Is Ulster Right?

by Anonymous

But when we turn to Ireland, everything is different. The two islands are separated by less than fifty miles. Ireland has for more than a century been adequately represented in the Imperial Parliament; the journey from Galway to London is shorter than that from Auckland or Dunedin to Wellington. So long as Europe remains as it is, Great Britain and Ireland must have a common system of defence-which means one army, one navy, and one plan of fortifications. Again, Irishmen, traders and others, will constantly have to make use of government agents in other countries. Now unless Great Britain is to arrange and pay for the whole of this, we are met at once by the insoluble problem of Irish representation in the British Parliament. If Ireland is not represented there, we are faced with the old difficulty of taxation without representation; if Ireland is represented there for all purposes, Ireland can interfere in the local affairs of England, but England cannot in those of Ireland; if we have what has been called the "in-and-out" scheme as proposed by Gladstone in 1893-that is, for the Irish members to vote on all questions of an Imperial nature, but to retire when matters affecting England only are under discussion-then, even if the line could be drawn (which is doubtful) we might have the absurdity of an English ministry which possessed the confidence of the majority of Englishmen and whose management of England met their approval, being turned out of office by the Irish vote, and England being governed according to a policy which the majority of Englishmen detested. Of course it may be said that there ought to be a number of small Parliaments in the British Isles, like those in the Provinces of Canada or the States of Australia, with one great Parliament supreme over them-in other words, Federation. That might be a good thing, although it would in its turn start many difficulties which it is unnecessary now to discuss, for it is not Home Rule nor does Home Rule lead to it. Federal systems arise by the union of separate States, each State giving up a part of its power to a joint body which can levy taxes and can overrule the local authorities. In fact, when Federation comes about, the States cease to be nations.

(I must here remark in passing that constant confusion has been caused by the various senses in which the word "nation" is used. Thus it is often quite correctly employed in a sentimental sense-we speak of Scottish National character, or of the National Bible Society of Scotland, though Scotland has no separate Parliament or flag and would on a map of Europe be painted the same colour as the rest of Great Britain. Quite distinct from that is the political sense, in which the Irish Nationalists use the word when speaking of being "A Nation once again," or of "The National Independence of Ireland.")

It might be possible for the United Kingdom to be broken up into a Federation (though it is strange that there is no precedent in history for such a course); but that would not be "satisfying the National Aspirations of Ireland." In fact, as Mr. Childers, one of the ablest of English advocates of Home Rule, has stated: "The term Federal, as applied to Irish Home Rule at the present time, is meaningless."

But when we come to examine the existing Bill, which will become law in 1914 unless something unforeseen occurs, we find that it is neither the Colonial plan nor Federation but an elaborate system which really seems as if it had been devised with the object of satisfying nobody and producing friction at every point. England (by which of course I mean Great Britain; I merely use the shorter term for convenience) is not only to pay the total cost of the army, navy and diplomatic services, including the defences of Ireland, but is also to grant an annual subsidy to Ireland commencing with £500,000 but subsequently reduced to £200,000. Whether the English taxpayer will relish this when he comes to realise it, may be doubted. Certainly no precedent can be cited for a Federal system under which all the common expenditure is borne by one of the parties. And further, the present Government state freely that they hope to carry out their policy by introducing a Bill for Home Rule for Scotland and possibly also for Wales. Will the Scotch and Welsh consent to contribute towards the government of Ireland; or will they demand that they shall be treated like Ireland, and leave the people of England to pay all Imperial services and to subsidize Ireland, Scotland and Wales? Then again, Ireland is to send forty-two representatives to what is still sarcastically to be called the "Parliament of the United Kingdom," but will no doubt popularly be known as the English Parliament. They are to vote about the taxation of people in Great Britain, and to interfere in local affairs of that country, whilst the people of Great Britain are not to tax Ireland or interfere in any way with its affairs. This is indeed representation without taxation. Of course it is inevitable that the Irish members will continue to do what they are doing at present-that is, offer their votes to whatever party will promise further concessions to Irish Nationalism; and they will probably find no more difficulty in getting an English party to consent to such an immoral bargain than they do now.

