The British hardly relaxed a moment. Their batteries were mauled, but their gunners never ceased to hurl forth their shot and shell. We had, by this time, so reduced the fire from the Barrack batteries, on the Russian right of the Redan, and from the earthwork round the Malakoff, that these batteries were regarded as silenced. But, when the French ceased, the left flank guns of the Flagstaff and Garden batteries, a little in its rear, but facing our trenches, and the Redan, went on as furiously as ever. The Russians fought their guns with a skill and persistence deserving the greatest praise. They were now testing the worth of all their defences. The costly casemated forts were replying to the allied ships; two steamers and a line-of-battle ship in the harbour were exchanging shots with our Lancaster guns and 68-pounders; while Todleben's extemporised batteries were in full play. But the British fire was so good that, about three o'clock, a shell found its way into the magazine of the Redan, and, setting it on fire, caused an explosion which silenced that work for half-an-hour. Then they got one or two guns to work, and with these they kept up a fire all the rest of the day. But this earthwork suffered so severely that its garrison was replaced three times between sunrise and sunset. Along the whole line opposed to our batteries we had, by the evening, established a complete superiority over the fire of the enemy; and had the French been equally successful, it is probable that an assault would have been hazarded. During the day we had demolished the Malakoff tower, exploded its magazine, the magazine in the Redan, and a magazine in the town; we had killed Admiral Korniloff, and killed or wounded 500 men, and dismounted thirty-five guns; and we had driven the line-of-battle ships out of the creek, and damaged a steamer in the harbour. In return our whole loss was 130 men killed and wounded, one Lancaster gun burst, and seven guns disabled in consequence of injuries to wheels and carriages.
The operation of the fleets had been a glorious display of courage, and that was all. The fleets were divided into three squadrons. The British took the left, the Turks the centre, and the French the right. In order to carry the great sailing ships into action, steamers were lashed to the side next the offing, and one hour was occupied in turning the Britannia, in order to place her in the proper position. The French were drawn up in two lines, eight ships of the line with one Turkish ship, in the first line, and eight, with a Turk, in the second. These were the first, about 1,800, the second about 2,000 yards from the Quarantine Fort and Forts Nicholas and Alexander on the south shore of the harbour. The British fleet consisted of twenty-six ships of war, but some of the steamers were used to carry the large sailing ships into position. They had to contend with Fort Constantine and the batteries on the cliff, notably the Wasp. A shoal running out from the spit on which the fort is built prevented a nearer approach than 800 yards; but the Agamemnon and Sanspareil, the first with only two feet of water under her keel, did not hesitate to run within that distance of the 130 guns of Fort Constantine. There was no wind, and the sea was smooth. About a quarter past one the conflict began, and it did not cease until dark. And what was the upshot? The forts looked "speckled." It is stated that the gunners were driven from their guns more than once, and that some pieces were dismounted; but the Russians again steadily resumed their fire, and fired on to the end. The superiority of stone forts, and even earthworks, over ships, remained as firmly established as ever. The fleets did not venture again to attack the great forts at Sebastopol.
At dawn, on the 18th, the cannonade was resumed. This time it was a duel between the British and the Russians, for the French had not recovered from the destructive blows they received on the 17th. The Russian fire was far heavier than on the preceding day. The batteries round the Malakoff, the Redan, the Barrack, the Garden, and left face of the Flagstaff batteries, were more vigorous than ever. But our fire did not equal in intensity and weight the fire of the first day. Then, our gunners were lavish of ammunition; now, they hoarded the slender store. Each gun fired once in ten minutes. But the enemy, having behind them the best stocked arsenal in the world, pitched in every kind of missile without stint. Although they could not touch our magazines, again we blew up one of theirs—this time in the Malakoff. The first day we fired as fast as we could, in the hope of subduing their fire and storming in; but on the second day all idea of instant storming had been given up. We fired to continue the bombardment and enable the French to recover. One ominous sign marked the 18th—the Russians made a reconnaissance from the Tchernaya in the forenoon, upon the lines of Balaclava. Their heavy masses appeared above Tchorgoun, and on the Fedoukine heights, but did not approach nearer. It was the first instalment of the great bodies on the road from Bessarabia. The superiority of the Russians was now established. They had more men, more guns, more supplies of all kinds. On the 19th they fired more shots; they fired steadily, and they had increased their number of guns. The artillery of the besieged was double that of the besiegers. It was all artillery of great weight and great range. The Russian general had men enough to serve all his guns, and to keep very strong parties on guard. Each night he more than repaired the damage done in the day. Todleben seemed to be sleepless. In short, the whole character of the operation, so far as the Allies were concerned, had become changed, not by their will, but by time and the will of the Russians. On the morning of the 20th the British store of ammunition had been so reduced that very few rounds per gun remained. They had fired 20,000 the first day. Moreover, the enemy was evidently gathering in force in the valley of the Tchernaya. Therefore the generals took counsel together, and determined to await the arrival of reinforcements, both of men and means, and then to recommence a fresh bombardment, with a greatly increased force of artillery.
CHARGE OF THE HEAVY BRIGADE. (See p. [60].)
