The Austrian Government selected Count Valentine Esterhazy to carry on this delicate negotiation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. He took his instructions direct from the Emperor Francis Joseph, and they were formally embodied in a despatch written by Count Buol on the 16th of December. To his despatch he annexed the "four points" or indispensable preliminaries, set forth at some length, so as to avoid the chance of a misunderstanding; but substantially they were these:—1. That the Russian protectorate in the Danubian Principalities should be completely abolished, and that these principalities should receive such an organisation as might be suited to their wants and interests, to be recognised by the Powers, and sanctioned by the Sultan as suzerain. That, in exchange for the strong places and territories occupied by the allied Powers, Russia should consent to the "rectification" of her frontier with Turkey in Europe. 2. That the freedom of the Danube and its mouths should be secured efficaciously. 3. That the Black Sea should be open to merchant ships, and closed to war ships—except a limited number for coast service—and consequently that no naval or military arsenals should be created or maintained there. 4. That the immunities of the Christian subjects of the Porte should be secured without infringing the independence of the Sultan. To these was added a fifth, of great moment, as it was, in a measure, the touchstone of Russian sincerity. It was this:—"The belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right which appertains to them of producing in European interest special conditions over and above the four guarantees." These were tolerably stringent conditions; and it was easy to see that the fifth, so indefinite in its nature, would test the sincerity of Russia to the uttermost.
Count Esterhazy arrived in St. Petersburg on the 24th of December. During his journey a very singular incident had occurred. The Cabinet of Russia had either guessed, or had been duly informed of, the nature of the trial to which they would be subjected. The probability is, that the Austrian Court gave the requisite information unofficially to Count Nesselrode. That astute politician was not long in making use of the opportunity. On the 22nd of December, while Count Esterhazy was journeying through Russian Poland, Count Nesselrode despatched a circular, embodying terms of peace to which his Government would agree. This was an adroit manœuvre, as it gave to Russia the appearance of dictating terms of peace. In this document it was laid down that Russia had always desired peace; that it was not her fault, but the fault of the Allies, that peace had not been made in 1855; and that the wish for a prompt and durable peace openly expressed by the Emperor Napoleon was the dearest wish of the Emperor Alexander. Russia had, in the summer of 1855, accepted the four points as a basis, and still accepted them; but they were susceptible of different interpretations. As long as his enemies appeared resolved to substitute the right of might for the spirit of justice, the Czar felt bound to remain silent; but as soon as his Majesty learned that his enemies were disposed to resume the negotiations for peace, he did not hesitate to meet them; and he was willing to put the most liberal interpretation on the third point, relating to the so-called neutralisation of the Black Sea. The liberal interpretation put by Russia on this point was that no war-ships should enter the Black Sea except those which, by a separate agreement between Russia and Turkey, those Powers should think proper to retain.
The Austrian Envoy was indeed the bearer of something more than conditions. He carried in his pocket instructions which amounted to a menace Russia could not afford to despise. If he did not obtain an acceptance of his conditions within a limited time, he was to quit St. Petersburg, taking with him the whole of the Austrian Legation. On the 27th he saw Count Nesselrode, read to him the despatch of Count Buol, and handed in the paper of conditions. The Russian Cabinet fought hard against the conditions. They wished to modify this Austrian ultimatum—for such was its real character—and thus sustain that claim to independent action put forward by Count Nesselrode on the 22nd of December. They wished to make the Allies accept Kars and the surrounding country for Sebastopol, Kertch, Kinburn, Eupatoria, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azoff, and parts of Mingrelia and Imeritia. They wished to avoid the unforeseen demands that might lurk in the fifth point. They desired to hold fast to the left bank of the Danube, and keep the Isle of Serpents. But the Czar was made aware that he could look for no aid from any German Power. France and Britain had just concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Sweden under certain conditions very adverse to Russia; and the Czar, like the rest of the world, knew it. Sardinia was certain to act with the Western Powers as long as the war lasted. Even Prussia was drifting towards the Western Powers. Britain was just acquiring that strength which would enable her blows to tell in another campaign. This the Czar knew also, and, moreover, he knew that France would do everything to make the terms of the treaty as little distasteful as possible. To crown all, the Austrian Government demanded an unconditional acceptance of the five points, the alternative being an instant rupture of diplomatic relations. Count Esterhazy was forbidden to discuss the contents of the ultimatum. He had simply to demand an answer, yes or no. Russia first sent an answer to Vienna; but as it was not a categorical reply, but a series of counter-propositions, Count Buol told the Russian Minister at Vienna that, unless the ultimatum were accepted on or before the 18th of January, the whole of the Austrian Embassy would quit St. Petersburg without a moment's delay.
