THE FRENCH IN THE MALAKOFF. (See p. [124].)
The Russians were quite right in assuming that an assault would be hazarded at no distant day. It was the uppermost thought in the minds of the allied generals. The approach of winter, the expenditure of men and ammunition, the vast extent of the works, the proximity of the trenches to the place, and the impossibility of pushing them farther in certain quarters, dictated imperiously a resolution to storm. General Pélissier and General Simpson, therefore, directed the principal officers of artillery and engineers to meet and report on the propriety of making an assault, and on the best means of carrying it out. They met on the 3rd of September, and drew up a memorandum. In the attack on the town, that is the French left attack, from the Flagstaff to the Quarantine, they said, the works of approach had remained for a long time stationary, and they declared that these works could not be pushed farther without causing great loss. The British had made some progress before the Redan—their works had stopped short at 200 yards from the salient angle. Here again these officers were of opinion that the approaches could not be advanced, because serious impediments interposed; in other words, because the ground was rocky and enfiladed by several Russian batteries on both sides of the South Harbour. In front of the Malakoff, the report went on to state, the French artillery had attained a marked superiority over that of the place, and under its protection—and, as we may add, the protection of the British batteries—the approaches had arrived within five-and-twenty yards of the enemy's lines. The French were also within thirty yards of the Little Redan. Here it was impossible to work nearer, because the ground was living rock. Therefore, for these reasons, the officers decided unanimously that the moment had arrived for assaulting the place. How should this be done?
It was assumed, and justly, that if the Malakoff could be captured and held, the fall of the Karabelnaia suburb, that is, the whole space east of the South Ravine, would be inevitable. Therefore the main attack was to be directed against the Malakoff, and in order that it might be successful, while a powerful column rushed into the work itself, two other columns assailed simultaneously the Little Redan, and the long rampart or curtain connecting it with the Malakoff. But as the Allies were fighting, not against a mere garrison of limited number, but against a numerous army, and as the enemy, knowing the importance of the position, would do his uttermost to keep, or, if he lost, to regain it, so it was held to be necessary that other attacks should be simultaneously made upon the place, in order to prevent the Russians from concentrating their forces at the vital point. It was with this object that the officers of the Engineers recommended an assault by the British on the Redan, and by the French on the west or town front. These, it should ever be borne in mind, were to be subordinate assaults. It was held essential to success that the assault should be preceded by a heavy bombardment for three days. Such was the scheme devised by the principal officers of artillery and engineers of both armies on the 3rd of September. The day chosen was the 8th of September, the hour, noon exactly.
The sixth and last bombardment began at daybreak on the 5th of September. Nearly the whole of the 800 pieces of ordnance in battery opened on the place. The sun shone brightly; a light air from the south-east blew over Sebastopol. One moment the old familiar scene was visible—the still majestic town, the serene waters of the harbour, the dark and rugged outline of the defences, the Black Sea, and the allied fleet. The next moment the rolling clouds of smoke, boiling up and extending on all sides, hid everything from view. It was the policy of the Allies to fill the mind of the enemy with doubt as to their projects, and thus force him to keep at a strained attention on all sides. Therefore it was from the 350 guns and mortars in the fifty-two batteries directed against the western face of the ramparts of Sebastopol that the most furious volleys issued. Even the official report of the British engineers calls it a "terrific cannonade." The fire from our batteries, and that of the French right, was what is called steady and careful. It was incessant but not hurried. This was calculated to make the enemy believe that the assault would be on the town front and not on the suburb, and, therefore, to keep more men in readiness in that quarter. Nevertheless, the mere weight of metal directed upon the Malakoff entirely silenced that work from the first. Upwards of 200 guns and mortars were levelled and trained to bear upon its outward faces, its embrasures, and its interior. The 7th passed like the 5th and 6th, opening with a volley along the whole four miles of batteries, then, of set purpose, dying away, and suddenly bursting forth again. The wind had changed. The smoke and dust were driven back from Sebastopol by a northern blast, and men strained their eyes in vain to catch a glimpse of the place. Yet patient watchers peering through the rifts in the sombre cloud saw enough to convince them that the enemy was suffering almost beyond endurance. At night fires were visible in several places; about eleven o'clock a magazine blew up; and at the same time a huge two-decker was burning solemnly in the Harbour. Up to this time the enemy had lost 4,000 men, exclusive of gunners, who, says Prince Gortschakoff, perished in great numbers, shot down at their guns.
