The British horse were thus for a moment far within the enemy's position. The Russians were almost stunned by the hardihood of the charge. But General Liprandi, who was watching the fight, gathered up a body of Lancers on his own left, and poured them into the space in front of the battery, between our troopers and their line of retreat. Fortunately, Colonel Shewell, of the 8th Hussars, had kept his regiment well in hand throughout. He had come on at a steady, deliberate pace, on the right of the 3rd line, but not so fast as the 4th. He had charged through the battery, and had shown front to the Russians beyond; but, like a good officer, he still kept his men in hand. His skill was rewarded. Across the rear came the Russian Lancer regiment, and some of our men and some officers thought for a moment it was the 17th, and proposed to form upon it. They were soon undeceived. Colonel Shewell did not hesitate. He wheeled about his squadrons just as Major Mayou, who had brought back a knot of the 17th from their charge towards Tchorgoun, joined him; and, leading the way, Shewell carried his men clear through the Russians, and thus removed the worst danger from the path of the little groups and single men, some wounded, some with wounded horses, some without horses, who were struggling back over the corpse-strewn valley, still under that terrible cross-fire.
Lord Lucan had brought up the Heavy Brigade to the crest of the ridge to protect the retreat, and they came under fire and lost men, and his lordship himself was slightly wounded. The Chasseurs d'Afrique had made a most daring and skilful charge on a battery on the Fedoukine heights, and had silenced its fire, with great loss to themselves. This was an admirable feat, deserving all the praise it received. While the Heavy Brigade was under fire, Lord Cardigan rode up and began to complain. At this time the remnants of his brigade were still in the Russian position, or just passing from it; for he had passed Lord Lucan, who was in advance of his brigade, before the returning heroes of the Light Cavalry were within Lord Lucan's sight. So deponeth Lord Lucan and his statement was amply confirmed. From which, taken in connection with Lord Cardigan's sworn statements, we learn that Lord Cardigan rode well into the battery, and fought with the Cossacks, but that he never had the brigade well in hand, and though alive, was not in the midst of his men at the moment when they required a guide and leader to extricate them from the heart of the Russian position.
Far from the guns of the enemy, the remnant of that valorous band re-formed. Lord Cardigan rode up to the front, and said, "Men, this is a great blunder; but it is no fault of mine." And the men cheered and replied, "Never mind, my lord, we are ready to go back again." And this was the charge of the Light Brigade, such a grievous waste of life, yet so sublime, and of such sterling quality, that its fame has rung through all lands, and its influence still permeates all armies. Out of the 670 who rode into the valley, there were left only 195 mounted men. The brigade had lost 12 officers killed and 11 wounded; 147 men killed and 110 wounded or missing; and 325 horses killed in the charge. All this devotion and daring had been shown, all this havoc wrought, within the short period of twenty minutes! Well might Lord Raglan say to Lord Lucan, "Why, you have lost the Light Brigade!" Let us be just. The responsibility, whatever it may be, for ordering that dreadful charge must be divided between three men. The whole blame should not fall on Lord Lucan. General Airey and Captain Nolan must share it with him.
The charge of the Light Brigade virtually terminated the battle. The Guards, indeed, the 4th Division, and a French division did advance farther eastward, and this, with the fire of the British guns, forced the Russians successively out of all the redoubts, and compelled Liprandi to take up a contracted position on the high ground between Kamara and Tchorgoun. Lord Raglan and General Canrobert debated the propriety of a further attack; but decided that it would be undesirable to waste life in the attempt, as, if regained, the heights could not be reoccupied. So the battle ended about one o'clock with a cannonade. At dusk the French troops and the British infantry divisions, save the Highland Brigade, which remained to reinforce the garrison of Balaclava, returned to the plateau. The Russians admit a loss of 550 men in their cavalry alone, but admit also that this was a hasty report. There is no other. The whole British loss in cavalry was 37 officers and 353 men killed, wounded, and missing.
CHAPTER V.
THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued.)
