Cassell's History of England, Vol. 6 (of 8) / From the Death of Sir Robert Peel to the Illness of the Prince of Wales

by Anonymous

The battle of the Tchernaya did not interrupt the progress of the siege. The Russians only succeeded in drawing upon themselves the bulk of the covering army, for although the French showed a strong line of troops on the old Inkermann ground, and kept up a sharp look-out upon their own left, this did not hinder the working parties in the advanced works from continuing their labours.

It should still be borne in mind that the French had fully recognised the fact that the Malakoff was the key of Sebastopol, that their main efforts were directed towards it, and that all the other attacks had become subordinate to this one. In short the attack on the Malakoff had become what is termed regular. But Sebastopol was not invested. The supply of guns in the place was practically unlimited. As much ammunition as the enemy could find transport for could be and was carried into the town. Hence, although the progress of the sap went on against the Malakoff and the Little Redan alone, the whole fire of the Allies could not be concentrated on those works, because they had to reply to the other batteries used so vigorously by the enemy. These conditions of the siege had been long established; the new feature in it was the determined attack upon the Malakoff, to which the other attacks were made subordinate.

The moment the French began to descend the western slope of the Mamelon, and push up the eastern slope of the Malakoff, they became sensible of the arduous nature of the undertaking. Their trenches had to be designed with the utmost care, their connecting parallels to be constructed with rapidity and solidity in the face of a destructive fire. About the period of the battle of the Tchernaya they were losing a hundred men a night in the trenches. Batteries, low down in the Russian works and unseen by the Allies, flung shells into the trenches and batteries with fatal accuracy. Nevertheless, the French steadily gained ground. They had descended one slope, they were ascending the other. But when they had reached within a hundred yards of the ditch of the Malakoff they could go no farther. The work of the night was destroyed by the enemy the next day. In vain the sharpshooters in their pits and in the most advanced cover kept up a deadly fire on the embrasures of the Malakoff. The enemy's guns were so numerous and so well placed that there seemed to be always some capable of firing, and with the dawn came the destruction of the labours of the night.

In these circumstances, General Simpson agreed to open on the 17th of August the heaviest possible fire upon the Malakoff; and the batteries of the French on the left were to bombard the town front to prevent the Russians on that side from overwhelming our left attack. Accordingly, on the 17th, the British opened fire; but the French, for some reason, did not support them, and the Russians in the town batteries did us considerable damage and killed two good officers. Yet this did not prevent the British from accomplishing their object. They maintained so crushing a fire on the Malakoff that the Russian artillerymen were soon obliged to quit their pieces, and only fire a gun now and then. At six in the evening a magazine blew up in a work between the Redan and the Malakoff. This battery was ruined. All night the mortars of the Allies fired heavily into the Malakoff and Redan, to hinder the enemy from repairing damages; and all night the French worked lustily at their trenches, doing more in twenty-four hours than they had done in a fortnight. The bombardment continued on the 18th. On the night of that day signal was made that masses of Russians were in the Redan. Thereupon the mortars were directed upon this work, and the heavy shells must have destroyed many men. There was a considerable exchange of musketry fire between the advanced trenches and the place, but the enemy did not venture out. The French on the left, who had been almost silent, now found that, in order to complete their approaches to a certain point, they also must open a general fire. This they did on the evening of the 20th, taking the enemy somewhat by surprise. While under cover of this fire they pushed forward their sap.

From this time to the end of the month there were constant alarms on the side of the Tchernaya. The French had been very active in the valley of Baidar immediately after the battle of the 16th. General d'Allonville had caused his infantry to penetrate the passes leading to the Tchernaya from the north, and establish posts of observation on the hills. At the same time the Sardinians strengthened their formidable works on Mount Hasfort, and the French constructed three batteries for guns intended to sweep the ground about the Stone Bridge. On the right they mounted twelve pieces of heavy artillery, naming the work the Raglan Battery. On the other flank they placed the same number of guns in a battery named after La Boussinière, a gallant artillery officer, distinguished at the Alma, and killed before Sebastopol. These guns looked obliquely up the road to the Mackenzie Heights. Then farther to the rear, and on the right of the road to Balaclava, they constructed a work for twelve pieces, whose fire would sweep the whole road as far as the bridge, and named it Battery Bizot. Behind these works they re-made the old Turkish redoubts of October, 1854. Thus the Allies covered Balaclava with a triple line, the third being the now famous line of Balaclava, constituting a position as strong as any in the world.