This was a great deal to bear. The Russian Government delayed their answer until nearly the last moment. The time for decision allowed to them by Austria had not quite expired before the Czar made up his mind. The public anxiety in every capital of Europe was extreme; but while on the Continent the anxiety was for an affirmative, in England there was a sort of dread lest an affirmative answer should proceed from the cabinet of the Czar. Three weeks had passed away in these negotiations on the Neva. On the 16th of January, 1856, Count Nesselrode informed the Austrian Envoy that the Czar had given way. Russia had complied with the demand of Austria, and had given her unconditional assent to the Austrian ultimatum. This was Count Buol's greatest triumph. The next day the fact was known in every capital in Europe.
There was another triumph in store for the Emperor Napoleon. When Russia had accepted the Austrian proposals, it became necessary to determine where the Conference or Congress of the treaty-making Powers should be held. This occasioned some little difficulty. There was a talk of Brussels and Dresden; and it was said that London, Paris, and Vienna were out of the question. There is little doubt now that it was intended the Congress should be held in Paris. The Governments took to paying each other compliments. France suggested London, and Britain suggested Paris. Russia, for good reasons of her own, settled the amicable dispute by adopting the suggestion of Britain. Therefore, it was in Paris, where famous peaces had been made, that this peace was to be made. Then came another question. Who should sit at this European council? Prussia put in a claim based on her share in determining the Czar to yield. But—independently of the fact that Prussia had all along acted like an ally of Russia, and had only taken engagements hostile to Russia on behalf of German interests, and therefore would enter the Congress as a friend of Russia—Prussia had really no right at all to sit with the belligerent Powers, because she had separated from them in the summer of 1855. Therefore Prussia was not invited to the Paris Congress. The other Power whose right was for a moment questioned, but only for a moment, was Sardinia. But Sardinia was a belligerent. One of the inducements which led her to take an active part in the war was the opportunity of showing herself as a European Power. For that she had incurred the expense and the risk. Therefore she was admitted, with the reluctant assent of Austria. The Powers to be represented at the Congress, therefore, were Britain, France, Austria, Sardinia, Turkey, and Russia. Each Power sent a special plenipotentiary, and each plenipotentiary was to be assisted by the resident ambassador. The British plenipotentiary was the Earl of Clarendon, assisted by Earl Cowley; France was represented by Count Walewski and Baron de Bourqueney; Austria sent the cautious and much-pondering Count Buol and the clever Baron Hübner; Sardinia confided her interests to her greatest statesman, Count Cavour, whose second was the Marquis of Villa-marina; Turkey was present in the person of Aali Pasha, one of her ablest men, and Mehemed Djemil Bey; the Czar sent his father's friend, Count Orloff, and Baron Brunnow, cool, astute, and experienced. Some time elapsed before these men—some of them travelling from the extremities of Europe—could reach Paris; and before they could meet there was an important step to take. It is usual to frame a preliminary treaty. In this case, to save time and avoid the chances of discord, it was agreed, at a meeting of the Ministers of France, Britain, Austria, Russia, and Turkey, at Vienna, on the 1st of February, that they should sign a protocol, recording the acceptance of the Austrian proposals by Russia as a basis of peace, and that this should be regarded as a preliminary treaty. It was further agreed that the Congress should open at Paris on the 26th of February.
The British Parliament was opened by Queen Victoria in person on the 31st of January. The public were not certain that the signs of peace could be depended on. They were doubtful of the sincerity of Russia; they were eager to hear the explanations of Ministers. The Queen's Speech was anxiously awaited—the more anxiously because the contents were not permitted to appear in the newspapers of the morning. While determined to prosecute the war with vigour, her Majesty said she deemed it her duty not to decline any reasonable overture promising peace. "Accordingly," she continued, "when the Emperor of Austria lately offered to myself and to my august ally, the Emperor of the French, to employ his good offices with the Emperor of Russia, with a view to endeavour to bring about an amicable adjustment of the matters at issue between the contending Powers, I consented, in concert with my Allies, to accept the offer thus made; and I have the satisfaction to inform you that certain conditions have been agreed upon, which I hope may prove the foundation of a general treaty of peace. Negotiations for such a treaty," her Majesty added, "will shortly be opened at Paris." And she continued—"In conducting these negotiations, I shall be careful not to lose sight of the objects for which the war was undertaken; and I shall deem it right in no degree to relax my naval and military preparations until a satisfactory peace shall have been concluded."