Effects of Balaclava—Attack on Mount Inkermann—Evans defeats the Russians—Menschikoff is Reinforced—His Plan of Attack—The Advance in the Fog—Soimonoff and Pauloff—Pennefather's Mistake—Repulse of Soimonoff—The Guards to the Rescue—Arrival of Lord Raglan—Bosquet's Help refused—The Guns ordered up—The Fight at the Sandbag Battery—The Coldstreams—The Guards' Charge—Defeat of Cathcart—Ammunition falls short—Arrival of the French—Charges of the Zouaves—The Russians slowly retreat—Canrobert hesitates to pursue—Loss of the Allies—Their Plight—The Baltic Fleet—Its real Objects—Capture of Merchant Vessels and Destruction of Stores—Sveaborg and Cronstadt reconnoitred—Bomarsund—Capture of the Fortress—End of the Naval Campaign—Changed Position of the Allies—Determination of the British Nation—Storm of November 14th—Destruction of the Transports—Sufferings of the Troops—Conduct of the War—Unpreparedness of the Army—The Duke of Newcastle—Timidity of the Government—Enlistment of Boys—Autumn Session—The Paper Warfare—Hostile Motions in Parliament—Lord John Russell's Resignation—His factious Conduct—Palmerston forms a Ministry—Resignation of the Peelites.
THE lower range of heights in front of Balaclava, and the seven British guns taken from the Turks, were the only material advantages gained by the enemy on the 25th of October. Moral advantages, beyond those implied in the capture of guns, he gained none. In order to strike a severe blow, Liprandi should have carried Balaclava as well as the Turkish redoubts; and had the British cavalry or the 93rd Regiment shown the least hesitation, the slightest symptom of wavering, it is most probable that the Russians would have instantly overrun the valley, and have swept like a torrent through the gorge into the little port. The charges of the cavalry and the steadfastness of the 93rd balked the Russian general. The Russian horse and Russian infantry fell again under that moral ascendency established at the Alma, and never lost. Therefore the moral advantages of the combat of Balaclava were with the Allies.
Prince Menschikoff, who still commanded the Russian army, seems to have had no clear, decisive views of the course he ought to adopt; for, having alarmed the Allies at Balaclava, he now determined to rouse their suspicions on the side of Inkermann. On the 26th, accordingly, the very day after the capture of the Turkish redoubts, he directed a force of 5,000 or 6,000 men, and abundance of guns, to attack the 2nd Division. These troops quitted the fortress by the Russian left of the Malakoff, and ascended the right bank of the Careening ravine. Their skirmishers were soon heard exchanging shots with the pickets of the 49th and 30th. These, falling back to a good defensible post, kept the Russians at bay for some time; so that the whole of the 2nd Division, under Sir De Lacy Evans, had time to form. But numbers prevailed, and the pickets were driven in; and the Russians soon showed a mass of columns on and about Shell Hill, and presently eighteen or twenty guns were brought to the front on that height. By this time the regiments of the 2nd Division were lying down in line on the crest in front of their camp; and their twelve guns were in action, while the skirmishers were busy on the slope between the two hills. At first the Russians threw some spirit into their advance. Under cover of their artillery on the hill they sent a heavy column down the slope which, by its steadiness and weight, looked as if it intended to sweep all before it. But a great calamity befell these brave men. The fire of our artillery, concentrated on the Russian guns, was so quick, precise, and severe, that the whole of the Russian batteries disappeared over the brow. Then the British artillerymen, with ready energy, turned their eighteen pieces full on the column of infantry which had so manfully come forward towards our line. The effect of the fire was immediate. The Russian infantry, thus deserted by their artillery, and exposed to the shot from our guns and to the bullets of our skirmishers, turned to the left and hurriedly sought the shelter of one of the many deep hollows. While they were thus concealed, the second column was seen to rise above the brow, and on them the guns poured their shot and shell. The officer commanding, observing what had befallen the first column, immediately withdrew his second over the ridge. All this time the Russian skirmishers in the scrub which roughened the hill side kept up the conflict. Presently the column which had fled into the ravine on the left emerged in broken order, and was seen climbing the slopes to rejoin the main body in rear of Shell Hill, and our artillery once more visited them with shot and shell and quickened their pace; while our right skirmishers, under Colonel Herbert, plied them with musketry. The 2nd Division, led by Major Mauleverer and Major Champion, Major Eman, and Major Hume, were now let loose upon the skirmishers in the space between the ridges; and they fell on with so much vigour and effect, and with such eagerness, that General Pennefather had great difficulty in arresting their fiery march. In an hour the action was over, and the enemy in full retreat.