Hitherto the allied generals had kept secret the hour of the assault. At noon they held a fresh council, and took their last resolutions. Now the secret was divulged. Precisely at noon of the following day the stormers were to make their rush. In order to secure uniformity of movement the staff officers met at headquarters, and set their watches in concert. Next morning General Bosquet, who had the immediate command on the Malakoff side, went into the sixth parallel; and between eleven and twelve General Pélissier took post in the Mamelon. General Codrington and General Markham were in the front of our Redan attack; and a little before noon General Simpson went to a spot selected for him by the engineers in the first parallel. With him went Sir Harry Jones.
We have already described the plan of attack; we have now to set forth the means of executing it. To ensure success in the attack on the Malakoff works, General Pélissier employed 25,000 men. There were not only the whole of the corps of Bosquet, but Mellinet's Brigade of the Imperial Guard, and Marolles' Brigade of the Reserve. MacMahon, with 5,000 men, was to storm the Malakoff Redoubt, and in support were Wimpfen's Brigade, 3,000 strong, and two battalions of the Zouaves of the Guard; thus giving 10,000 men to take and hold the Malakoff itself. General La Motterouge was entrusted with 4,300 men to storm the curtain between the Malakoff and Little Redan; and General Dulac had 4,600 wherewith to carry the Little Redan itself, and 3,000 under Marolles wherewith to make good his grip of this work, and thence carry the unfinished interior lines of defence. There was no special support allotted to La Motterouge, but General Bosquet had upwards of 3,000 men as a general reserve. In addition, two batteries of artillery were held in readiness to drive through the trenches and over the open, and take part in the combat in case they were required. On the western front General de Salles commanded. He had 18,500 men available, including Cialdini's 1,200 Italians. Levaillant, with 4,300 men, was to make two attacks on the Central Bastion, and D'Autemarre, with 5,280 men, was to furnish a support. In case of success, and when one of the storming columns had turned the Flagstaff Bastion on its proper right, D'Autemarre's division, Cialdini at its head, was to turn the proper left of the Flagstaff. The remaining troops were in reserve. Thus Pélissier had set apart 43,000 men for the assaulting and supporting columns.
The British arrangements were not on this colossal scale. Two divisions, the Light and Second, were directed to furnish both stormers and supports. Each division supplied a covering party, a ladder party, a storming party divided into two sections, and a working party. The whole amounted to 1,600 men. The covering parties, riflemen intended to spread out and keep down the fire of the unsubdued Russian guns, were under Captain Fyers and Captain Lewes. The ladder parties, intended to be stormers as soon as they had placed their ladders, were under Major Welsford. The storming parties were under Lieutenant-Colonel Handcock, Captain Grove, Brigadier Shirley, and Colonel Windham. The supports consisted of 750 men of each division, and the remainder of both were held in reserve. Thus General Simpson had resolved to try and take the Redan by dribbling into it about 3,100 men; and the whole force he kept in hand in case of emergencies was about 4,000 more. At the same time the Highland Division was posted next to the French attack, while the Third and Fourth were held back in the rear of the right attack, and the First was under arms in camp.
The Russians had no fewer than 75,000 men in Sebastopol. There were sixteen battalions in the works on the proper left of the Malakoff, and twelve battalions in reserve on this side. In the Malakoff were four battalions and some companies, and four battalions in the Gervais Battery on its proper right. There were besides sixteen battalions in reserve. They had been called up from the town by General Chruleff, when his suspicions were aroused by the information that the French trenches seemed to be full of troops. Thus there were about 22,000 men under arms for the defence of the Malakoff system of works. In the Redan and to the right and left of it were nine battalions and sixteen in reserve. The battalions in the front line were chiefly our old foes of the Alma and Inkermann. Their numbers were about 13,000. In addition to these troops there were no fewer than 10,000 in reserve for general purposes. The total number for the defence of the line from the Barrack Battery to the Harbour was therefore 45,000 men; or 2,000 more than were set apart by the French alone for all their attacks, and 10,000 more than the combined numbers of the English and French on the eastern side. In the town the Russians had 20,000 men, 2,000 more than the number at the disposal of General de Salles. The front line of works from the Quarantine to the Flagstaff was strongly manned; and besides the special reserves of the different bastions, there was a general reserve nearly 10,000 strong. Such a vast force, fighting behind the strongest entrenchments ever raised, was certain to be hard to conquer; and although it was divided into huge fragments, and one half was separated from the other by an arm of the sea—the South Harbour—we have shown that in mere numbers alone the Russians were in every point superior to their assailants. This should be remembered in view of what followed.
At mid-day the officers gave the signal. The clarions sounded, the drums beat, the men cried "Vive l'Empereur!" and dashing over the trenches, went headlong towards the Malakoff, the curtain, and the Little Redan. At the first rush all these places were surprised and overrun; but the attack on the great redoubt was the only one destined to be permanently successful.