The Emperor Napoleon opened the Session of 1856 on the 4th of March. He contrasted the state of affairs, the last time he had met them—"Europe, uncertain, awaiting the issue of the struggle before taking sides"—with their state at the time he was addressing them, when the struggle for Sebastopol had been decided in favour of the Allies, and had brought Europe over to their side openly. As a "fact of high political significance"—truly, very high to him and his—he reminded his subservient hearers of the visit of "the Queen of Great Britain" to his Court, and cited it as "a proof of her confidence in and esteem for our country." He told them also of the visit of the King of Piedmont—a visit more significant, if his hearers could only have foreseen—and then he said:—"These Sovereigns beheld a country some time so disturbed and fallen from her rank in the councils of Europe, now prosperous, peaceable, and respected, making war, not with the hurried delirium of passion, but with that calm which belongs to justice, and all the energy of duty. They have seen France, which had sent 200,000 men across the sea, at the same time convoke at Paris all the arts of peace, as if she meant to say to Europe: 'The present war is but an episode for me, and my strength is always in great measure directed towards peaceful occupations. Let us neglect no opportunity of coming to an understanding, and do not force me to throw into the battlefield the whole resources and power of a great nation.'" Such was the attitude, as it is called, of the Emperor Napoleon in the spring of 1856. The alliance with Great Britain, the glories of the Crimea, the Congress of Paris, had established his throne, and had made him respectable in the eyes of his people, and for the future dreaded in Europe.

The scene in Constantinople on the 21st of February was very different from that in Paris. In the capital of Turkey there had also been a conference—a conference whereat the British, French, and Austrian Ministers had assisted the Turks in drawing up a grand Charter for the Christians. At a solemn meeting in the room of the Grand Council this charter was read. This firman is a very amazing document, promising almost more than any Government could perform. It is a sweeping Charter of civil and religious liberty, surprising to meet with in the latitude of the Bosphorus. It decreed freedom of religion, admission to the national schools and to public offices. There were to be mixed tribunals for all civil and criminal cases where the parties differed in religion, and open courts. Flogging and torture in prisons were abolished, and the use of them made penal. As all were liable to taxes, as all were placed on an equality of rights before the law, so there should be an equality of duties; and the duty of serving in the army, almost a patent of nobility in a Moslem State, became one of the duties of the Christians. In addition to these reforms, the firman provided for the improvement of the mode of collecting the taxes; for the publication of the Budget; for annual assembling of a grand council of delegates; for free trade; for the right of all to hold land. In short, it declared the resolve of the Sultan to execute very sweeping reforms in all departments of the State, and on all the great lines of public policy. Clearly this was more than an executive so weak as that of the Sultan could effect, and remained for the most part a dead letter. The Emperor of Russia did not fail to make use of this famous firman, and tell his subjects that one of the reasons that induced him to make peace was that the Sultan had granted that act of justice, the want of which led the father of the Czar to make war. These two documents—the Imperial Speech and the Sultan's firman—mark, the first, the solid establishment of the personal power of Bonaparte; the second, the most considerable step yet taken towards the full emancipation and uplifting of the Christian races in the East.

The Congress of Paris sat seven weeks, opening its proceedings, as we have seen, on the 25th of February, and closing them on the 16th of April. The first five weeks were devoted to the discussion of the articles of the treaty—indeed, they were determined on in the first month; put into final shape during the last week in March, and signed on the 30th. When the work was substantially done—that is, on the 12th of March—Prussia was at length gratified by an invitation to send plenipotentiaries, and to accede to what had been already determined on. As she had abstained from taking part in the war, Prussia could have no place in a conference assembled to settle terms of peace. But as the articles to be negotiated trenched upon treaties relating to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, to which Prussia was a party in 1840 and 1841, it was thought fit to invite her to accede to the conclusions adopted by the other Powers. Prussia, of course, readily accepted such a pretext for putting the names of her Ministers and her Sovereign at the foot of a European treaty; and thus on the 18th of March, at the tenth sitting of the conference, Baron Manteuffel and Baron Hatzfeld took their seats at the round table in the Hall of Ambassadors. Thus there were seven Powers represented around that green board at the closing scenes of a diplomatic conference which was so gratifying to the Emperor and all Frenchmen. Nor was this the sole piece of good fortune that befell his Majesty, for on the 16th day of March there came into the world a Prince Imperial, the only child of the marriage between Louis Napoleon Buonaparte and Eugénie de Montijo, the bright Spanish beauty chosen by him when his overtures at imperial and royal Courts went for nought. As in duty bound, the plenipotentiaries waited on the Emperor to congratulate him, and Paris, as in duty bound, covered itself with illuminations.

