THE ZOUAVES ASSAULTING THE RIFLE-PITS. (See p. [86].)

The French Emperor, finding he had unwittingly spoiled a fine design, sent another telegraphic message, ordering Canrobert to resume the expedition, if Lord Raglan assented. Lord Raglan, thinking the enemy, apprised of the intended attack, might have strengthened the place, said it would now be prudent to employ a larger force. To this Canrobert demurred. The fact was, he had lost a good many men in the trenches, and he was employing a whole division in perfecting the lines at Kamiesch, that essential prelude, according to Imperial views, of the Imperial plan of campaign. Omar Pasha was willing to spare 14,000 of his best troops for the Kertch expedition, but Lord Raglan did not deem it expedient to accept this offer. About this time the Sardinian contingent, under General la Marmora, landed in the Crimea. The far-sighted policy of Count Cavour had led him to join the Western League. Austria, who had not fulfilled her qualified pledge to engage in active war, was now less inclined than ever to do so. By sending her contingent to the Crimea, under the flag of Italian unity, Sardinia took rank among the effective Powers of Europe, and won that place in the general councils of Europe which Cavour knew so well how to use for the profit of his country. The Sardinian troops were under the orders of Lord Raglan. The British force now numbered 32,600 men, effective; the arrival of the Sardinian troops raised it to 47,600 men, not counting the sick.

The troubles of General Canrobert now reached a climax. His Emperor found that he could not go to command the allied army in the Crimea. The "voice" of the French people, the "prayers" of the French people, and we suspect something more potent than either, showed the Emperor that he must abandon this dream of ambition. But he was eminently gratified by the realisation of another. Louis Napoleon, Emperor of the French, and Eugénie, his Empress, became the guests of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert at Windsor Castle—recognition of royalty more precious than the glory of commanding a huge army in the Crimea.

When it was decided that his Imperial Majesty must refrain from his projected adventure in the East, he sent an aide-de-camp with a grand plan of campaign; and poor General Canrobert, already harassed by Imperial interference, had to submit this scheme of operations to Lord Raglan, and press it upon his acceptance. This he did about the 12th of May. The Emperor's proposal was to divide the armies into three. One he proposed should consist of 60,000 men, half French and half Turks. This, under Pélissier, was to hold Kamiesch and the trenches, not with the object of continuing the siege, but of blockading the south side. The French were to guard their own batteries; the Turks were to hold ours. The second army, 55,000 strong, composed of the British, with the Sardinians and certain French and Turks, the whole under Lord Raglan, was to hold the Tchernaya in front of Balaclava. Behind these, 40,000 Frenchmen were to gather ready to pour into the valley of Baidar, while 25,000 from Maslak landed at Alouchta, forced the pass of Ayen, and being joined by the 40,000 men from the valley of Baidar, moved in a compact body upon Simpheropol. Then, if the Russians advanced towards Batchiserai, Lord Raglan was to storm the heights of Mackenzie, and seize the "position" of Inkermann; but if the Russians awaited an attack on the north side, then Lord Raglan was to file through the Baidar valley, and joining Canrobert at Albat, the combined force was to advance and throw the Russians into Sebastopol or into the sea. If the pass of Ayen could not be forced, the 25,000 men sent to Alouchta were to return to Balaclava, and in that case the whole disposable force of 65,000 men was to enter the Baidar valley, and break through the mountain chain by Albat. Such was the pretty paper plan sent by the Emperor. The alternative plan was an advance from Eupatoria upon Simpheropol; but this he only discussed to destroy by numberless objections. Napoleon early in his reign acquired the habit of meddling in matters of which he was ignorant.

When General Canrobert unfolded his scheme before Lord Raglan and Omar Pasha, both the English and the Turkish chief deemed it impracticable. The immense extent of the works before Sebastopol rendered it impossible of execution in their eyes; for they rightly judged that 60,000 men, one-half Turkish, could not hold the trenches, now crowded with artillery. Lord Raglan would not entrust British guns to the guardianship of the Turks. He preferred to go on with the siege; but if he adopted any plan of field operations, he would have chosen an advance from Eupatoria or the mouth of the Alma, and, failing that, an attempt to turn the heights of Mackenzie by Baidar and Albat. The council of war broke up without coming to any decision. On the 16th, unable to face the difficulties that beset him, General Canrobert resigned; the Emperor accepted his resignation, and General Pélissier was appointed to the command of the army of the East. By carrying out the will of the Emperor, Canrobert felt, as he said, that he had got into a false position, and he withdrew, much to his credit. But, more to his credit, he begged that he might remain with the army and that he might be reinstated in the command of his old division. This request was granted. From the 19th of May to the end of the siege, Pélissier commanded the French army in the Crimea and Canrobert resumed his position of general of division.

By permission of F. Vincent Brooks, Esq. Reproduced by André & Sleigh, Ld., Bushey, Herts.

QUEEN VICTORIA REVIEWING CRIMEAN VETERANS (1854).

FROM THE PAINTING BY SIR JOHN GILBERT, R.A., P.R.W.S.

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