The Reichstag was closed on May 20, the Socialists remaining silent in their seats, instead of leaving the House, as they had hitherto, while the other parties responded to the President's call for three cheers for the Emperor.
In February a private company composed of members of the leading industrial concerns of the Empire was formed at the instigation of the head of the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office to "further German industrial prestige abroad," i.e. to supply the foreign Press with information favourable to Germany and German industrial enterprise. The sum of 12,500l. a year, the whole Secret Service Fund at the disposal of the Imperial Foreign Office for subsidising foreign papers, was added by the Government to the funds of the company.
In March, the Emperor William visited the Emperor Francis Joseph at Vienna, and afterwards the King of Italy at Venice. The chief feature of these meetings was the special favour shown by the German Emperor to Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, with whom he had long conversations on Eastern affairs.
A discussion on Colonial reforms took place on February 18 in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Dr. Solf, said that after comparing the colonial administrations of the world he had found the British system the best suited to be a model for Germany, and he accordingly intended to strengthen the powers of the Colonial Governors and correspondingly to lighten the burden of the Colonial Office. Replying to a member who complained of the ill-treatment of the natives and the existence of forced labour, the Minister said that the Government was endeavouring to protect the natives, and had instructed the Colonial governors to abolish forced labour. The question was raised again in a full House shortly afterwards, when the Reichstag passed a resolution desiring the abolition of serfdom in German East Africa by January 1, 1920. The Government, on the other hand, issued a White Paper in March, saying that it would be a highly dangerous experiment to fix a date for the abolition. According to the German law every native born after December, 1905, is free, and those who are still serfs can purchase their freedom for a small sum, usually between thirty and forty rupees, which their masters are not allowed to prevent them from earning; more than 2,000 purchase their freedom every year. The number of serfs now in East Africa was estimated to be about 85,000, but it was believed that in fifteen years' time serfdom would be extinct. To abolish it at the date stated in the Reichstag resolution would cost 4,200,000 rupees (about 280,000l.) in compensation to the owners, and leave many serfs without the means of existence. These arguments apparently satisfied the Centre and the National Liberals, but the Social Democrats urged that the Colonies were merely a burden, and that the sooner they could be got rid of the better, as they were useless as homes for white men and contained hardly 25,000 whites altogether. The increase of their trade was only 3½ per cent. of the total of that of German trade, and was less than Germany's trade with Cape Colony and with England's Crown Colonies; most of their needs were supplied from England, and they were not wanted for emigration, for Germany had no surplus population and was always importing foreign workmen. Finally, the Colonies were administered in the interests of unscrupulous companies which were exterminating the natives.
The usual crop of espionage cases came up in the first half of the year. In July a German sergeant was sentenced to fifteen years' penal servitude and expulsion from the Army for corruption and betrayal of military secrets to the Russian military Attaché Colonel Bazaroff, who suddenly left Berlin when the sergeant was arrested. He was clerk in the Engineer Inspection Office, and had sold plans of the fortifications of Königsberg and other places in East Prussia to the Attaché.
Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, in the usual statement of German foreign policy in the Reichstag, on May 14, referred especially to the violent attacks made upon Germany in the Russian Press, which had naturally led the German Press to retaliate, but for this the German Government was not responsible. He knew of no real Russo-German antagonisms and "had reason to suppose" that the Russian Government was determined to maintain friendly relations. As to England the negotiations "were being conducted on both sides in the most friendly spirit, a spirit which in other matters also prevailed in Anglo-German relations." "An understanding which removed possibilities of friction" was also being arrived at with France.