It was on a Sunday afternoon, a fortnight after this event, that the treaty of peace was signed by the plenipotentiaries. The Treaty of Paris was not a very long or complicated document. It consisted of a preamble and thirty-four articles, and there were attached to it three conventions, each having the same force as the general treaty. In the preamble the six Powers declared their intention to establish and consolidate a peace "by securing, through effectual and reciprocal guarantees, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire," and, further, they recorded that Prussia was invited to participate in the arrangements come to. Peace being established, Russia was to restore Kars and the country occupied by her troops in Turkish Armenia, and the Allies were to restore the towns and ports of Sebastopol, Balaclava, Kamiesch, Kertch, Yenikale, and Kinburn, and all other Russian territory occupied by them. Each Power was to grant an amnesty to those of their subjects who had been employed against them, or who had otherwise compromised themselves. This was done to meet the case of Poles who had taken service with the Allies. All prisoners of war were to be given up. The whole of the seven Powers declared formally that the Sublime Porte should be admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe. "Their Majesties," the treaty went on (Article VII.), "engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement, and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest." If a quarrel arose between the Porte and one of the Powers, before force was resorted to, the other Powers were to have an opportunity of preventing by mediation the outbreak of war. It was then recorded that the Sultan would communicate to each Power the firman he had issued touching his Christian subjects; but it was expressly declared that this act of the Sultan did not confer on all, or any, of the Powers any right to interfere in the internal affairs of his empire. The Black Sea was "neutralised"; that is, all ships of war, with recognised exceptions, were prohibited from entering its waters, while it was to be free to the mercantile marine of every nation. The exceptions were specified in a convention between Russia and Turkey, annexed to the general treaty, and equally valid with it. By this convention the two Powers were each to maintain not more than six steamships of 800 tons, and four light vessels of 200 tons. It was also provided in the treaty that no military-maritime arsenal should be maintained by either Power on the coasts of the Black Sea. Consuls were to be admitted to any port. The navigation of the Danube was declared to be free, and a commission was to be appointed to clear the mouths, improve and regulate the navigation, and pay the expenses out of a shipping rate. Thus the Black Sea was set apart for commerce and the Danube opened to all the world. This was what, in the language of diplomacy, was called the neutralisation of the Black Sea. Russia would not admit that the terms of this treaty applied to the building-yards of Kherson and Nicolaief, or to the Sea of Azoff; but Count Orloff gave a promise, which was recorded in the protocols, that Russia would not build "anywhere on the shores of the Black Sea, or in its tributaries, or in the waters dependent on it," any ships other than those allowed by treaty. This was accepted as a binding engagement.

In order to show that the Allies did not exchange the territories held by them in return for Kars, it was expressly stated that in exchange for the ports in the Crimea held by the Allies, and the better to secure the free navigation of the Danube, Russia consented to what was absurdly called "the rectification of the frontier of Bessarabia." The new frontier was to start from the river Pruth, at a point where it was not navigable, and follow a line which would exclude Russia altogether from the Danube, and take from her the fortress of Ismail and Kilia Nova. A commission was to trace the new line, and of that we shall have to speak at a later stage, as it nearly gave rise to a renewal of the war. The remainder of the treaty provided for the future status of the Danubian Principalities. They were placed under the collective guarantee of the seven Powers. Their rights and privileges were to be secured, their laws and statutes revised, and a commission was to report on their new organisation, after taking counsel of Divans called for the purpose of expressing the wants of the people. Finally, the Sultan was to give his sanction to the new arrangements, and then the Principalities passed under the protection of the seven Powers. These were the chief stipulations of this remarkable treaty.

We have said that there were three conventions annexed to the general treaty. One we have described already. The second, signed by all the Powers, recorded the declaration of the Sultan that he would continue to prohibit the entry of ships of war into the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and would not admit any so long as he was at peace; and the other Powers agreed to respect this determination of the Sultan. There were exceptions, as in the case of ships bearing ambassadors, admitted by permission of the Sultan, and of ships that the contracting Powers might send to keep watch over the mouths of the Danube. The third convention was signed by the Ministers of France, England, and Russia, and it recorded the undertaking of the Czar "that the Åland Islands shall not be fortified, and that no military or naval establishments shall be maintained or created there." We may here remark that the Allies, after the capture of Bomarsund, offered these islands to Sweden, but that Sweden, fearing to offend Russia, and apprehensive of the burden they might prove, declined the gift. The islands lie at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, off the Swedish capital. It was in the interest of Sweden that this convention was made.