The expedition to the Crimea was undertaken on the idea that Sebastopol could be taken by a landing, a battle, a march, and a coup de main. The Allies landed on the 14th. The news of the battle of the Alma reached Paris and London on the 30th of September. On the 1st and 2nd of October came a report that the place had been taken on the 25th. This report was believed by most people, including the British Government, and it was believed by them because they were cognisant of the real nature of the plan. Those who felt and expressed doubts respecting the truth of the story were indignantly silenced. The French Emperor shared in the general delusion, and it was not until the 4th of October that it was dispelled by the arrival of Lord Raglan's despatch of the 28th, stating that he had only just reached Balaclava. In the midst of their labours in the trenches, and when the grave fact, that Sebastopol could not be taken without a regular siege, was becoming more apparent every hour, this wild story reached the allied camp with the English journals, and excited feelings of the warmest indignation. This incident is narrated to show how great were the expectations of the people and the Governments, and how little either knew of the real nature of the enterprise which they had promoted and sanctioned. In England there was a passion to take Sebastopol, and it cannot be doubted that the failure of the original plan, while it intensified that passion, also made the people angry with the heads of the army and the heads of the State.
The Czar Nicholas was also angry at the invasion of his dominions and the defeat of his troops; and anger and prudence alike dictated the reinforcement of Prince Menschikoff and the resumption of offensive operations. Accordingly, he gave orders for the march of the 3rd and 4th Corps d'Armée to the Crimea, and by the end of October the Russians outnumbered the Allies by two to one. Prince Menschikoff meanwhile was meditating a counter-stroke, and devising plans to force the Allies to raise the siege. Surveying their position, he deemed it assailable on two points; from the Tchernaya, in front of Balaclava, and from the head of the harbour on the British right flank opposite Inkermann. Perhaps the feasibility of the latter operation was then only germinating in his mind. He was seduced into another operation. The apparent weakness of the British position about Balaclava made him impatient to attack it. From the lofty ridge of Mackenzie, on the north, and from the heights to the east, which on one side look towards the Baidar valley and the road to the Crimean undercliff, and on the other into Kamara and the Balaclava plain, he saw the weak-looking defences of the Allies in front and flank. The little knolls crowned by the Turkish redoubts lay exposed in the plains, nearly two miles from any support. They ran in a curved line north-west from Kamara—No. 1, on a mound called Canrobert's Hill, being nearest to Kamara; and No. 5 being almost under the ridge of Mount Sapoune. Between them and Balaclava and Kadikoi, and on to the Col and the fortified ridge, there was nothing except the Marines on the eastern Balaclava heights, the 93rd in front of the gorge leading to the harbour, the sailors' gun-battery above Kadikoi, and the camps of the British Cavalry Brigades, north-west of that village. Could he not by a rapid and vigorous movement sweep through these defences, expel the Turks, destroy the 93rd, seize Balaclava, destroy the shipping, and cut off the British from their road out to the sea? Having won Balaclava and the heights on both sides, could he not next carry the Col, and so break into the rear of the allied camps, and place them between his guns and bayonets and those of Sebastopol? General Liprandi had arrived with the 12th Division and four regiments of horse and 44 field-guns, and reinforcing these from his over-abundant garrison, Menschikoff determined to attempt the enterprise.
Sir Colin Campbell, who commanded at Balaclava, feared an attack from Kamara and on this side, and he had done all that was possible, with the scanty means at his disposal, to provide against it. As he watched daily, his keen eye detected the increasing symptoms of the coming storm, but so weak was our force that we could do little, except place guns in the Turkish redoubts, a measure which did not meet with general approval; and in case of attack to rely for safety upon the arrival of troops from the main body in time to give battle to the assailants. General Liprandi, as early as the 23rd, had collected on the Tchernaya his own 12th Infantry Division, and he was then reinforced by seven battalions and fourteen guns from Sebastopol. This gave him a force of about 21,000 men, including 3,200 cavalry and 52 guns. The 24th was spent in reconnoitring the position, and Sir Colin Campbell heard the same evening, from a spy, that an attack in force would be made at dawn; information which Lord Lucan sent by his own aide-de-camp to headquarters. But it does not appear that any measures were taken in consequence. Perhaps no trust was placed in the spy. Perhaps Lord Lucan did not enjoy that confidence at headquarters which a really good cavalry commander would not have failed to inspire. In any case it does not appear that special measures were taken to meet the attack.
Long before dawn of the 25th of October the Russians stood to their arms. The valley of the Tchernaya, the plain beyond, and the hill sides were shrouded in a thick clammy mist. This was favourable to the assailants. The plan of General Liprandi was to move in three separate columns upon the redoubts occupied by the Turks. The Turks were alarmed. They opened fire, but as the enemy's troops rolled on towards them they lost heart. Arrived within a hundred yards, the Russian infantry made a rush over the intervening space, and the first redoubt was won. The Turks fled, some over the valley, some into the next redoubt; but some fought, for the Russian general reports that 170 were slain in the work. The English artilleryman in charge of the 12-pounders had spiked them. Moving swiftly forward, bringing up his right and pushing his horsemen along on the flank, Liprandi forced the Turks to flee from the next two redoubts; and the Cossacks were soon over the slopes, dashing among the fugitives, and spearing them as they ran. The Turks still fled. Panic ran along the whole line. The last redoubt was abandoned, and the Russians occupied the whole line of outposts, and bringing up their artillery, opened a heavy fire. But General Liprandi, fearful of thrusting his men under the fire of the heavy guns about Balaclava and Kadikoi, halted in full career, and refrained from pressing an attack which, at one moment, seemed likely to sweep like a tide through the whole valley.