The division of Fyzabad lies to the south-east of Lucknow, and extends from the Ganges to the Gogra. The chief station was Fyzabad, a town on the left bank of the Gogra, just then notorious for the sharp quarrel which had occurred in the previous February between the Moslems and Hindoos. Here lay in gaol that moulvie who had traversed Hindostan preaching sedition, and whose daring had compelled the Government to employ force against him, and to put him in prison. There were two regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a horse battery at Fyzabad. These were known to be so disposed to mutiny that the civilians had sent their wives and children to Shahgunge, a fort belonging to Rajah Maun Sing, a powerful talookdar. Several other European women and children joined them, but some of the officers' wives remained. On the 8th it was clear that the dreaded moment was at hand. Mutineers were coming up the river from Goruckpore and Azimghur, notably the 17th Native Infantry, whose agents entered the lines at Fyzabad, and summoned the troops there to join. This they did on the night of the 8th of June. "They did not go through the form of pretending a grievance, but said they were strong enough to turn us out of the country, and intended to do it." Nevertheless, these men would not murder their officers. They provided them with money and boats wherewith to descend the Gogra, and then, with horrible treachery, instigated the 17th to waylay the boats at Begumgunge and kill the Europeans. Twenty officers and sergeants and one lady embarked in four boats. Of these only six escaped; for as the boats approached Begumgunge, the Sepoys of the 17th opened fire on the fugitives. Some fell wounded, others were killed.

At Sultanpore were Fisher's Irregulars and two foot regiments. Colonel Fisher, the commandant, sent away the ladies and children, who, befriended by Madho Sing, reached Allahabad, plundered, but alive. But the Military Police shot Colonel Fisher, his own men, who "liked him," looking on. They slew Captain Gibbings, and ordered Lieutenant Tucker to be gone. Mr. Block and Mr. Stroyan were also cruelly and treacherously murdered near Sultanpore. The British at Salone on the Sye, and Durriabad, north of the Goomtee, receiving protection from zemindars and talookdars, their lives were preserved. It was thus that, in ten days, all the native troops in Oude freed themselves from British control; and by a sort of common impulse directed their steps towards Nawabgunge Bara Baukee, which became the point of concentration for the meditated attack on Lucknow.


CHAPTER XIII.

Reign of Victoria (continued).

March of the British on Delhi—Battles on the Hindon—Wilson joins Barnard—Hodson reconnoitres Delhi—Battle of Badlee Serai—Behold Delhi!—The Guides arrive—Outbreak at Jallandhar—Johnstone and Ricketts—The Delhi Force in Position—The Enemy assume the Offensive—A "Mistake of Orders"—Destruction of a Battery—A Three Days' Battle—An Unfulfilled Prophecy—Reinforcements arrive—Lord Canning's Inaction—Lord Elphinstone's Discretion—Troops from Madras and Persia—Benares is saved—So is Allahabad—Cawnpore—Nana Sahib and Azimoolah—The Europeans in the Entrenchment—The Mutiny—The Sepoys start for Delhi—Nana Sahib brings them back—Sufferings of the Garrison—Valour of the Defence—The Well—The Hospital catches Fire—Incidents of the Siege—Moore's Sortie—Nana Sahib's Letter—The Massacre at the Ghaut—Central India—Lawrence fortifies the Residency at Lucknow—An ineffectual Sortie—The Defences contracted—The Death of Lawrence.

IT is necessary to return to Delhi again, to bring the British force well up before its walls, and show the Punjab authorities once more in action. We left the troops under Sir Henry Barnard advancing slowly towards Delhi. Among them were the 60th Native Infantry; but instead of disarming them, he placed Colonel Thomas Seaton at their head, and sent them to Rhotuck, in the vain hope that they would escape the contagion. Of course in due time they mutinied, but did not kill their officers; and we may dismiss them here with the remark that the Sepoys swelled the rebel army, and the officers joined the British. Thanks to the journey made by the gallant Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, the Meerut force were under orders to march on Bhagput, where there was a bridge over the Jumna. They were to reach this place and cross on the 1st of June. Accordingly, on the 27th of May, Colonel Archdale Wilson collected his little brigade. It consisted of half a battalion of the 60th Rifles, two batteries, and two squadrons of the Carabineers, with a few native sappers and troopers. The King of Delhi had got wind of this movement, and he sent out a body of mutineers to meet the column. Wilson's force encamped on the 30th on the Hindon, a feeder of the Jumna, crossed by an iron bridge at Ghazeeoodeen Nugger. The rebel force took up a position on their own side of the river. The warning of their proximity given by the outposts was followed by the fire of their cannon. Two heavy round shot were flung into the camp, wounding two bearers. In a moment the force was under arms. A company of the Rifles took possession of the bridge. Major Tombs, with four guns and a troop of dragoons, dashed along the river and took the enemy in flank, while two 18-pounders, posted in front, soon shook the nerves of the rebel gunners over the river. Then, seeing their fire growing unsteady, the Rifles on the bridge were reinforced, and, led by Colonel John Jones, they charged and captured five rebel guns. Thus in a short time the mutineers were worsted in the first pitched battle. They hurried away so fast that pursuit was impossible, and were so cowed that the very Goojurs despoiled their stragglers of arms and accoutrements. We lost one killed and thirty-one wounded. But fresh forces came out from Delhi to retrieve their lost military honour. Our advance was now over the bridge in a burnt village. The enemy, who came up on Whitsunday, the 31st of May, posted themselves on a ridge, with a village on their left. The fight began by a fire from their heavy guns, which were rapidly answered, by Tombs and Light, with 9- and 18-pounders. For two hours the contest was one of artillery, during which the Carabineers were drawn up in the open ground to protect our guns. Then the Rifles charged upon the village occupied by the enemy, and forced them out. The Sepoys, in this fight, kept as far as possible out of musketry range and would not allow our soldiers a chance of coming to close quarters. As we moved on, although we were hundreds and they thousands, they fell back, and when we crowned the ridge the discomfited army was seen in the distance hurrying along the Delhi road. Our loss was six killed in battle, three by sunstroke and twelve were wounded. After this fight, Wilson's force halted four days, during which 100 Rifles and the Sirmour battalion of Ghoorkas, under Major Reid, came up from Meerut—a welcome addition to the brigade.

