What looked like an important step towards the co-ordination in one confederacy of the Australian colonies was taken in the autumn of this year. A new treaty between Great Britain and the Zollverein was being negotiated; and it would appear that Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, in a circular despatch to the Australian Governments, used certain expressions in relation thereto which seemed to the colonists to imply the recognition of a right on the part of the mother country to concede, and on the part of a foreign country to claim, certain tariff arrangements as between the different colonies which would be favourable to the interests of the treaty-making Power. Delegates from the Governments of New South Wales, Tasmania, South Australia, and Victoria met at Melbourne, in September, 1871, to consider the question; and having carefully examined Lord Kimberley's despatch, agreed unanimously to the following resolutions:—
1. "That the Australian colonies claim to enter into arrangements with each other, through their respective Legislatures, so as to provide for the reciprocal admission of their respective products and manufactures, either duty free or on such terms as may be mutually agreed upon.
2. "That no treaty entered into by the Imperial Government with any foreign Power should in any way limit or impede the exercise of such right.
3. "That Imperial interference with inter-colonial fiscal legislation should finally and absolutely cease.
4. "That so much of an Act or Acts of the Imperial Parliament as may be considered to prohibit the full exercise of such right should be repealed.
5. "That these resolutions, together with a memorandum from each Government, or a joint memorandum from such Governments as prefer to adopt that method, shall be transmitted to the Secretary of State through the Governors of our colonies respectively." The movement, however, proved premature, so far at least as it concerned inter-colonial (that is, Australian) Federation. Nor had the larger project of Imperial Federation come within the view of the statesmen of the day.
In September, 1870, a circumstance had occurred that gave us the disagreeable certainty that, although secured from the direct risks of war by what Mr. Gladstone called "the silver streak," we too might be injuriously affected by the disturbance of the European equilibrium caused by the prostration of France. A circular note, addressed by Prince Gortschakoff to the representatives of Russia at foreign Courts, and made public at the end of October, declared that it was the intention of his Majesty the Czar no longer to be bound by that clause of the Treaty of 1856, concluded after the Crimean War, which prohibited Russia from keeping up a naval force above a certain strength in the Black Sea. Lord Granville, in a despatch to Sir A. Buchanan dated the 10th of November, 1870, stated that the British Government could give no sanction to the course announced by Prince Gortschakoff.
The concilatory tone adopted by Prince Gortschakoff in his reply to Lord Granville went some way to neutralise the disagreeable impression which the circular had produced. He would not admit that Russia encouraged a laxity of principle in regard to the obligation of treaties; and in the case of this particular treaty he declared that in its main stipulations Russia considered it as binding as ever, although she declined to be bound any longer by the special convention with Turkey which it contained, regulating the number and size of the men-of-war which the two Powers might maintain in the Black Sea. With regard to the objection that Russia had not sought for a modification of the treaty through the medium of a conference, Prince Gortschakoff remarked that Lord Granville well knew that "all the efforts repeatedly made to unite the Powers in a common deliberation, in order to do away with the causes of complication which trouble the general peace, have constantly failed."
There was something deceptive in this way of stating the matter, because it did not follow, if difficulties had arisen in the way of the meeting of congresses to settle all the perplexing questions of Europe, that therefore a proposal by Russia for a conference of the signatory Powers to discuss the comparatively unimportant matter now on the tapis would have encountered any serious opposition. Lord Granville pointed out this distinction, admitting at the same time with satisfaction the moderation and courtesy of tone by which the Russian despatches were distinguished. Here, as between England and Russia, the matter rested. But a doubt remained whether the conduct of Russia had not been previously sanctioned, possibly even instigated, by the Court of Berlin. Mr. Odo Russell was sent to clear up this delicate point, and brought back the tranquillising assurance from Count Bismarck that the German Government had given no sanction to the step. At the same time a proposal was made by Prussia that a conference of the Powers should be summoned, and meet in London, in order to settle the question.
This conference accordingly met in London on the 17th of January. The presence of a French Plenipotentiary at the Conference had been earnestly desired, and M. Jules Favre had been requested to attend it by the Paris Government. But difficulties arose in connection with his obtaining permission to pass out of Paris through the Prussian lines; and when the permission was obtained—or, rather, when through the close of the siege the difficulty no longer existed—M. Favre had his hands so full of the work of negotiating the armistice with Bismarck that it was impossible for him to leave Paris. The plenipotentiaries of the other Powers—Britain, Germany, Austria, Italy, Russia, and Turkey—proceeded, though with reluctance, to the deliberation of the question.