In another German White Paper, entitled "Memorandum and Documents with Regard to the Outbreak of War," the "Memorandum" stated that the Balkan League against Turkey had been organised under the patronage of Russia, and that when the League was successful in the Turkish Campaign and had been broken up in consequence of the dissensions of its members, Russia desired a new Balkan League "whose activities should be directed this time not against Turkey ... but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy." Serbia was under this plan to "cede to Bulgaria the section of Macedonia that she had won in the last Balkan War and compensate herself by the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Austria-Hungary, in view of this scheme, considered that "it was not consistent with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action," and asked Germany's opinion in the matter. Germany assured her ally "most heartily" of her agreement with the Austro-Hungarian view, while fully aware "that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question" and might draw Germany into war "in accordance with her duties as an ally." Recognising, however, that "the vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake, Germany could neither advise her ally" to a compliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity "nor deny her Germany's support," especially as "her interests were also seriously threatened," for "if Serbia with the assistance of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the existence of Austria-Hungary any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall of the monarchy and her submission to Slavonic sway under the Russian sceptre, thus making the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable. A morally weakened Austria-Hungary, breaking down under the advance of Russian Panslavism, would no longer be an ally on whom Germany could count such as she needs in view of the attitude of her Eastern and Western neighbours.... Austria was therefore given a free hand in her action against Serbia, in the preparation of which Germany took no part." This was "Austria's affair; she alone would have to settle it with Serbia, and Germany therefore devoted her entire efforts to localising the war," holding that "no civilised nation had the right in this struggle against barbarism and criminal political morality to prevent Austria from inflicting a just punishment on Serbia." Although the Austrian Government had declared through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg that it had no plans of conquest, the first reports of Russian mobilisation had reached Berlin on the same day, and in the evening the German Ambassadors in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were directed to call the attention of the English, French, and Russian Governments energetically to the danger of this measure, "for the decision as to the peace of the world lay entirely in St. Petersburg." The Ambassador at St. Petersburg especially was directed to inform the Russian Government that if it mobilised Germany would also have to mobilise, "both against Russia and France." On the following day (July 27) the "Russian Minister of War, M. Sukhomlinoff, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honour that no mobilisation order had yet been issued; for the present only preparatory measures had been taken, but if Austria crossed the Serbian boundary the military districts facing Austria would be mobilised."
Meanwhile Germany "continued her mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the monarchy," but "unluckily all these mediatory acts were soon overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On July 29 the Russian Government officially announced in Berlin that it had mobilised four Army districts, and reports arrived of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on land and sea." Yet on the same day the Chief of the Russian Staff had informed the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg "that everything had remained the same as had been explained by the Minister of War two days before, and gave his word of honour in the most formal manner that mobilisation had begun nowhere up to three o'clock that afternoon; though he could not answer for the future." At the same time he declared most emphatically that no mobilisation was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching on the German boundary. As numerous and positive reports of the levying of reservists in these districts had reached St. Petersburg, Warsaw and Vilna, the Attaché expressed the opinion to his Government that the statement of the Chief of the Russian General Staff "was an attempt to mislead Germany with regard to the extent of the measures that had already been taken." The assembling, the Memorandum proceeds, "of troops on the East Prussian border and the declaration of a state of war in all important places on the Russian Western boundary no longer left any doubt that Russian mobilisation was actively going on against Germany," notwithstanding the denials "on his word of honour" of the Russian Minister of War. The Memorandum further publishes the text of telegrams exchanged between the Emperor William and the Tsar. On July 28 the former expressed "the greatest disquietude" at the impression which he heard Austro-Hungary's action against Serbia was making in the Russian Empire. "The unscrupulous agitation," he said, "which has gone on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which the Archduke Ferdinand was the victim. The spirit which allowed the Serbians to murder their own King and his wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that you and I, as well as all Sovereigns, have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment." He knew how difficult it was for the Tsar and his Government to resist the pressure of public opinion, and remembering "the heartfelt friendship which had bound him and the Tsar closely for a long time," he was exerting "all his influence to endeavour to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfactory understanding with Russia." He "earnestly hoped, therefore, that the Tsar would help him in his efforts to set aside all obstacles that may yet arise." To this the Tsar replied on July 29 with an urgent appeal that "in this serious moment" the Emperor would help him. A disgraceful war, he said, had been declared on a weak nation; the indignation at this, which he fully shared, was immense in Russia, and he foresaw that soon he would not be able longer to withstand the pressure that was being brought to bear upon him, and that he would be "forced to adopt measures which