The enemy had fled, but not yet into Delhi. They had halted on the ridge overlooking that city, and here seemed disposed to make a stand. Sir Henry Barnard, with one brigade and guns, moved to the left, upon the cantonment lines, while Brigadier Wilson with the remainder took the road to the Subzee Mundi, a suburb of Delhi, while Reid's Ghoorkas extended between the two. The march of the main body had to be performed under fire, which, as the troops were filing over a canal bridge, proved very galling. But they went on with a will, and emerging from the old lines, near the Flagstaff Tower, opened fire and instantly silenced the enemy's guns. The 60th and the 2nd Fusiliers, charging, took the guns, and sweeping along the ridge, arrived at a building at the right extremity, called the Hindoo Rao's house, and destined to be famous in the siege. Here the whole force rallied, Wilson having cleared the Subzee Mundi and captured a gun. All this time the Sepoys in Delhi cannonaded the British from the walls. It was now noon, and the troops withdrew behind the ridge to the camp, after posting pickets at the Hindoo Rao's house, and in the Flagstaff Tower. Thirteen guns had been captured; our loss was fifty-one killed and 152 wounded; among the former was Colonel Chester, Adjutant-General. The loss of the enemy is supposed to have been about 400 killed and wounded. So far, a good beginning had been made; but instead of rushing into Delhi with the enemy, here was the little force obliged to sit down and begin a siege destined to last three months.
HODSON RECONNOITRING BEFORE DELHI. (See p. [204].)
At length, then, behold Delhi. There lay the prize which might have been seized by a bold march from Meerut, on the night of the 10th of May, under an Edwardes or a Nicholson, but which now, swarming with the soldiers of sixteen or eighteen corps of our own training, having in its arsenal and magazine a practically inexhaustible supply of guns and ammunition, defied the gallant few who, after a month's delay, once more looked down upon the handsome walls and beautiful buildings. And trooping along from all points were mutineers hastening to rally round the Great Mogul, and dispute for empire with the pale faces.
Early on the morning of the 9th there was a scene in camp well worth recording, because, in many respects, it illustrates forcibly the transition from the old to the new. There came into the camp squadrons of swarthy horsemen and dusky foot. An officer was out riding; suddenly horse and foot closed upon him, surrounding him, shouting, and "behaving like frantic creatures." They seized his bridle, his dress, his hands, his feet; they threw themselves before his horse, and wept for joy, hailing him in their own tongue as "Great in Battle." The officer was Hodson, the warriors were the horse and foot of the Guide Corps, which had started just three weeks before, from Hotee Murdan, beyond the Indus, 580 miles away. These real soldiers had crossed the Punjab and the Cis-Sutlej States in twenty-one days, doing thirty miles a day, and halting only three days, and then by order. Three hours after they entered the camp the Sepoys showed fight, and the Guides were at once to the front, engaging the enemy hand to hand, and coming out with one officer, Quentin Battye, mortally, and every other officer more or less, wounded. Such was the first exploit of the force which had been raised through the prescience of Sir Henry Lawrence.
