CHAPTER VII.
THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).
The Course of Diplomacy—Austria's Position—She becomes a Peace-maker—The Treaty of the 2nd of December—The Four Points—The Czar agrees to negotiate—Russell's Mission to Vienna—Opening of the Conference—Prince Gortschakoff's Declaration—The Third Point broached—Its Rejection by Russia—Count Buol's Compromise—A Diplomatic Farce—Count Buol's final Proposition—Resignation of Drouyn de Lhuys—The War debated in Parliament—Lord John Russell resigns—Strength of the Government—The Sardinian and Turkish Loans—Vote of Censure on the Aberdeen Cabinet—Finance of the War—General Pélissier—The Fight for the Cemetery—Success of the French—Occupation of the Tchernaya—Expedition to Kertch—Description of the Peninsula—Sir George Brown's Force—The Russians blow up their Magazines—Occupation of Kertch and Yenikale—Lyons in the Sea of Azotf—Result of the Expedition—Attack upon Sebastopol decided—Ordnance of the Allies—The Attack—The French occupy the Mamelon—The British in the Quarries—Lord Raglan overruled—New Batteries—Pélissier's Change of Plan—The Fourth Bombardment—Preparations for the Assault—Mayran's Mistake—Brunet and D'Autemarre—The Attack on the Redan fails—Abandonment of the Assault—General Eyre—Losses on both Sides—Death of Lord Raglan.
WHILE the armies in the Crimea had been occupied in holding their ground, and recovering from the effects of the winter campaign, the political action of the allied Governments had been directed into a channel of negotiations opened by Austria and conducted at Vienna.
Austria had not approved of the expedition to the Crimea. She had, to a certain extent, joined the Western Powers; and although Russia might not deem it expedient to turn upon Austria and make war upon her, still that was possible; for Austria had given a cause of war to Russia by exerting that pressure—severe, though distant and indirect—which impelled the Czar to raise the siege of Silistria, and then abandon the Principalities. Then the troops of Austria, by slow degrees, occupied the country as far as the Pruth, and thus enabled the Western Powers to divert their armies upon Sebastopol. But when they took that direction, and left Austria alone face to face with Russia, supported only by a few Turks, and having a very doubtful ally in Prussia, Austria was discontented. She had, however, gone too far to recede. She was committed to the course of armed neutrality, verging always upon open war. Becoming aware of her situation, and having, just before the war broke out, reduced her army by 90,000 men, she now spent £16,000,000 sterling in order to place her public force on an effective war footing. For a moment, in the victory of the Alma and the first bombardment of Sebastopol, she saw prospects of a speedy termination of the war. The dark cloud of Inkermann and the failure of the bombardment suddenly hid those prospects from her view. The Allies had not been beaten, but they had been frustrated; and Austria saw in the new circumstances an opening for a new effort to bring about peace. Her special object had been gained when the Russian monopoly of the Lower Danube had been removed, and she did not appear to appreciate the larger objects of the Allies, namely, a definite reduction of Russian power in the Black Sea; or she did not feel capable of aiding in their accomplishment by a direct participation in hostilities. She therefore renewed her part of peacemaker.
In order to place herself in a better position as regards the Western Powers, she agreed to sign a treaty known as the Treaty of the 2nd of December, 1854. This document stated that the Three Powers, being desirous of bringing the war to an end as speedily as possible, and of re-establishing peace on a solid basis, and being convinced that nothing would be more conducive to this result than the complete union of their efforts, they had resolved to conclude this treaty. By it they undertook not to make peace without first deliberating in common. Austria engaged to defend the frontier of the Principalities against any return of the Russian forces; in case war ensued between Austria and Russia, the Three Powers mutually promised to each other their offensive and defensive alliance; and in case peace should not be re-established before the 1st of January, 1855, the Three Powers agreed "to deliberate, without delay, upon effectual means for obtaining the object of their alliance." Here, then, it seemed, were fetters binding Austria to the fortunes of the alliance; and the Western Powers believed that at last they had a fair prospect of aid from Austrian arms, especially when she concluded a defensive alliance with Prussia. The object of Austria, however, was not war, but negotiation. By giving what seemed a proof of her willingness to share the fortunes of the Allies, she took up a position which enhanced the value of any peace proposals she might devise. Accordingly, she set to work, contriving how, upon the bases of the negotiations carried on in the summer, which took the shape of the Four Points, she could present a scheme which Russia would be willing to consider. These four points were a further definition of the Protocol signed by the Powers at the beginning of the war, by which the purpose of the contest was set forth. If she succeeded, she would relieve herself from the obligation of fighting imposed by the treaty; if she failed, some excuse might be evolved in the process of failure. Thereupon negotiations were quietly resumed at Vienna between Count Buol and the Ministers of the Allies. Prussia, having declined to accede to the treaty of December 2nd, had no part in these proceedings. By the 28th of December the Ministers had agreed to a paper defining the sense of the Four Points. Those points were