will lead to war." In order to prevent such a calamity he asked the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to do all that is possible to prevent his ally from going too far. The Emperor replied that he shared the Tsar's wish for the maintenance of peace, but that he cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action "a disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Serbia's promises, when they are only on paper, are quite unreliable, and full guarantees must be secured that Serbia's promises shall be turned into deeds. Russia might, he thought, remain in the rôle of a spectator towards the Austro-Serbian War without dragging Europe "into the most terrible war that it has ever seen." He therefore suggested a direct understanding between St. Petersburg and Vienna as "possible and desirable"—an understanding which his Government was endeavouring to help with all its power. He added, however, that military measures by Russia would hasten a calamity which they both wished to avoid, and would undermine his position as mediator. On July 30 the Emperor repeated that if Russia mobilised against Austria-Hungary, his position as mediator, which he had accepted at the Tsar's urgent request, would be jeopardised, if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the decision now rested on the Tsar's shoulders; they must bear the responsibility for war or peace. To this the Tsar replied that the military measures now being taken "were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations," and that he hoped "with all his heart" that these measures would not influence in any way his (the German Emperor's) position as mediator. On July 31 the Tsar again expressed his thanks to the Emperor for his mediation, "which permits a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peaceably," but added that "it is a technical impossibility" for Russia to halt her military preparations "which became necessary through Austria's mobilisation," though "we are far from being desirous of war." So long as the negotiations continue with Austria regarding Serbia "my troops will not undertake any challenging action, I solemnly pledge my word as to that. I am trusting in the grace of God with all my might, and hope for the success of your mediation at Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe—Your sincerely devoted Nicholas." The Emperor replied that upon the Tsar's appeal to his friendship and plea for his help he had undertaken a mediatory action between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments, but that while this negotiation was under way the Tsar's troops were mobilised against Austria-Hungary, and that his mediation was thereby rendered almost illusory. Notwithstanding this, he had continued it; but now he was in receipt of reliable reports of serious preparations for war on his Eastern boundary also, and responsibility for the safety of his Empire compelled him to take defensive measures. He had carried his efforts for the maintenance of the world's peace to the utmost limit, and it was not he that bore the responsibility for the calamity that now threatened the entire civilised world. Yet at this moment it lay in the Tsar's power to stave it off. No one threatened the honour and might of Russia, which might have awaited the result of his mediation. "The friendship," the Emperor concluded, "for you and your Empire which was bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred to me, and I have been faithful to Russia when she was hard pressed, especially in her last war. It is still possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary."
The mobilisation of the entire fighting force of Russia, the Memorandum adds, which had been ordered in the forenoon of the day when these telegrams were despatched, was in full swing—"the Tsar's telegram was sent at two o'clock in the afternoon"; and this "shows clearly that Russia desired the war," and "in the afternoon of August 1 Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on German territory. By this move Russia began the war." To the question put to the French Cabinet as to what steps it would take "the reply given on the afternoon of August 1 was that France would do what her interests seemed to warrant. A few hours later, at five in the afternoon, the complete mobilisation of the French Army and Navy was ordered, and on the morning of the following day France opened hostilities." A long reply to the French Yellow Book published by the North German Gazette on December 21 further states, with regard to the argument that Austria and Russia were on the point of coming to an understanding respecting the Note to Serbia, when Germany suddenly destroyed all chances of peace by declaring war, that the general mobilisation ordered by Russia brought to naught the entire mediatory work of Germany, so that nothing can get rid of the fact "that Russia bears the responsibility for unchaining a European war."
Germany was badly served by her diplomatists and Ministers, and also by her generals, though she had perhaps the most efficient, and certainly the best organised, army in the world. She believed up to the last moment that neither Russia nor England would fight, being completely ignorant of the relative strength of the cross-currents of influence at the Russian Court and of the determination of all parties in England to resist the violation of the neutrality of Belgium—a step which only turned against her all the civilised nations of Europe, and probably did not bring her much nearer or more quickly to Paris than if she had invaded France from the South, which was the reason given for Germany's action (no doubt based on the opinion of the German General Staff) by the German Secretary of State (p. [314]). Another reason, or rather pretext alleged by the German Government was that it was necessary to anticipate a hostile attack of France through Belgium, and that it had received reliable information to the effect that French forces "intended" to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur; but as a matter of fact there were no French forces in that direction; the attack was made from the Vosges and the subsequent alleged discovery of documents proving that France and England had for some time been preparing together with the Belgian Staff for an attack upon Germany through Belgium only showed that these preparations were made in view of the defence of that country against a possible violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality; besides which both France and England had, in response to an appeal from Belgium to defend her neutrality, replied that they would do so (p. [365]).
