PLAN OF SEBASTOPOL, SHOWING THE DEFENCE.
The Russians had profited by the change in the plans of the Allies. Prince Menschikoff had moved his army upon Batchiserai on the 24th and 25th, in order to regain his communications with Perekop and the eastern part of the Crimea, whence, as he knew, large reserves were approaching to succour the cherished city of the Czar. He hoped to place himself in rear of the Allied armies, which, he supposed, would attack the northern works of Sebastopol, and preserve his position there until he was strong enough to fight a battle for the relief of the place. When the attack of the Allies on his rear-guard, and intelligence from Sebastopol of the capture of Balaclava, revealed to him the change of plan, he was persuaded by Korniloff's remonstrances to move at once from Batchiserai and take up a position on the Katcha, whence, on the 1st of October, he marched his army through the village of Belbek, and rested for the night on the left bank of the stream. The next morning the army was moved up to the northern works, and thence transported across the harbour to aid in throwing up the defences; so that, two days after the Allies had planted their camps on the southern plateau, 20,000 men of Prince Menschikoff's beaten army had re-entered Sebastopol.
During the fortnight that had elapsed since the battle of the Alma a striking change had been made in the landward defences of Sebastopol. When the Allies landed the defensive works were few and disconnected. On the eastern face—that is, from the Careening Bay to the great ravine—there were but three works, the centre of which was the Malakoff tower on its commanding hillock. On the western face there was a long loop-holed wall, running from the sea in front of Artillery Bay to a stone tower, called the Central Bastion, opposite a cemetery, and a second work made of earth, called the Flagstaff Bastion, crowning a hill at the southern apex of the town, and on the western side of the great ravine. Not more than fifty guns were mounted on these works at that time. In the interval, the genius of Todleben had converted the place into a strongly entrenched camp. The sailors and soldiers, the civilians, and even women, were employed, without stint, in throwing up earthworks and in mounting guns. Inspired by the energy of Korniloff, a tough Russian, directed by the skill of Todleben, supplied by the vast resources of an arsenal crammed with means and appliances of all kinds, the workers, in a few days, surrounded the city with powerful defences. Batteries, connected by entrenchments, arose on all sides; so that when the Allies sat down before the place, and looked out over the waste towards the goal of their efforts, instead of finding an open town, they found an entrenched camp, which grew stronger under the gazer's eye. They had shrunk from the northern works, because they were too strong; they marched up to the southern works, and discovered that these were stronger. They had come thither to take a town by a coup de main, and, in the opinion of Sir George Cathcart, could have walked into the place on the 28th of September without the loss of a soldier. They soon found that they were in front of an entrenched position which no troops could assail and live. Therefore the siege guns were landed with all practicable speed, and it was resolved to raise batteries, not to breach the works, but to silence the fire of the guns, and then to storm in on all sides.
But the more minutely the Allies looked into the ground they would have to take up, and the works they would have to execute, the less likely did it appear that they would readily reduce the place. The plateau occupied by the British sloped down to the Russian works. It was broken into ridges by five deep ravines, whose sides became more precipitous as they fell towards the South Bay or Dockyard Creek. The left ravine was the largest and the most profound. Towards its termination in the South Bay, the two next ravines towards the right ran into it, leaving flat slopes between. The second, on the right, was the larger and more important, and along its bottom ran the Woronzoff road, whence it became known as the Woronzoff ravine. Next, on the right, was a smaller ravine, called Karabelnaia, because it led to that suburb; and the next, having its source near Inkermann, ended in the Careening Bay. The Malakoff tower, with its surrounding entrenchments, stood between the Careening and Karabelnaia ravines. Then on the south-west of the Malakoff, but on the opposite bank of the Karabelnaia, stood the now famous Redan, and the works known as the Barrack batteries. In order to attack these, the engineers were forced to trace their parallels on the flats between the ravines; but such was the nature of the ground that the batteries raised to fire on the Redan were obliged to be erected, not on the plateau which descended to it, but on the opposite side of the Woronzoff ravine; while those intended to batter the Malakoff were placed, not on the plateau which ran down to the Malakoff, but on that which ran down to the Redan. Thus the two systems of attack were separated by these deep gullies. They were called the right and left attacks, and were the scenes of the principal labours and loss of the British.
It was the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne and the engineers that the proper point of attack was the Malakoff. On the ridge leading down to this work was a remarkable mound, first called Gordon's Hill, but afterwards known as the Mamelon. It afforded a good site for batteries directed against the Malakoff, and as the hill on which this work was placed commanded the city and the anchorage, Sir John wished to make this the principal point of attack, and direct the main efforts of the besiegers to its mastery; while the French held the enemy in check on their side, and a battery west of the Woronzoff ravine—that is, our left attack—kept down the fire of the Redan. But the French engineer, General Bizot, did not agree with Sir John Burgoyne. In his opinion, the Flagstaff Battery, a bold salient work on the west of the South Bay, was the key of the position. Sir John desired to employ our 3rd Division against the Malakoff, but the French objected, and it could not be done. Wherefore, the imperfect plan of attack which we have indicated was resolved upon.