first, the cessation of the Russian protectorate in the Principalities, and the substitution therefor of a European protectorate; second, the free navigation of the Danube; third, an arrangement having "for its object to connect the existence of the Ottoman Empire more completely with the European equilibrium, and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea;" fourth, renunciation by Russia of her pretentions to exercise a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan. These bases of negotiation were presented to Prince Gortschakoff, Russian Minister at Vienna, and by him transmitted to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The Emperor of Russia was not at all disinclined to treat. He had nothing to lose by negotiations, and, as it was possible something might occur at a conference to disturb the harmony of the Allies, he might have something to gain. Then it may well be that he counted on the presence of a Prussian envoy, and consequently of a backer; and therefore in December he gave his Minister at Vienna conditional, and on the 7th of January definite, power to negotiate. But the British Ministry falling under the shock of a popular tempest, it became impossible to send any plenipotentiary to Vienna until the Government of England was once more in such a position, as regarded Parliament, that it could act with authority. Lord Palmerston adopted the resolution of sending Lord John Russell to attend a conference at Vienna. While at Paris Lord John received and accepted an offer of the post of Colonial Secretary. He had been sent off so hurriedly that his written instructions were not prepared until two days after he had sailed. Passing through Paris and Berlin, and conferring in each capital with the highest personages of the State, he did not reach Vienna until the 4th of March, and even then ten more days passed before the Conference held its first sitting.
This took place on the 15th of March, in the Austrian Foreign Office. The Plenipotentiaries were, for Austria, Count Buol-Schauenstein and Baron Prokesch-Osten; for France, Baron de Bourqueney; for England, Lord John Russell and the Earl of Westmorland; for Turkey, Aarifi Effendi; and for Russia, Prince Gortschakoff and M. de Titoff. Count Buol, as a matter of course, became the President of the Conference. At the very outset there was a faint foreshadowing of the discussion which subsequently occurred. The Czar Nicholas had just died, but his successor had declared with emphasis that he should pursue the policy of Peter, Catherine, Alexander, and Nicholas. When, therefore, the mild tones of conciliation in which Count Buol opened the Conference had died away, and Baron de Bourqueney and Lord John Russell had, on behalf of their Governments, reserved the right of making special conditions over and above the four guarantees, Prince Gortschakoff seemed to regard this as a challenge. At all events, he took it up as such, and answered promptly. He hoped, he said, they all had a common object, the object of arriving at an honourable peace. "If," he added, "from whatever quarter they come, conditions of peace were wished to be imposed on Russia which should not be compatible with her honour, Russia would never consent to them, however serious might be the consequences." He did not contest the right of the belligerent Powers to add new demands according to the chances of the war; but, for his part, he considered himself under the obligation to keep within the limits of the Four Points. Having thus broken ground, the Conference went at once into the details of the First Point, and determined to debate them in the order laid down. We need not enter into these details. It is sufficient to state that in five sittings the plenipotentiaries had agreed upon a form of words, fully embodying the spirit of the original basis of the first two Points. It was on the third, the key-stone of the whole, that they split asunder.
It was on the 26th of March that Count Buol broached the question. It may be remembered that the object in view was to connect Turkey with the European system, and, in the words used by Lord Clarendon's instructions to Lord John, to abrogate the supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea. For this, indeed, three fleets and three armies were thundering against the stronghold of the Czar. It was this supremacy and the temptation it held out to Russia which had led her Sovereign into arrogant courses, and had brought on the war. In opening the debate on this now famous Third Point, Count Buol, speaking not only for himself but his allies, suggested that it would be the better course for the Ministers of Russia and Turkey to state to the Conference what means they thought adequate to accomplish the ends desired. The French and British Ministers supported this suggestion, Lord John enforcing it with the courteous remark, called forth by Prince Gortschakoff's early declaration touching the honour of his country, that England and her allies deemed "the best and only admissible conditions of peace would be those which, being the most in harmony with the honour of Russia, should at the same time be sufficient for the security of Europe." Of course, Prince Gortschakoff could only be gratified, and could not do less than agree to ask his Cabinet whether they would act on the suggestion of Count Buol. The Turks did the same. As it was unavoidable that some time should elapse before answers were received, Count Buol proposed to pass to the Fourth Point; but to this neither the Cabinet of Britain nor that of France, and both were consulted, would consent. Thus several days were wasted, during which the French and Turkish Ministers for Foreign Affairs were hurrying towards Vienna to take part in these very critical negotiations.