FROM THE PAINTING BY R. CATON WOODVILLE.

By permission of Messrs. Henry Graves & Co., Ltd., Pall Mall, S.W.

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After the fierce combat on the 23rd of March the Allies busied themselves with preparations for a second bombardment of Sebastopol. Enormous masses of shot and shell and powder were brought up from Balaclava and Kamiesch, and deposited in the magazines. The forwardness of the railway had greatly diminished the labours of the British, and the French were so numerous that they found no difficulty in getting fatigue parties to carry on the works of approach, and to supply their guns with ample store of munitions. It was about this time that Lord Raglan and General Canrobert began to disagree on essential points. The French commander, naturally afraid of responsibility, was also much embarrassed by the perpetual interference of the Emperor Napoleon in the conduct of the war. That potentate, newly seated on the throne, was ambitious of commanding an army in the field. He had formed the plan of proceeding himself to the Crimea. The news thereof was bruited abroad throughout Europe, and of course it was known in the camp of the Allies, where, creating a state of expectation, it did not tend to impart vigour to the proceedings at the French headquarters. General Canrobert leaned to his master's views, and was afraid of doing anything which might be disapproved of at Paris. The Emperor wanted to operate in the field, and the French general, apparently desirous of keeping the army in a high state of numerical efficiency, was indisposed to thorough measures before the place. So from day to day the opening of the bombardment was deferred; sometimes at the instance of the French, sometimes at the instance of the English general. The first would be desirous of reinforcing the army by bringing up 14,000 Turks from Eupatoria, and the second, having acquiesced in the necessary delay, would begin fresh batteries, and then require further time to complete them. At length, on the 8th, Omar Pasha and his troops landed at Kamiesch, and Lord Raglan, although two of his newest and most advanced batteries were not complete, willingly gave his consent to the opening of the second bombardment on Easter Monday, the 9th of April, exactly six months from the date of the first bombardment.

During the morning of the 9th, while it was yet dark, the batteries and trenches were manned. There were in the magazines 500 rounds per gun, and 300 per mortar. The orders were to fire as soon as the enemy's works became visible. At half-past five the officers in command decided that the moment had come, and five minutes later the report of a solitary gun gave the signal so eagerly desired. In a moment the whole of our guns were in action; and in another the French began to fire; so that by a quarter to six on that dreary morning, the missiles of five hundred guns, showing a line of fire from the head of the Quarantine Bay to Inkermann, were pouring into the defences and the town of Sebastopol. No second elapsed without a shot or shell. Day after day, night after night, for a whole week, the bombardment went on with a dreadful monotony; and although our fire inflicted evidently serious damage upon the enemy, he managed to repair his works and mount fresh guns at night. The Russian writers admit a loss of fourteen guns disabled every day; yet this was comparatively of little moment to him, as he had such a boundless store of artillery. Besides the guns in the arsenal, there were all the guns of the fleet, and these resources were used unsparingly. On our side the resources of the Allies in guns and ammunition were limited. The object of the bombardment was definite. It was to reduce the fire so far as to permit of an assault. Very early in the week this effect had been produced to the utmost extent possible. Still the assault was delayed. The British alone had fired 47,000 projectiles into the enemy's works, and the French must have fired three times that number. Yet the enemy, though shattered and weakened, was unsubdued, and it was plain that this duel of opposing ordnance might go on till doomsday without a decisive result. Lord Raglan, from the first, had always proposed a heavy bombardment to be followed by a prompt and unflinching assault. To this the French general could not be got to agree.

In the meantime the British had pushed on towards the Redan. There were three large rifle-pits on the left of the third parallel of the right attack, whence the enemy annoyed our working parties and our gunners. Colonel Egerton, with a party of the 77th, was directed to carry these pits, and on the night of the 19th he moved his men out of the parallel, followed by some companies of the 33rd in support. Egerton was a very fine soldier; and although his movement was detected by the enemy, he did not give his own men time to reply to their fire, but led them on with the bayonet. The Russians, surprised, turned and hurried away; and our working parties at once began to turn the faces of the pits towards the Redan, and to connect them by the sap with the third parallel. This labour was carried on under a smart fire of shot and musketry, but it was quite successful. Colonel Egerton unhappily was killed. We retained one pit, and the next night destroyed the other two, carrying a demi-parallel in rear of them through Egerton's pit. Equally brilliant was the storming on May 1st of the pits in front of the central bastion by a French force under General de Salles. Both sides lost many hundred officers and men; but the gain of ground on the part of the French was the more important to them because it put a limit to the daring system of counter-approaches on that side. The Russians showed great jealousy of the progress of the British attacks, and on the 9th and 11th of May they made two sorties upon our parallels. The first was directed against the right attack, the second against the left. On both occasions they were met stoutly by the British troops on guard, and after a good deal of firing, driven away. In the second sortie, however, they got into one battery, and had to be expelled by the bayonet. These sorties presented splendid pyrotechnic spectacles, as they usually finished with a boisterous cannonade. They cost both sides many men, but did not stay the advance of the assailants.