When the Address came under debate, Lord Gosford, the mover, expressed the feeling of the country when he said he found himself reluctantly an advocate of peace. That sentiment prevailed in both Houses. There were some who, like Mr. Roebuck, gave utterance to a positive condemnation of peace. But Mr. Roebuck was only continuing his career as accuser-general. Lord Clarendon pointed out that when the Austrian Government offered its good offices to bring about a peace, the British Government could not refuse them. "However confident," he said, speaking for his colleagues, "they might have been that another campaign would have increased the military fame of England, and might have led to a treaty of a different and more comprehensive character, yet such anticipations would have been wholly unjustifiable, if they had induced us to prolong the war when a prospect appeared of obtaining the objects for which the war was undertaken." On the Continent the common belief was that the British Government was insincere. This Lord Clarendon denied in explicit terms, and there is no reason to believe he did not express the sentiment of the nation. Lord Palmerston was far more emphatic than his Foreign Secretary in repudiating the notion that Britain desired to go on with the war for the sake of glory. "No doubt," he said, "the resources of the country are unimpaired. No doubt the naval and military preparations which have been making during the past twelve months, which are now going on, and which will be completed in the spring, will place this country in a position, as regards the continuance of hostilities, in which it has not stood since the commencement of the war. We should therefore be justified in expecting that another campaign—should another campaign be forced upon us—would result in successes which might perhaps entitle us to require—perhaps enable us to obtain—even better conditions than those which have been offered to us, and have been accepted by us. But if the conditions which we now hope to obtain are such as will properly satisfy the objects for which we are contending—if they are conditions which we think it is our duty to accept, and with which we believe the country will be satisfied—then undoubtedly we should be wanting in our duty, and should not justify the confidence which the country has reposed in us, if we rejected terms of that description, merely for the chance of greater successes in another campaign." The country—that is, the judgment of the country—approved; but, as Lord Gosford said, with reluctance, much doubting whether the work undertaken had been finished. The reluctance sprang from that feeling, and by no means from a thirst for naval and military glory. The nation accepted the proposal to make peace, trusting, but not too blindly, that it would be safe and honourable; and whether it would be so remained to be seen.
In the meantime Russia, who had yielded, but yielded with misgivings, was very anxious it should be understood that she would not stand any very stringent development of that fifth point, those special conditions which the Allies had reserved their right to demand. She would not pay any indemnity to Turkey; she hoped that no one would think of prohibiting the re-fortification of the Åland Islands; she even suffered her organs to talk of keeping Kars and part of Turkish Armenia. But this was all bravado; the loud talking being intended to cover the fact that Russia had been worsted, and to make it appear that she would enter Congress as a Power proposing conditions. Prussia was very busy; very anxious to be invited to the Congress; very eager to demonstrate that it was her influence which finally induced the Czar to grant peace to Europe. Austria did not fail to submit her peace propositions to the German Diet, and to obtain the assent of that singularly-constituted and abortive political corporation. Prussia again made a bid for a seat in the Congress by supporting the proposals of Austria before the Diet; and Austria, to please the minor German Powers, dwelt on the effect of the expression of their opinions at St. Petersburg. Count Rechberg, who then represented Austria at the Diet, expressed his firm conviction that the right of proposing new conditions reserved in the fifth point would not be exercised in a sense likely to frustrate the hopes of peace. Neither Prussia nor the Diet was invited to the Congress; but this mysterious discussion of the fifth point raised doubts in the minds of the public, who were not told that the Powers had already determined that there should be no difficulties, and that peace should be made.
February had nearly passed away before the plenipotentiaries began to assemble. The Congress met on the 25th of the month, one day earlier than the time fixed upon provisionally at Vienna. It was a matter of course that Count Walewski should preside over this meeting. It is the custom for the Minister of that Sovereign to preside in whose capital a congress is held. But this was not done without a formal motion, made in this case by the Austrian Plenipotentiary, and assented to unanimously by all present. Then the Congress settled what are called the preliminaries—that is, they gave their sanction to the transaction at Vienna on the 1st of February. Next they resolved that an armistice should be concluded between the belligerents, to terminate on the 31st of March unless renewed; but not to extend to any blockade established or to be established. It was understood, however, that no hostilities should occur off the coasts of the enemy. Wherefore the British sent a light squadron again into the Baltic, but merely as a measure of precaution; and, of course, the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff remained in the hands of the Allies.