While the British, the Ghoorkas, and the Guides were establishing themselves before Delhi, a fresh mutiny in the Punjab threatened for a moment the safety of the Great Road to Lahore. The Sepoys broke out at Jhallandhar. The reader will remember that here were the 36th and 61st Native Infantry and the 6th Cavalry; that it was from this station the troops went out who secured Philour; and that here incipient mutiny, on the 12th of May, had been checked by menace and precaution. Brigadier Johnstone succeeded Colonel Hartley on the 17th of May, and from that time the effects of a feebler hand are discernible. The brigadier humoured the Sepoys, listened to the prayers of their colonels, who here, as elsewhere, were infatuated, and, on the plea of conciliation, gave in to their demands. He was exhorted to disarm Sepoys who could not be expected to resist the contagious example of their brothers, neither could he resist the reproaches and appeals of their officers. He had an ample European force. Captain Rothney halted his famous 4th Sikhs, and Charles Nicholson brought in the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, to aid in the disarming. The brigadier could not make up his mind; and these could stay no longer. At length, when it was too late, Brigadier Johnstone determined to do what he should have done before: too late, for the Sepoys took the initiative, rose on the 7th of June, led, as usual, by the Moslem cavalry, fired the station and shot some of their officers. They called on the native gunners to join, but these replied with grapeshot and would have given more such effective replies had not the brigadier stopped them. All was soon confusion. The Europeans were not allowed to act. The mutineers had it all their own way. For an hour and a half they burnt, plundered, and murdered, and then marched off, unpursued. About 200 remained staunch to their officers; and one whole company, kept in order by a subahdar, preserved the treasury, containing £10,000. The rest decamped, part going towards Loodiana, part taking the hill road, and striking the Sutlej higher up. The former got safely off, the latter met with unexpected resistance, being intercepted by Mr. Ricketts with a small force of Sikhs. And where was the European force from Jhallandhar? In camp near Philour, within hearing of the sound of Ricketts' solitary gun, yet forbidden to move by the brigadier, who thought them too fatigued! Had half the force marched up the river, and opened only on those mutineers who had not crossed, how different would have been the result! As it was, the mutineers were able to enter Loodiana, open the gaol, burn the church and the mission houses, try ineffectually to destroy the powder in the fort, and then fly in a panic across country towards Delhi. Had they moved down the Great Road they would have swept everything before them. A few days later Mr. Ricketts, having the passing aid of Coke's Punjabees, disarmed the town, seized and punished the ringleaders in the late riots and inflicted a heavy fine on the community. Sir John Lawrence also felt the necessity of securing Umritsir, and thither he sent Nicholson with the movable column; while at the other extremity of the Punjab, Crawford Chamberlain, acting on Sir John's orders, very deftly disarmed the native infantry and cavalry at Mooltan by the aid of two Punjab regiments and a European battery.
While these blows were parried in their rear, the army before Delhi had made good its position. It was strong and defensible. To the north of Delhi, some two miles, there is a sandstone ridge running nearly parallel to the course of the Jumna—that is, north-north-east. The slope from the city walls is gradual, but somewhat broken. The plateau on the summit is tolerably flat, and along the whole course of the ridge, but well in rear—that is, north of it,—lay the lines of the camp. The ridge, in fact, may be roughly described as the right bank of the Jumna, to which it approaches at its northern, and from which it recedes at its southern, end. This was the position of the besieging army. Its left rested on the ridge near the river; its centre was behind the Flagstaff Tower; its right at the butt end of the ridge, where the ground fell rapidly towards the Subzee Mundi and Kishengunge, suburbs of Delhi, facing its western walls and set in gardens and groves. At this end the ridge was crowned by a house formerly belonging to a Mahratta chief, and called the Hindoo Rao's house; and here we quickly established a battery, and made a strong post to defend that side. The Grand Trunk Road to Loodiana and Lahore, going from the Cashmere Gate, ascended the ridge, and crossed it to the east of the Flagstaff Tower, and a good road ran along the interior of the ridge parallel to it, thus tying together the position. From this ridge, but especially from Rao's house, Delhi was visible, standing up bold and distinct in the clear air, with its stout red walls and bastions, and white buildings embowered in trees. Between the ridge and the city the ground was rugged, and dotted all over with houses, mosques, tombs, and ruins, rising up among clumps of trees. Such was the base of our attack; for on the south, the whole of the country, as far as Agra, was in the hands of the enemy; the river protected the eastern face, and we had no choice but to assail the north.