Although it seemed improbable that the Russians would repeat the enterprise of the 16th of August, yet the information that reached headquarters, the partial disappearance of the Russians from the North Camp, the incessant flashing of signal lights from the eastern mountains to Inkermann, and from Inkermann to Sebastopol, induced the Allies to keep on the alert. General Simpson reconnoitred the whole position on the Tchernaya. The troops were under arms, both on the plateau and on the Tchernaya, long before daylight for several days, dispersing only when the sun rose. The men-of-war in the harbour of Balaclava were in readiness to take up positions whence they could do the most damage to the enemy. The splendid cavalry of the Allies turned out every day, and showed its thousands of sabres and lances in the plains of Balaclava; a spectacle gratifying to the military eye, and not encouraging to the enemy. The Highland Division took post above Kamara. The field artillery of the Allies was in constant readiness. From the hills that enfold the Baidar valley to the heights of Inkermann all was vigilance. Prince Gortschakoff, who had his army on the plateau of Mackenzie, and in the little valleys leading down towards the outposts and main position of the Allies, probably looked upon this scene, enacted daily; if he did so, what he saw must have extinguished any notion of breaking into the allied lines at any point. There was no weak place in the chain.

Nevertheless, the siege works made steady progress towards the Malakoff. There the assailants and defenders were within a few yards of each other. The Russians had a series of rifle-pits on the slope under the Malakoff Redoubt itself. The French works had approached so near that it became necessary to seize these pits, and incorporate them with the main body of the approaches. Accordingly, on the 23rd of August, a body of Zouaves worked all day in opening a trench leading towards the pits; and in the evening the light infantry of a line regiment went in and carried them. But the Russians, determined not to lose their shelter without a struggle, dashed out of the Malakoff, and expelled the Frenchmen. The Russians, however, did not long enjoy their triumph, for the expelled troops, being supported by their comrades, returned to the assault, reconquered and held the work. The next day the enemy kept up a heavy fire on the Mamelon, in spite of the support that our batteries afforded to the French. But the onward march of the latter could not be arrested. On the evening of the 24th they seized the whole line of Russian works on the glacis. Again the enemy violently essayed to prevent the French from making good their hold. Before the morning the whole line was complete, and the French works were within thirty-four yards of the salient of the Malakoff. The efforts of the enemy were directed chiefly against the Mamelon and the approaches therefrom, the quarter, as they well knew, where their greatest peril lay. On the night of the 28th they made a lucky shot. One of their shells rolled into a magazine in the left or southern face of the Mamelon Redoubt. There were at the time 15,000 pounds of powder in the magazine. This exploded with an awful roar, awakening the whole camp, and killing or wounding 150 Frenchmen. This vast explosion of powder did not seriously damage the Mamelon; but it delayed the final assault, because the store of powder, thus expended, had to be replaced.

For the remainder of the month the trying labour of getting close to the Malakoff and Little Redan went on in the usual way. But the crisis of the long siege had now come. Neither side could bear much longer the horrible losses inflicted by this deadly strife. The Russians might endure, hoping against hope, to hold out until the winter once more became their keen ally; but the French and British felt that they must risk an assault or raise the siege.

When Prince Gortschakoff saw that the French had opened their seventh parallel within a few yards of the Malakoff, he must have felt certain that an assault would soon be attempted. He was quite as well aware as the allied generals that the Malakoff was the key of the place. General Todleben had, from the first, shown a just appreciation of the ground, and upon those two salient and commanding points, the Flagstaff and the Malakoff, he had exhausted the resources of his art. Once firmly established in one of these, he knew that the Allies must win the city. He knew also that if the Flagstaff only were taken, he could defend the place long enough to secure a retreat; but that if the Malakoff fell before a raft-bridge could be constructed, the Russians must surrender or die fighting, for the Malakoff Hill commanded the harbour. Here one cannot but admire the foresight of a general, who, while he defended his lines to the last, took early and ample precautions to secure a retreat. The great raft-bridge over that arm of the sea we call the Harbour, which is half a mile wide, was begun in July, and finished by the end of August. This stupendous work was designed and executed, no doubt, partly with the object of enabling the Russian general to pour troops rapidly into Sebastopol, but mainly to enable him to avoid capture in the last extremity. Nor was this the only work undertaken with the view of preparing against a calamity. The genius of Todleben had designed an inner line of works in rear and to the east of the Malakoff; and this must have been done only to gain time for the evacuation of the place in the event of the capture of that work.