. de Freycinet, the plan of an advance of the 15th and 16th Corps on Orleans. Crossing the Loire at Blois and other places, the 15th and 16th Corps, preceded by numerous bodies of Franc-tireurs, forming altogether an army of between 60,000 and 70,000 men, were ranged, at the end of October, on a line facing the north-east, and extending from the forest of Marchenoir to the Loire, near Beaugency. Von der Tann, who commanded in Orleans and whose force was considerably weaker in point of numbers, was alarmed at the movement and prepared to march out and attack the enemy, intending, should he be unsuccessful, to evacuate Orleans. D'Aurelle continued to press forward, handling his troops warily and deliberately, as well knowing how disastrous, with such inexperienced soldiers, the consequences of any mistake might easily be. The two armies met on the 9th of November, on the plain around the village of Coulmiers, ten miles west of Orleans, and for the first time in the war the Germans were defeated.
On the following day (November 10th) General d'Aurelle entered Orleans and was welcomed enthusiastically by the inhabitants. He fixed his headquarters at Villeneuve d'Ingre, about three miles outside the city. He has been repeatedly censured for not leading his army, after the victory of Coulmiers, directly upon Paris, so as to raise the siege. Had Prince Frederick Charles been still detained at Metz, this is what d'Aurelle undoubtedly ought to have done. But the Prince, in his southward march, was already almost as near Paris as the Army of the Loire; his headquarters on the 10th of November were at Troyes. D'Aurelle with good reason shrank from the enterprise of attacking the Duke of Mecklenburg (whose army, swelled by the remains of Von der Tann's corps, amounted to about 50,000 men and was posted near Chartres), with the certainty that Prince Frederick Charles, a man not likely to miss an opportunity, was, with 100,000 victorious Prussians, within striking distance of his right flank. D'Aurelle's plan, therefore, was this—to form a large entrenched camp in front of Orleans and fortify it with great care, mounting on the works a number of heavy marine guns of long range; behind these entrenchments to continue the organisation of the army and the instruction of the soldiers, in both of which respects much improvement was still to be desired; and to receive here, with his forces united and well in hand, the attack which Prince Frederick Charles was marching to deliver. Had that attack been successfully resisted, had the Prussian legions been beaten back from before the walls of Orleans, then, General D'Aurelle thought, there might be a chance of marching effectually to the relief of Paris. But Gambetta interfered with his plans, and the result was that a French advance was defeated on the 28th of November at Beaune la Rolande.