By this treaty and these conventions the Allies secured the object of the war, which really was the reduction of the power of Russia. They not only destroyed Sebastopol and the Black Sea fleet, they prohibited the revival of fleet or arsenal; they removed Russia from the Danube; they deprived her altogether of that exclusive protectorate over the Danubian Principalities which she had extorted from the Porte, and declared null and void that pretended protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan to which Nicholas violently laid claim; they gave Turkey a collective guarantee, and they thus delivered her from the grinding pressure of Russia, and struck out of the hands of the Czar those two formidable weapons of coercion—a mighty arsenal and fleet. Without these, it was thought, an invasion of Turkey from the north would be almost impossible, and the chances of working down upon Constantinople from the east—that is, from Kars—would become very slight. Moreover, by newly organising the Principalities, the Powers provided for the growth of a national Christian State, one of a group which, when the time comes, will take the place of the Turk on the Danube, the Bosphorus, and the European shores of the Levant. In the Baltic the Allies reduced the power of the Czar, and delivered Sweden from a standing menace. So that, on the whole, the fruits of the war were considerable, though not so considerable as they might have been had the war gone on. That peace was then justly made no rational man will deny; for, although all had not been accomplished, enough had been done to meet the exigencies of the period.

With these stipulations Britain, Austria, and France were not content. They took a remarkable step. They, on the 15th of April, signed a treaty of guarantee. That is to say, they jointly and severally guaranteed the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; and declared that "any infraction of the stipulations" of the general treaty, signed on the 30th of March, would be considered by these three Powers as a casus belli. This was a very strong measure; and when it became known, as it soon did, Russia, though offended at a want of confidence, saw that she must not attempt to wriggle out of the conditions she had subscribed. Nevertheless, she did, at a later period, succeed in frustrating the intention of that stipulation which removed her altogether from the Danube, and thrust back her frontier from its banks and waters.

The Congress of Paris did not restrict its attention to those points which arose directly out of the war. The Congress indeed sat for a fortnight after the peace treaty had been concluded, and took some remarkable steps. On the 8th of April, for instance, Count Walewski, as president, submitted to the Congress no fewer than four important subjects, and invited discussion. It was a rather unusual proceeding; but it showed the tendency, which afterwards became more manifest, to draw all great questions for settlement to Paris, and to bring about a sort of government of Europe by congresses. Count Walewski called for the opinions of the plenipotentiaries on the condition of Greece, Italy, and Belgium, and suggested a new declaration of maritime law. Greece had been occupied by the Allies for contumacious conduct; before the troops were withdrawn, the evils must be remedied. In Italy, France, "the eldest son of the Church," occupied Rome—that was abnormal, and the Emperor was ready to withdraw his troops as soon as he could do so without injuring the interests of the Pope—a safe promise. Count Walewski hoped Count Buol would say the same for Austria, whose troops were in the Romagna and Tuscany. Then there was a violent attack on Belgium. What Count Walewski said on this topic was that there were outspoken enemies of the Emperor in Belgium, that they abused the freedom of the press, that this might be dangerous for Belgium, and that the Powers, perhaps, would be good enough to say that Belgium must pass severe laws and repress these excesses. This was very uncalled for, not to say insolent, conduct on the part of the French Minister. Lord Clarendon and Count Cavour spoke with some freedom, and seemed to concur with Count Walewski's Italian views, joining in the blows aimed at Austria and Naples. Count Cavour, indeed, was eloquent on the subject of the Austrian occupation of the Romagna, and the very tyrannical conduct of the King of the Two Sicilies. But the other plenipotentiaries seemed to be rather taken by surprise by the French manœuvre and said little. Even Lord Clarendon did not repel with sufficient, with any vigour, the unwarranted attack on Belgium. So that Count Walewski, in summing up the results of the conversation, could record some sort of hollow agreement as to the principles he laid down affecting Greece, Italy, and Belgium. In fact, the object of the French minister was to bring Italy bodily before the Congress, to pave the way for a policy which was to put a violent end to Austrian occupation, and leave French occupation as flourishing as it was when Count Walewski affected to lament its existence before the Congress of 1856. Italy was introduced to satisfy also the urgent demands of Count Cavour, who had already begun to meditate on plans for his country's liberation with the aid of Britain or France. Italy therefore, at the Congress of 1856, was the shadow of a coming event.

The suggested new declaration on maritime law also took the plenipotentiaries by surprise. They demanded time, but a week afterwards—namely, on the 16th of April—they agreed to a declaration which was annexed to the treaty, and understood to be binding on those who signed it and on those who might accede to it. The points solemnly set forth as for the future international law were these:—"1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished. 2. The neutral flag covers enemies' goods, with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to seizure under an enemy's flag. 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of an enemy." This forms a great landmark in the history of belligerent and neutral rights. It marks the enlargement of neutral, and the restriction of belligerent rights; and by many it was thought that the surrender of the right to take enemies' goods wherever found would prove injurious, unless accompanied by an abolition of the right of capturing private property at sea altogether. Certainly Britain surrendered a great deal to the neutral and non-maritime Powers; and when she had done so, the greatest, the United States of America, would not accede to the declaration—would not agree to abolish privateering unless Europe agreed to abolish the right of capturing private property at sea.