The German armies forced their way through Belgium with the precision and pitilessness of a machine, but the victories of the Marne and the Aisne in September arrested their progress, and from then until the end of the year they practically remained stationary. In Russian Poland and Galicia, too, although there they had a leader, Field-Marshal Hindenburg, who gained some brilliant victories, they did not succeed in freeing Prussia from the danger of a Russian invasion.[17]
The Germans and Austrians had at the end of the year occupied, besides nearly all Belgium, one twenty-seventh of French territory and one-third of the Kingdom of Poland, while the French and the Russians held respectively about 200 square miles in Alsace, nearly half of Galicia, and some frontier districts of East Prussia; but neither of the great Austrian fortresses, Cracow and Przemysl. Of the important towns in Poland Russia had Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, while Germany held the equally large, though politically not so important, town of Lodz, "the Polish Manchester." The troops engaged on both sides amounted to about 2,000,000 with upwards of 20,000 guns; the Russian artillery, mostly manufactured in the Creuzot works in France, were only surpassed by the German when the latter brought into action their 42 centimetre and 30½ centimetre mortars, the former manufactured at the Krupp works and the latter at Pilsen, in Austria. The last four months of the year were spent in a series of gigantic but inconclusive struggles, accompanied by hideous carnage of hundreds of thousands of men and in which often each side claimed the victory, but whose only appreciable result was the stemming by Marshal Hindenburg of the advance on Silesia by the Russians and by Generals Joffre and French of the advance on Paris by the Germans. In Poland the Germans had the advantage of internal lines and numerous railways by which they could rapidly bring up abundant supplies of men and material, while the Russians were hampered by a lack of railways, by bad roads, and long distances to their base; in France, on the other hand, the Germans had to go long distances for their reserves, and their difficulties were greatly increased by their occupation of Belgium, the cardinal blunder of the war. The losses of the Germans financially were enormous. Professor Julius Wolf, Professor of Political Economy at Berlin, estimated the damage done in East Prussia and in Alsace at about 50,000,000l., and computed that Germany must reckon upon a total waste in three months of 350,000,000l.
The German Navy[18] did not venture to leave its secure harbours in the Baltic except in the battle off Heligoland in August, the two cruiser raids on the East coast of England in November and December, and some attacks on the Russian port of Libau, where the cruisers Magdeburg and Friedrich Karl were destroyed. When the war broke out the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau were in the Mediterranean, and after bombarding Bona and Philippeville made their way to Messina, whence they escaped to the Bosphorus and were renamed as Turkish ships (p. [183]). The armed merchant cruiser Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, which endeavoured to arrest traffic between England and the Cape, and the Cap Trafalgar were sunk before they could do much damage (Aug. 27 and Sept. 14), but the light cruiser Emden, which escaped from Kiaochau, and the Karlsruhe captured about thirty-three British merchant ships, and the armoured cruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, which had also escaped from Kiaochau, after being engaged by the British unsuccessfully off Coronel, on the Chilian coast, were caught on December 8 off the Falkland Islands and sunk (pp. 226, 247). By the end of the year the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean were nearly free of German cruisers. The submarines of the Germans were equally active and enterprising, but beyond sinking the Cressy, Aboukir, and Hogue in the North Sea in September and the cruiser Hermes in the Straits of Dover in November (pp. 212, 225) they were not very effective in their attacks either upon the Navy or on merchant ships; more were lost by striking the German mines which were laid at the mouth of the Thames and off Ireland. The German airships, too, did not prove very effective.
In the Pacific Ocean Germany lost all her Colonies. On August 18 Japan demanded of Germany the delivery of the entire leased territory of Kiaochau with a view to its restoration to China, and no reply having been given, besieged its fortified port, Tsing-Tao, from October 31 to November 7, when its garrison surrendered. This was by far the most valuable of the German colonies. The Marianne, Caroline, and Marshall Islands were also taken from Germany by the Japanese. German New Guinea and New Britain were captured by an expedition from Australia, and Samoa by one from New Zealand. In Africa Togoland was occupied by the British and French on August 7. In September some raids were made by the Germans on British East Africa, Nyasaland, and British South Africa which were repelled after heavy fighting. On September 19 Lüderitzbucht, in German South-West Africa, was occupied by the Union Defence Force.
On September 27 the British and French invaded the German Colony of Cameroon, whose capital, Duala, surrendered to them, but an attack by British and Indian troops from Bombay on Tanga, in German East Africa, on November 4, was repelled, and the troops then embarked, as it was considered inadvisable to attempt a second attack without adequate reinforcements. In November the Germans made a raid on the Portuguese Colony of Angola, which was repeated in December, although the German Consul had presented a formal apology to the Portuguese Government for the first raid. Finally, on December 30 an Australian force occupied Bougainville, the largest of the Solomon Islands, and hoisted the British flag, and on the following day the British Colony of Walfish Bay, which had been raided by the Germans, was reoccupied by the British.