It is possible of course that the Irish revenue derived from existing taxes may increase, and so the burden on the English taxpayer may be lightened; but as it is more probable that it will decrease, and consequently the burden become heavier, the English taxpayer cannot derive much consolation from that.
It will be seen from the foregoing remarks that a number of extremely intricate and difficult financial questions must arise; for instance, what sum really represents the net cost of "Irish Services" at the time of the passing of the Act; what sum equals the net proceeds of new taxes imposed by the Irish Parliament; and at what moment it can be said that the revenue of Ireland has for three consecutive years exceeded the cost of government. All such matters are to be decided by a Board of Five, of whom one is to be nominated by the King (presumably on the advice of the English Ministers), two by the English Government, and two by the Irish. From the decisions of this Board on matters of fact there is to be no appeal. It is needless to point out that every detail in which the three English members overrule the two Irish will be fought out again in the English Parliament by the forty Irish members. This again will show how vain is the hope that future English Parliaments will be relieved from endless discussions as to Irish affairs. Professor Dicey has well named the able work in which he has analysed the Bill and shown its impossibilities "A Fool's Paradise."
The provisions concerning those matters as to which the Irish Parliament is to have no power to legislate are as strange as the other clauses of the Bill. For six years the Constabulary are to be a "reserved service"; but as they will be under the orders of the Irish Government, the object of this is hard to see-unless indeed it is to create an impression that the Ulstermen if they refuse to obey them are rebelling not against the Irish but the Imperial Government. The Post Office Savings Banks are "reserved" for a longer period; as to the postal services to places beyond Ireland, the Irish Parliament will have no power to legislate; but the Post Office, so far as it relates to Ireland alone, will be handed over at once to the Irish Parliament-although even in the case of Federal Unions such as Australia the Post Office is usually considered to be eminently a matter for the Federal authority. And the question whether an Irish Act is unconstitutional and therefore void will be decided by the Privy Council, which will be regarded as an essentially English body; hence if it attempts to veto an Irish Act, its action will be at once denounced as a revival of Poyning's Act and the Declaratory Act of George I.
The Bill excludes the relations with Foreign States from the powers of the Irish Parliament, but says nothing to prevent the Irish Government from appointing a political agent to the Vatican. That is probably one of the first things that it will do; and as the Lord Lieutenant could never form a Government which would consent to any other course, he will be obliged to consent. This agent, not being responsible to the British Foreign Office, may cause constant friction between England and Italy.
But quite apart from the unworkable provisions of the Bill, everything connected with its introduction and passing through Parliament has tended to increase the hatred which the Opposition feel towards it, and the determination of the Ulstermen to resist it if necessary even by force. Those who lived in Australia whilst Federation was under discussion will recollect how carefully the scheme was brought before the people, discussed in various Colonial Parliaments, considered over again line by line by the delegates in an Inter-Colonial Conference, examined afresh in the Colonial Office in London and in the Imperial Parliament and finally laid before each colony for its acceptance. Yet here is a matter which vitally affects the government not of Ireland only but of the whole United Kingdom, and thus indirectly of the Empire at large; it was (as I have shown) not fairly brought before the people at a general election; it has been introduced by what is admittedly merely a coalition Government as a matter of bargain between the various sections, at a time when the British Constitution is in a state of dislocation, as the power of the House of Lords has been destroyed and the new Upper Chamber not yet set up; and it has been passed without adequate discussion. This I say deliberately; it is no use to point out how many hours have been spent in Committee, for the way in which the discussion has been conducted has deprived it of any real value. The custom has been for the Government to state beforehand the time at which each batch of clauses is to be passed, and what amendments may be discussed (the rest being passed over in silence); when the discussion is supposed to begin, their supporters ostentatiously walk out, and the Opposition argue to empty benches; then when the moment for closing the discussion arrives, the Minister in charge gets up and says that the Government cannot accept any of the amendments proposed; the bell rings, the Government supporters troop back, and pass all the clauses unamended. As an instance of this contemptible way of conducting the debate, it is sufficient to point to the fact already mentioned, that so vital a matter as the power of the English Parliament to tax Ireland was not even hinted at until nearly the end of the debates.
And now the Bill is to become law without any further appeal to the people.
Are English Unionists to be blamed if they declare that an Act so passed will possess no moral obligation, and that they are determined, should the terrible necessity arise, to aid the Ulstermen in resisting it to the uttermost?