Marching towards the Jumna on the 4th of June, they crossed it on the 6th by the bridge of boats at Bhagput, which Hodson had taken care should be in order. On the 7th they joined the main body under Barnard, which had arrived at Alipore. The force now numbered 2,400 infantry, 600 horsemen, and twenty-two field guns. The siege train from Philour, with 100 European artillerymen, strengthened the little army, and all was ready for grappling with the enemy. Very early on the 7th Hodson rode out, accompanied by a dozen native troopers. He went up to the very parade ground before Delhi, scaring away the rebel vedettes and reconnoitring the place so well that it was on his information the general based his plans. The infantry were divided into two brigades; one, consisting of the 75th and the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, under Colonel Showers; the second, consisting of the 60th Rifles, the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, and the Ghoorkas, under Brigadier Graves. With each brigade went some horse and guns; the remaining horse formed a cavalry brigade under Colonel Hope Grant, with two troops of horse artillery. These soldiers had come down from Umballa and Meerut, under a blazing sun of the Indian June with the wind blowing, when it blew, in a current of "liquid fire." Cholera had stricken down officers and men. The soldiers were fretful from impatience to fight. Few armies have ever marched to battle animated by so fiery a spirit of revenge.

Before daylight on the 8th of June the army began its forward movement. The Sepoys had taken a post of vantage a few miles north of Delhi. They formed across the Great Road at the serai of Badlee. A serai is a square walled enclosure, having a tower at each angle, one door, and a flat roof. It contains many small chambers for the use of travellers, and is loopholed all round. Thus, it is really a strong post. Badlee Serai lay a little to the west of the Great Road. Around it was the Sepoy camp; and in front, on a hillock commanding the road, they had made a sandbag battery for four heavy guns and an 8-inch howitzer for grape. On both sides of the road the ground is swampy, having pools here and there. The left flank of the Sepoys was covered by the Delhi canal, which ran parallel to the road, and was crossed by bridges not far from each other. This was the position which Hodson had looked at the day before. The plan of attack was simple. Sir Henry Barnard, with the main body, was to assail the front from the Great Road; while Hope Grant turned the left flank with three squadrons of the 9th Lancers, under Colonel Yule, fifty Jheend Horse, under Hodson, or 350 lances, and ten horse-artillery guns, under Tombs, Turner, and Bishop. This little force moved out of camp first, and crossed the canal near Alipore, with the intention of recrossing it in rear of the Sepoys, thus cutting them off from Delhi. The main column, 1,900 infantry, 170 horse, and fourteen guns, marched later, but still in the dusk before dawn. A march of five miles brought them within sight of the Sepoy camps, where the lights were still burning. As our troops were moving down the road the enemy opened fire, and our guns coming rapidly into action, the battle began. The left brigade, under Graves, was still in the rear, when the 75th and the 1st Fusiliers deployed to the right of the road, and soon felt the weight of the heavy shot from the sandbag battery, which our light guns could not silence. Time was precious, but men were more so, and it would never do to play at long bowls with the mutineers. Grant's horsemen were not in sight, but the left brigade were hurrying up, when Sir Henry Barnard ordered the 75th to carry the battery. The men eagerly obeyed. Moving on steadily over rough and watery ground, they were exposed to a fire so heavy that in a few minutes nearly a hundred fell. But without a halt they pressed on, and bringing down the bayonet to the charge, surged into the battery. The 1st Fusiliers had supported the 75th, and soon joined them, when the two regiments dashed at the serai and stormed it. The left brigade had now come up. Grant's cavalry, delayed by watercourses which obstructed the progress of the guns, debouched on the left rear of the rebels, and these scattering and fleeing, left our troops masters of their camp and the greater part of their guns.