The landing of the siege train occupied eight days, and on the 16th of October, 41 pieces of ordnance, including five 10-inch mortars, had been mounted in batteries on the left attack, and 32 pieces of ordnance, including five 10-inch mortars, had been mounted on the right attack. The guns and mortars in these batteries were to direct a cross fire on the Malakoff, the Redan, and the Barrack batteries, or to search the flank of the Flagstaff on one side, and the men-of-war in the Careening creek on the other. Thus in less than a week the British had put these 73 guns into position; but in the meantime Todleben had shown such amazing industry and skill, that he had brought no less than 107 guns to bear upon the British attack alone, 82 of which were heavy siege guns, and 130 against the French. The garrison was augmented daily; first by Menschikoff's army, then by troops from Taman and Kertch, then by battalions from Odessa; so that in a few days there were in Sebastopol no fewer than 23,000 soldiers, and 12,000 sailors armed and drilled as soldiers; and about the heights of Mackenzie's Farm and Inkermann, a corps of observation, numbering 25,000 men, giving a total of 60,000 men, a force equal to that of the Allies.
No place in the world could be more impregnable to an attack from the sea. At the mouth of the roadstead there were three mighty forts. On a low point of land, under the cliff on the northern side, rose the immense work named Fort Constantine, showing 110 guns, in three casemated tiers, with another tier on the roof. On the south shore, also low down, and having a good command of the sea, first the Quarantine Fort, with its sixty guns, and beyond that, Fort Alexander, with its ninety guns, defied all assailants, so that in first line, an invading fleet would have to encounter the fire of 260 guns, securely placed in solid works. Looking from the sea, these three forts impressed the beholder with the strength of the place. But these were not all. Beyond Alexander rose Fort Nicholas, armed with 110 guns; and beyond this, Fort Paul, with its eighty-six guns, standing at the mouth of the south bay. Altogether, there were no fewer than 700 guns looking towards the sea from their secure casemates. Nor should the small work, called the Wasp Battery, above Fort Constantine, improvised on the spur of the moment, be overlooked. It deserved its name. Such were the formidable defences which the allied fleets were to attack in wooden ships, and which some sanguine persons expected them to reduce to helplessness. No greater delusion could exist.
The real hour of trial had now come. The batteries of the Allies were ready to open fire, and on the night of the 16th of October orders went forth from both headquarters that the embrasures should be unmasked in the obscurity of the dawn; that the troops in camp should be held in readiness to fall in at a moment's notice ready to storm; that the fire of the land batteries should open soon after six; and that the fleet, moving up, should assail the great forts overlooking the sea. Both admirals, it is understood, were opposed to this proceeding. They held the sound opinion that the fleet could not effect anything against the forts. The safety of the army, they said, depended on the safety of the fleet, and it would be imprudent to risk the fleet in an encounter with forts so well placed and so heavily armed. The mouth of the harbour was closed by the sunken ships. A shoal, running out in front of Fort Constantine, prevented the great men-of-war from placing themselves near enough to batter the walls with effect. The sailing ships must be towed or propelled by steamers, and would fight at a disadvantage. These arguments did not prevail. Admiral Hamelin was under the absolute command of General Canrobert, and not at liberty to disobey. Admiral Dundas was not under the absolute command of Lord Raglan; but he could not well refrain from executing his wishes, or look on while the French attacked. The allied generals were pressing in their orders, as they held that an attack from the sea would operate as a diversion, and favour the attack from the land. Therefore it was decided that the ships should go in, take the risk, and do their utmost to damage the enemy.
The first spectacle that arrested the eye when the first cloud of smoke rolled away was the broken Malakoff. The 68-pounders, in Peel's battery, more than 2,000 yards from the work, had dismounted the guns and ruined the tower. Then it was seen that the French were inferior to their foes. Their light brass guns and hastily constructed works were no match for the heavier metal of the Russians. The batteries were beginning to look deformed, their fire wanted the force and continuity of ours. The Russians pounded them in front, and sent their heavy shot and shell into their left flank; and, seeing the effect, redoubled their energy. Our magazines were small, and the rapid firing soon exhausted the supply; but the artillerymen drove down to the trenches, under a fierce cannonade; and their daring was rewarded, for they met with few casualties. Then, freshly supplied, the gunners went to work with renewed vigour. About twenty minutes to nine there was an explosion, so loud that it struck everyone with amazement, and caused a perceptible slackening of the fire. A Russian shell had broken through the great magazine of the principal French battery. In a moment all the guns were dismounted, 100 men were killed and wounded, and the battery rendered absolutely useless. A shout of triumph arose in the town, and its roar reached even the lines of the besiegers. The French guns were now nearly silenced, so heavy had been the storm directed upon them when it was found that they were giving way; and between eleven and twelve, with one battery destroyed and two silenced, General Canrobert gave orders to cease firing. Thus before noon the French had retired from the contest altogether.