We have now cleared the way for the narration of a series of very remarkable facts which occurred between the last week in April and the middle of May, and ended in a change of the chief command of the French army.

The French Emperor desired to take the most conspicuous place in the allied camp. He desired to command the allied army, and to try his skill in strategy. Early in the year he sent part of his Guard to the Crimea, and later, giving out that he intended to join the army, he directed the whole of the Guard, except the depôts, to proceed to Maslak, near Constantinople, and hold themselves ready for active service. The dominant idea in the mind of the Emperor at this time was sound enough in principle. He thought that Sebastopol could best be taken after an army operating in the field had driven the Russians beyond the Putrid Sea, and enabled the Allies to invest the place on all sides. There can now be no doubt he designed to lead that army in person. General Canrobert was allowed to have some, perhaps not very complete, glimpse of this plan. He was warned not to neglect a favourable moment, but not to risk anything. The knowledge that the Emperor was planning and scheming in Paris how he could compass the command of the Allies, weighed upon the mind of Canrobert, and greatly increased his natural shrinking from responsibility. Lord Raglan was decidedly for a general assault of Sebastopol. For a moment, on the 24th of April, Canrobert gave way before his arguments, and General Pélissier, nothing loth, received orders to prepare a force sufficient to storm the principal works, and the British plan of attack was decided on in detail. But no sooner had this been settled in council, than Canrobert recurred to his secret instructions; his doubts began as soon as he left the presence of Lord Raglan. Moreover he got fresh news from Paris that the Emperor would certainly arrive in the Crimea early in May. On the 25th, therefore, he sent two generals to Lord Raglan, to tell him that he no longer agreed with the plan of an assault, and, in consequence, all the orders given were withdrawn, and the siege relapsed into its ordinary posture.

While General Canrobert was in this dubious and painful frame of mind, Lord Raglan proposed a subsidiary project. He asked his colleague to join in an expedition having for its object the capture of the town and straits of Kertch, with the ulterior aim of naval operations in the Sea of Azoff. This project had the hearty support of Admiral Bruat and Admiral Lyons. General Canrobert unable to resist the force of the arguments addressed to him, yielded his assent, then recalled it, then, on the 1st of May, once more fell in with Lord Raglan's views. It was arranged that General d'Autemarre should take 8,000 French, and that the British should furnish 3,000, including a troop of horse, with one British and two French batteries; the whole under Sir George Brown, who was nominated for the command by Canrobert himself. These troops were collected, marched to Kamiesch, and embarked on the 3rd. They sailed away with great ostentation, going north, to bewilder the enemy; and, at night, or when out of sight of land, they went about and steered for Kertch. But, in the evening, just as our headquarters were congratulating themselves on the fact that the expedition was well on its way, General Canrobert appeared, and said he must recall the French troops at once. Why? Because he had received a peremptory order from the Emperor's Cabinet, direct by electric telegraph, to concentrate his troops. Lord Raglan said that the Emperor, when he gave that order, was not aware that the expedition had sailed, and for a moment the French general consented reluctantly to take the view it implied. But two hours later, that is, about midnight, he sent Colonel Trochu, the chief of his staff, to say that, on considering the dispatch once more he must recall and had recalled the French part of the expedition by a special steamer. Lord Raglan was vexed at this vacillation, but he could show no resentment. The expedition, if it returned, would reveal its object. The enemy might prepare to parry a similar blow. Feeling this, in his despatches to Admiral Lyons and Sir George Brown, he informed them of the falling off of their allies; but he told them they might go on alone, if they deemed it expedient, and he would shoulder the responsibility. The French steamer caught up the fleet just as it sighted Kertch, and General d'Autemarre, with some chagrin, found he must desert his comrades. Then the British steamer came up, and Lyons and Brown, considering Lord Raglan's hardy offer, thought it inexpedient to go on alone. So, to the amazement of both armies, and the profound astonishment of the Russians, the expedition returned, after revealing its object.