When Austria-Hungary sent her ultimatum to Serbia the German Emperor was on his usual holiday trip in Norway. He was informed of the text of the ultimatum by the German Ambassador at Vienna, but did not think it necessary to return at once to Berlin, as both he and his Ministers and Ambassadors believed that Russia would not actively interfere and that England in any case would be neutral. He shared the indignation of the Austrians and Hungarians at the murder of their Crown Prince, and fully approved of the text of the ultimatum;[6] it was probably intended as a preliminary to war, but he thought the war would be localised, and if successful would remove from Austria-Hungary the danger of a "Slavonia Irredenta" (A.R., 1912, p. 338), which threatened her existence as a great European Power. It was not believed at St. Petersburg that he really wanted war,[7] and in the opinion of his Ministers at Berlin, the declaration of Austria-Hungary that she had no intention of seizing Serbian territory "would have a calming influence at St. Petersburg."[8] As, however, the situation became more threatening, the Emperor suddenly returned to Berlin on July 26, the day before the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was delivered. On July 27, when Germany declined to accept the British proposal for a Conference on the ground that it would practically amount to a Court of Arbitration, she stated that "if Russia mobilised only in the South, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in the North, Germany would have to do so too."[9] As Russia would evidently have to mobilise in the North for a war against Austria-Hungary as well as against Germany, this showed that the Emperor William had now decided for war, and his subsequent acceptance of the principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers,[10] and his assertion that he was "doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way"[11] were merely concessions to the British Government in the hope that it would be neutral. His bid for British neutrality (p. [177]) was made two days after, and when it was refused Germany prepared at once to mobilise both against Russia and France, although negotiations were still going on between the Powers for a pacific issue, and Austria-Hungary had agreed to discuss with them even the basis of the conflict with Serbia.[12] On July 31 the German Chancellor informed the British Ambassador at Berlin that as the whole Russian Army and Fleet were being mobilised, Kriegsgefahr (danger of war) would be proclaimed by Germany at once, and mobilisation follow almost immediately.[13] When on the same day Russia issued orders for a general mobilisation, Germany addressed an ultimatum to the Russian Government demanding that the Russian forces should be demobilised, and that a reply should be given within twelve hours. This, of course, meant war, which was declared against Russia on August 1, and a last effort to secure British neutrality was made by Germany on the same day. The German Ambassador in London asked Sir E. Grey whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, England would engage to remain neutral, and he even suggested that the integrity of France and her Colonies might be guaranteed, to which Sir E. Grey replied that he "felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise on similar terms."[14] Germany then declared war against France (Aug. 3). The day before her armies, which had for some time been ready on the frontier, had marched into Luxemburg, the Chancellor declaring that this was not a hostile act, but was merely intended to insure against a possible attack of the French Army, and promising full compensation for any damage done.[15] Luxemburg protested against this violation of her neutrality, but, of course, without effect. On August 2 Germany invited Belgium to allow German troops to pass through her territory, in which case Germany would guarantee the possessions and independence of Belgium on the conclusion of peace, and pay an indemnity for any damage done by German troops. Belgium rejected this proposal on August 3. And while Germany, on August 4, "repeated most positively the formal assurance that even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory," German troops entered Belgium and summoned Liège to surrender.[16] The German excuse for this violation of Belgian neutrality was that Germany had to advance into France "by the quickest and easiest way," and that "it was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got, through without formidable opposition, entailing great loss of time, which would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier; rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops." The British Ambassador having, in accordance with instructions from his Government, then demanded his passports, the German Secretary of State expressed "his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France." The Chancellor, on receiving the British Ambassador's farewell visit, complained that Great Britain was going to war "just for a word, neutrality, which in war time had so often been disregarded, just for a scrap of paper, on a kindred nation which desired nothing better than to be friends with her." All his efforts, he added, had now been rendered useless, and "the policy to which he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards." What Great Britain had done was "like striking a man from behind while he was fighting against two assailants," and he held her responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. When the news was circulated that England had declared war against Germany, the Berlin mob broke the windows of the British Embassy. On the following morning, August 5, the following message was delivered to the British Ambassador by one of the Emperor's aides-de-camp:—
The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles.
A second attempt was made by Germany on August 10, after the capture of Liège, to obtain the consent of Belgium to the German armies passing through Belgian territory on the understanding that "Germany would evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so," but this proposal was also rejected by the Belgian Government (Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 62 to 65).
A German "White Paper" was issued in August under the title "How the Franco-German Conflict could have been Avoided," which contained the telegrams exchanged between Prince Henry of Prussia, the King of England, and the German Emperor before the outbreak of the war. It was issued from the Government printing office in Berlin in English, not in German. Prince Henry's telegram to the King, dated Berlin, July 30, stated that the Emperor his brother "is much preoccupied" and "is trying his utmost" to fulfil the Tsar's appeal to him to "work for the maintenance of peace," adding that Germany has "taken no measures, but may be forced to do so any moment should our neighbours [France and Russia] continue," and urging the King to use his influence on France and Russia "to keep neutral." The Emperor, he concluded, "is most sincere in his endeavours to maintain peace," but "the military preparations of his two neighbours may at last force him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which would otherwise remain defenceless." A telegram from the German Emperor to the King, dated July 31, stated that the proposals of the British Government (that Russia and France should suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a hostage for the satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their military operations) "coincide" with his ideas and the statements he had got that night from Vienna and forwarded to London, but that the German Chancellor had just informed him that an official notification had arrived that the Tsar had "ordered the mobilisation of his whole Army and Fleet, not even awaiting the results of the mediation he" (the German Emperor) "was working at," and leaving him without any news. He had accordingly left for Berlin to take measures for insuring the safety of his Eastern frontiers, "where strong Russian forces were already posted." Finally, on August 1, the German Emperor telegraphed to the King, with reference to a suggestion by the German Ambassador in London that Germany might refrain from attacking France in a war between Germany and Russia if France remained neutral, that "on technical grounds" this suggestion could not be accepted, as the German mobilisation, which had been proclaimed that afternoon, "must proceed against two fronts, East and West, as prepared, and cannot be countermanded," but that if France should offer her neutrality, "which must be guaranteed by the British Fleet and Army," he would "refrain from attacking France and employ his troops elsewhere." He added that the troops on his frontier were "in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France." It was afterwards explained that the suggestion had created a misunderstanding, as it would probably have been incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance.