Cassell's History of England, Vol. 6 (of 8) / From the Death of Sir Robert Peel to the Illness of the Prince of Wales

by Anonymous

BALACLAVA.

Signs of the presence of the enemy in great strength were now visible almost daily. The two remaining infantry divisions of Dannenberg's corps arrived at Batchiserai on the 28th of October. The 10th Division, under General Soimonoff, entered Sebastopol on the 3rd of November, and on the same day, the 11th, under General Pauloff, took up its quarters among the hills about the ruins of Inkermann. The arrival of these troops had been seen by the Allies, and the generals became convinced that, it might be in a few hours, the enemy would make an attack upon some point or points. Yet not a single change was made in the arrangements, except that the British cavalry—the wreck of two splendid brigades—were marched up to the plateau, and posted in the rear of the French lines upon Mount Sapoune. The Allies, had, for all purposes, little more than 60,000 men. Prince Menschikoff had under his orders, exclusive of the sailors, 70,000 infantry, 9,000 horse, 3,000 artillery, and 282 guns. What use should he make of a force which exceeded that of the Allies by one-fourth?

According to the Russian accounts, Prince Menschikoff had been informed that the Allies intended to open fire once more upon the place from all their batteries, and, after a short and sharp bombardment, storm. His information was correct. In order to anticipate the Allies, he determined to assume the offensive himself, and, if possible, force them to raise the siege. Two Grand-Dukes, sons of the Czar, were on their way to the army, hoping to arrive in time to witness the total defeat of the arrogant Western Powers. It was decided that there should be one real and two false attacks—the real attack from Inkermann, the false attacks from the Tchernaya valley upon Mount Sapoune, and from the Quarantine Bay upon the left of the French siege works. Thus, to begin with, Prince Menschikoff divided his disposable force into three parts, separated from each other by such wide intervals that neither could aid the other. Thus, it will be seen, Prince Menschikoff devised a very wide plan for the destruction of the Allies. He hoped that the attacks from the town and from the Tchernaya would entirely occupy the French; and that General Dannenberg would be able to catch the British alone and unaware, and deliver the fortress by passing over their bodies. Had Prince Gortschakoff attacked the French with energy, this might have happened, for there were, counting everything, only 22,343 British troops effective, and of these 16,308 were infantry, rank and file—that is, in technical language, bayonets. The consequence was that the immense lines they had to guard were thinly manned, and so scarce were labourers that there were none to repair the trenches in the night attack.

In November the sun rises earlier in the Crimea than it does in England. The rays of the dawn shoot up behind the snows of the Caucasus about five o'clock; hence this hour was selected for the movement of the Russian troops on the 5th of the month. But although the upper air was growing brighter, a thick white fog overspread the hills around Sebastopol, and settled down in heavier masses in the valleys. Hidden within its folds the Russian columns stole unobserved out of Sebastopol, and Pauloff began to throw a bridge over the Tchernaya, close to its mouth. As soon as it was completed, the infantry poured over and the guns followed. The fog deadened the sound of the hundreds of wheels emerging from the east and west, and the grey-coated infantry, in silence and obscurity, tramped along. The pickets of the 2nd Division were in the hollow between their camp and Shell Hill and on the old post road, and those of the Light Division were in the Careening ravine and on both its banks. There was not more than usual watchfulness, for the Russian secrets had been kept, and no attack was expected that morning more than any other. General Codrington had ridden out at dawn to visit the outposts, and was riding back to camp when the report of a rifle struck on his ear, and he halted and listened. A sputter of musketry followed, and seemed to come from the Careening ravine; and soon after the same ominous sound, its natural, sharp, angry note being muffled by the fog, was heard on the right. The skirmishers of the two Russian columns had touched the line of British pickets. Codrington galloped off to turn out the Light Division. The battle of Inkermann had begun.

Soimonoff, moving out of the Russian lines, had quitted the plateau on which stood the Malakoff, and instead of resting his left on the Careening ravine, by some mistake, crossed; and thus carried his twenty-nine battalions along the proper right bank of the ravine towards the heights, where Pauloff's troops had begun to assemble. It was his advanced parties who came in contact with the outposts of the Light Division, whom they drove into and over the Careening ravine, and whom they followed. Pauloff had not got all his force up the heights; but as soon as the British pickets were thrust back, he had hastened to put his heavy guns in battery on the highest ground, and his lighter guns on the slopes beneath them, within twelve hundred yards of the camp of the 2nd Division. He at once opened fire to cover an assault of infantry and thus it happened that Evans's British regiments had no sooner formed than they were exposed to an iron shower of shot, shell, and grape. Evans, who had been disabled by an accident, was on board a ship at Balaclava, and Sir John Pennefather commanded the division. Protected by the fire of fifty guns, Soimonoff directed a strong column to cross the Careening ravine; while Pauloff threw forward by the old post road the two rifle regiments of Borodino and Taroutino; so that both flanks of the English position were about to be assailed at once.

The British troops at this moment in the front line were those of the 2nd and Light Divisions. General Pennefather, instead of relying on his artillery, rashly rushed to the support of the pickets, sending Adams's Brigade to the right of the post road with three guns, and keeping his own on the left of the road. Sir George Brown brought up the Light Division. Codrington's gallant soldiers were arrayed on the left bank of the Careening ravine, not far from the 68-pounder battery, and Buller moved up into the space between the left of Pennefather and the right of Codrington. The front was contracted; but narrow as it was, the troops were so few that there were gaps between the four brigades. At the first onset of the enemy, the other brigades were not present. Soon after six an orderly rode into headquarters with the news that the right flank was assailed in force; and, indeed, the sound of cannon, not only at Inkermann, but from the fortress and from the Balaclava front, told the Allies with emphasis that the enemy was upon them. Lord Raglan soon convinced himself that the real attack was at Inkermann, and he determined to ride thither after issuing such orders as seemed expedient. The Guards had not even reached the front when the Russian columns began to surge up against our thin, straggling line.