As soon as the force settled down on the ridge, the enemy commenced a series of attacks which may be described as incessant. This was policy, for it harassed the besiegers, and kept the Sepoys in good heart, although they were invariably beaten. The first of these was on the 9th of June. They issued from the Lahore Gate on the west, covered by a cannonade from the Moree bastion, at the north-western angle, and, moving on the right flank of the position, strove to storm the ridge. But in vain. The Guides, coming up to support the Rifles and Ghoorkas, charged so vigorously that the Sepoys were driven up to the very walls with great loss. On the 10th and the 11th the mutineers sent up fresh men to turn and carry the right, and paid heavily for their temerity. The heavy guns were now in battery on a knoll forming part of the garden of the Hindoo Rao's house, but their fire was not sufficient to silence, barely to cope with, that of the enemy from his bastions. Our officers began to respect the rebel artillerymen, whose guns were so accurately laid that some could only account for it by supposing that there were European deserters in their ranks. On the 12th the enemy, tired of trying the right, fell unexpectedly on the left. There, in front and due east of the Flagstaff Tower, stood the house and grounds of Sir T. Metcalfe, just where the fertile soil ends and the sands of the Jumna begin. Here the mutineers had established a garrison and a battery; and from this, on the morning of the 12th, they pushed out a large force, which by stealthy movements approached within musket-shot of the Flagstaff Tower, without being detected. There were a few of the 75th and two guns in position. The Sepoys turned its flank and, pressing vigorously forward, gained the ridge and even crossed it. For a moment the whole of that side was in extreme peril; but the 75th soon rallied, and the guns began to play. Then supports came up—1st Fusiliers, Guides, Rifles. A steady charge was made, and the enemy, cut up and bayoneted, rolled down the hill. The charge became eager. The pursued went fast, but the pursuers were almost as speedy; and seeing the opportunity, chased the men into and out of Metcalfe's house, and up to the walls of Delhi. Thus won, this advanced post was held and made the most of, completely barring the way to any force directed on our left, and placing us so far nearer Delhi. This sharp onset had no sooner been repulsed than the enemy showed himself on the right. It was a clumsy attempt at a combined attack on both flanks. Issuing from the Subzee Mundi, on our right rear, the Sepoys made a fruitless effort to mount the hill. The Ghoorkas and Rifles on picket, and part of the 1st Fusiliers, met them, drove them back, and chased them out of the enclosures, killing a goodly number. No quarter was given. The loss inflicted on them in these fights was estimated at 400 killed.
On the 11th five young officers, Hodson, Wilberforce, Greathed, Chesney, and Maunsell, were directed to sit in council, and draw up a plan showing how they would take Delhi out of hand. Their plan was simple enough. They proposed that all the infantry available, some 1,800 men, should move at midnight down to the walls, blow in two gates with powder bags and, storming in, surprise and capture the place. The general took the plan, considered it, adopted it, and issued his orders. The thing was to be done on the night of the 12th, on the heels of the repulse inflicted that day. The young men were sanguine of success, and eager to try—none more so than Hodson. Part of the troops marched; they reached their stations, then halted and reconnoitred: all was still; but the remainder did not arrive; instead of the remainder, came an order to retire. Brigadier Graves refused to believe that the general intended to leave the camp in charge of native troops and horsemen; and in place of sending his infantry, went himself to remonstrate with Sir Henry Barnard. The brigadier admitted readily that the city could be taken, but doubted whether it could be held. Sir Henry hesitated, time was lost, and so he gave way. The conduct of the brigadier is described both by Hodson and Norman as a "mistake of orders." This mistake was bitterly censured at the time, but we cannot help agreeing with those who are thankful for the delay, since even success would have saved no one from massacre, and would have sent a horde of armed ruffians pouring down the unprotected south road; whereas for three months Delhi served as a rallying-place and the Sepoys were kept together.
Unsuspicious of the danger hanging over them, the enemy were still full of fight, and encounters, more or less sharp, continued every day. The front and flanks of the position were now more strongly secured, as it was plain that Delhi could not be taken until large reinforcements of infantry, more guns, and especially more gunners, arrived. Major Reid held the Hindoo Rao's house with his Ghoorkas, commanding Kishengunge and protecting the batteries. Major Tombs had charge of a post to the right rear, over against the Subzee Mundi. The whole front was strengthened by entrenchments, and Hodson kept both eyes on the rear. But they were not content to stand still and repel attacks. Few though they were, they could show their teeth on occasions. On the 17th the enemy, under cover of a very severe cannonade, threw a large force on to a hill near the Eedgah, a walled enclosure, and there began to work on a battery, which, when finished, would enfilade the position on the ridge. Sir Henry Barnard determined to stop this dangerous move; in the afternoon he formed two columns, one under Major Reid, the other under Major Tombs. Starting from our right flank, Reid pushed straight through Kishengunge, and emerged on the right of the new rebel battery, while Tombs, having made a detour, fell upon their left. The new battery was soon carried; the magazine blown up; the mutineers were hunted from garden to garden; the doors of four serais were destroyed, and one gun was carried off by the gallant Tombs. The enemy lost about 300 killed and wounded. Considering the nature of the country, our loss was trifling—three killed and twelve wounded.