THE "BLOCK" AT BALACLAVA. (See p. [80].)
Having once determined on the right point of attack, the French began to work with their usual industry, and by the middle of the month they had formed their first parallel from the Careening Ravine to the steep cliffs of the Great Harbour, had connected that parallel with the British right, and had constructed a strong redoubt and place of arms, called the Victoria Redoubt, on the upper part of the slope running down to the Malakoff. The Russians, seeing these works in progress, began to pull down the ruined tower on the Malakoff Hill, and to construct around its site that enormous redoubt which so long defied its assailants. On its right and left they were equally busy, and soon they took the daring and wise resolution of constructing counter-approaches in this quarter.
In the middle of the month, while these works of preparation were in progress, Omar Pasha won fresh laurels by repelling a vigorous attack on Eupatoria. The Allies lost 107 killed and 294 wounded. The Russian loss was estimated at 500 men. This success served to raise the reputation of the Turks and dispirit and vex the enemy, who could not feel altogether at ease with 20,000 good soldiers within two or three marches of his great north road. The day after this combat, and while the news of it was ringing through the allied camp, Lord Raglan and General Canrobert agreed upon a plan for surprising the Russians on the Tchernaya at Tchorgoun; for Prince Gortschakoff had again sent only small bodies over the river, and it was believed that the whole force on both sides of the stream might be captured. It was therefore arranged that on the 20th, while yet dark, General Bosquet should lead 12,000 men from the French camp, to co-operate with 3,000 from the British force at Balaclava, under Sir Colin Campbell, in this enterprise. But Bosquet did not move, and the affair miscarried. Nothing of importance took place during the remainder of February.
On the 2nd of March an event occurred which sanguine men thought would bring the war to a speedy end; and they thought this the more because negotiations for peace were at that moment pending in Vienna. The event was the rather sudden death of Nicholas, Czar of all the Russias. He died in the middle of the day, and five hours afterwards the news had been flashed along the electric wire to every European capital. His heir, Alexander II., who immediately ascended the throne, was described as mild and pacific by nature; nevertheless, he did not fail to tell his awe-stricken subjects that he would incessantly pursue the aims of Peter, of Catherine, of Alexander I., and of his father; aims incompatible with the peace of Europe, and the independence and integrity of Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, as well as Turkey. The news reached the allied camp on the 6th, and perhaps the "sensation" in this quarter was greater than in the capitals of Europe, for here were men engaged in frustrating one of the grandest of the comprehensive aims of Catherine and Nicholas. But really, it was not the Czar only with whom Europe was contending; it was the ambition of the Russian nobles and the traditional policy of the house of Romanoff. There was a kind of poetical justice in this sudden death of the man whose arrogance had brought calamity on his subjects.
The month of March was spent by the Allies in making preparations for a second bombardment, and by the enemy in prodigious efforts to meet and frustrate it. Far from reviving operations against the new Russian works on the Careening Ridge called by the Allies the White Works, the French allowed the enemy to strengthen and complete them. General Todleben had devised a system of counter-approaches. As the operations against Sebastopol were mainly of the nature of an attack by one army on another posted in a strongly entrenched position, the Russian engineer saw the great assistance he would derive from solid outposts, as by that method he would not only anticipate the Allies in the occupation of commanding points, but would seriously injure and annoy them. Knowing also the importance of the Mamelon, which was higher than the Malakoff Hill, the Russian general caused the Mamelon to be occupied in greater strength, and began to dig and delve upon its crest. First making rifle-pits and then connecting and enlarging these, he soon raised the nucleus of a very formidable work right in the path of the French advance on the Malakoff. Had the army been under one commander, this hill would have been seized in October. Now the French could not even sap up to it, much less assault it, because the enemy had been allowed to become so strong on our right of the Malakoff Ridge. The British immediately framed a battery with guns bearing on the Mamelon; but although they obstructed the working parties by day, at first, their fire at night was little heeded, and this outpost, set up in the face of the Allies with great hardihood, grew into a stronghold.
Having plenty of men—for they, too, had been reinforced—the Russians supported their system of counter-approaches by energetic sorties. In the month of March these fell principally upon the French. In addition to the redoubt on the Mamelon, the enemy had formed his rifle-pits in advance, like skirmishers in front of a column. The riflemen within them were very troublesome; and two or three nights in succession the French assaulted these pits. Two or three companies of Zouaves would leap out of the trenches, dash into the pits, and drive off the defenders. Then the supports would hurry up on the Russian side, and the Zouaves would have to fly before they could make good their hold. From the French trenches more men would issue. The rattle of musketry would raise the camp; horses would be saddled at headquarters, and aides would stumble hither and thither in the gloom. Suddenly the firing would die away and cease. The French had been frustrated. Determined to succeed, they began to sap towards the rifle-pits and took the outworks on the 21st. This led to something like a general action on the night of the 23rd of March.
It was about eleven o'clock when the Russians, issuing from both flanks of the Mamelon, dashed into the lodgments held by the French. They came on in such numbers and with so much resolution that the French were forced out of the pits and chased into the parallel. The Russians followed, leaping over the parapet and forming up within the trench, and continuing the fight. At the same time the batteries of the place opened a hot fire upon our lines, by way of diversion, and the right of Chruleff's heavy column of counter-assault burst in on the extreme right of our line. Then the French supports, coming down with suddenness and decision, drove the enemy over the parapet. Surprised, but not discouraged, the Russians charged again, and deadly hand to hand combats followed along the whole front. This fierce combat, lighted up by the incessant flashes of opposing musketry, and rendered bloody by the free use of the bayonet, was maintained for nearly two hours. The French not only kept the Russians at bay, but perceiving signs of yielding, they assumed the offensive and, charging, forced their foes to retire into the Mamelon. Towards the close of this fight the second and third Russian columns fell suddenly, one on the left of the right, the other on the left of the left attack. In both cases they forced their way into the British trenches. After a rough contest the enemy was driven out of our lines. This was the most severe action that had yet been fought in the trenches. The Russians lost 1,500 men killed and wounded, according to their own returns. The Allies lost 727, of whom 85 were British, so that the French must have borne the brunt of the fighting.
"ALL THAT WAS LEFT OF THEM,
LEFT OF SIX HUNDRED."