The British guns had come into action on the crest as fast as they arrived, and were at once exposed to an unequal combat with the heavier guns of the enemy. And now the dense fog was made more dense by the volumes of smoke which, breaking out from the guns in clouds, unfolded itself, and lay almost motionless close to the surface of the miry ground. Through this thick atmosphere the opposing troops made their dubious way, and thus it happened that our men, hastening up to the front, came suddenly upon enemies, who seemed to spring out of the hill side. Soimonoff, on reaching the scene of action, found himself trenching upon the ground apportioned to the columns of Pauloff. The huge masses had converged upon a comparatively narrow front, and the Russians complain that they had not room to range their men for a powerful and simultaneous onset. Soimonoff had taken the wrong road, and instead of effecting a junction with Pauloff at the head of the Careening ravine on the site of the 2nd Division camp, he had joined Pauloff on the east of the ravine, and found that hollow way between him and the troops he had been directed to overwhelm—the Light Division. An ambiguous order had caused this mistake. To retrieve his error, while the Taroutino and Borodino regiments were climbing the hills to attack the Sandbag Battery, Soimonoff plunged into the ravine, and led his men to the charge. Thus he came full on the front of Codrington's Brigade, deployed on the left bank. The heroes of the 7th, 19th, and 23rd were not dismayed by the masses which loomed large and portentous in the fog, but opened upon them such a heavy fire that the Russians heaped together in the deep hollows, and descending the steep sides, never reached the opposite bank, but fell into disorder, recoiled, and receded from view. These early combats rudely disarranged the Russian plans.

In the centre the regiments of the 2nd Division had come upon enemies as soon as they had formed. These were the leading companies of the Borodino battalions, and they were at once set upon by Pennefather's brigade, and pushed back. On the extreme right, half-way down the spur, whose crags drop on one side into the Tchernaya valley, and on the other into the Quarry ravine, Pennefather had posted the 41st and 49th, with three guns, under Captain Hamley. They had no sooner arrived than heavy Russian columns were seen indistinctly moving down the opposite slope. The guns opened on them, but the Russians turned their artillery to that side, and our guns, though steadfastly served, were too weak to contend with the heavy metal opposed to them. The columns went down into the hollow, and soon reappeared, flocking up the British side of the hill. The Taroutino regiment turned upon the Sandbag Battery, and part of the Borodino went with them up the road to break against Pennefather's brigade. The Russians came on without faltering. Our troops were outnumbered and outflanked; our guns were in danger of being taken. The 41st and 49th, quitting the Sandbag Battery, fell back, and the hill seemed in danger of being lost; but at this moment the bearskins of the Guards were becoming visible. The Duke of Cambridge, when he had turned out his brigade, moved it to the right of Pennefather, and went to succour the hardly-pressed 41st and 49th. The Guards came steadily down the slope of the spur, and, passing to the right and left of the guns, cheered and charged, checked the advance of the enemy, and recovered the battery. Hitherto they had only used the bayonet; they now brought their rifles into play, and smote the retreating Russians with deadly precision. The regiment Taroutino was so broken that it retired even into the Inkermann valley to re-form. The brigade was not complete when the Guards charged into the battery; but the Coldstreams came up at once, and the three regiments took ground, the Grenadiers on the right, the Coldstreams in the centre, and the Fusiliers on the left of the recovered work.

It was at this time—about seven o'clock—that Lord Raglan arrived. The fog had cleared somewhat, but the smoke of battle had taken its place. He rode down the spur towards the Sandbag Battery just as the Guards had recovered it; and he sought to penetrate the thick mist, and discern the numbers and intentions of the foe. He could see but little through the rifts in the smoke. He saw enough to make him feel the peril of his position, and that of the whole army. Upon his tenacity hung the fate of every soul on the plateau. Lord Raglan was a calm and steadfast man. If danger rose high, his resolution rose higher; and knowing that his soldiers were like himself, children of a proud and obstinate race, he felt that he could do his duty, and hold fast to that narrow strip of rugged ground, which formed, as it were, the gate into the lines drawn about the southern defences of Sebastopol. He therefore resolved to stand on the defensive, and dispute for the gate with the enemy until he won or his troops were destroyed. The British soldiers actually before the enemy at the end of this first heavy onset of Soimonoff and Pauloff did not number more than 6,000 men. The 4th Division on the march would bring the number up to 8,000, and beyond this he could not array a bayonet, for the 3rd Division had to guard the trenches, and the Highland Brigade was at Balaclava. Lord Raglan knew he could rely on aid from General Bosquet. That officer at the first had offered several battalions to the Duke of Cambridge and Sir George Brown, but these two, though ignorant of the serious character of the attack, took upon themselves to refuse. Had it not been for this proud unwillingness to accept French aid, or this fear of responsibility, Bosquet would have been earlier in the field; for Gortschakoff had so feebly acted on the side of Balaclava that the quick Frenchman soon saw through his weak devices. As soon as he received a request for troops from Lord Raglan he at once put three battalions in motion. But he had two miles to march; the earth was soaked with a night's rain, and part of the way lay through thick scrub. Some time, therefore, was required to force the troops along. Two battalions were directed upon the right rear of the 2nd Division, and the third was ordered to take post near the Canrobert Redoubt at the extremity of the entrenchments on the Sapoune ridge.