The provisions as to legislation for Ireland are still more extraordinary. The Irish Parliament is to have complete power of legislating as to Irish affairs, with the exception of certain matters enumerated in the Act; thus it may repeal any Acts of the Imperial Parliament passed before 1914. On the other hand, the English Parliament (in which Ireland will have only forty-two representatives) will also be able to pass laws binding Ireland (and in this way to re-enact the laws which the Irish Parliament has just repealed), and these new laws the Irish Parliament may not repeal or overrule. Now this power of the English Parliament will either be a reality or a farce; if it is a reality, the Irish Nationalists will be no more inclined to submit to laws made by "an alien Parliament" in which they have only forty-two representatives than they are at present to submit to those made by one in which they have 103; if it is a farce, the "supremacy of the Imperial Parliament" is a misleading expression. The Lord Lieutenant is to act as to some matters on the advice of the Irish Ministry, as to others on the advice of the English. Anyone who has studied the history of constitutional government in the colonies in the early days, when the governor was still supposed to act as to certain affairs independently of ministerial advice, will see the confusion to which this must lead. Suppose the Lord Lieutenant acts on the advice of the English ministers in a way of which the Irish Parliament do not approve, and the Irish Ministry resign in consequence, what can result but a deadlock?

But most extraordinary of all are the provisions as to finance. The Government appointed a Committee of Experts to consider this question. The committee made their report; but the Government rejected their advice and substituted another plan which is so elaborate that it is only possible to touch on some of its more important features here. I have already said that the English Parliament will have no power to tax Ireland. That statement, however, must be taken subject to two reservations. The Bill provides that if ever the happy day arrives when for three consecutive years the revenue of Ireland has exceeded the cost of government, the English Parliament (with the addition of twenty-three extra members summoned from Ireland for the purpose) may make new provisions securing from Ireland a contribution towards Imperial expenditure. As this is the only reference to the subject in the Bill, the general opinion was that until those improbable circumstances should occur, the English Parliament would have no power to tax Ireland; but when the debates were drawing to a close, the Government astonished the House by stating that according to their construction of the Bill, should any new emergency arise at any time after the Bill becomes law (for instance, a great naval emergency requiring an addition to the Income Tax) it would be not merely the right but also the duty of the Imperial Chancellor of the Exchequer to see that the charge should be borne by the whole United Kingdom-in other words, the Parliament in which Ireland possesses only forty-two representatives may and ought to tax Ireland for Imperial purposes. The friction which will arise should any attempt of the sort be made, especially as the power is not stated in the Bill, is evident. In plain words, it will be impossible to levy the tax.

But apart from these rights, which one may safely say will never be exercised, the financial arrangements will from their very complexity be a constant source of trouble. All taxes levied in Ireland are to be paid into the English Exchequer (or as it is called in the Bill "The Exchequer of the United Kingdom"). Some of the objects for which these taxes have been levied are to be managed by the Irish Government-these are called "Irish services"; others are to be managed by the English Government-these are called "Reserved services." The English Exchequer will then hand over to the Irish Exchequer:-

(a) A sum representing the net cost to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom of "Irish Services" at the time of the passing of the Act;

(b) The sum of £500,000 a year, reducible to £200,000, above referred to; and

(c) A sum equal to the proceeds of any new taxes levied by the Irish Parliament.

Then the balance which the English Exchequer will retain, after handing over these three sums, will go to the "Reserved Services." But as, in consequence of the establishment of the Old Age Pensions and some other similar liabilities, the aggregate cost of governing Ireland at this moment exceeds the revenue derived from Ireland by about £1,500,000, the English taxpayer will have to make up this sum, as well as to give to Ireland an annual present of £500,000; and even if the Irish Government succeeds in managing its affairs more economically than the Government at present does, that will give no relief to the British taxpayer, for it will be observed that the first of the three sums which the Exchequer of the United Kingdom is to hand over is not a sum representing the cost of the "Irish Services" at any future date but the cost at the time of the passing of the Act.