Britain feels a general failure of credit, not only in the East India Company, but in individuals: and this failure of credit she can ascribe to no other cause, than to some extraordinary defect of numerical circulation, or a deficiency of numerical specie, sufficient to support the wonted credit of paper. How happens this want of numerical specie to be so severely felt, all of a sudden; or from whence should such defect arise? Assuredly from a decrease of her wonted influx of numerical specie; whilst her drain of that specie continues to be at least the same as formerly. But what channel or source, of Britain’s influx, hath been dried up so suddenly, as to create this surprizing failure of numerical circulation? We have shown it to originate in Indian dominion; which being, through misgovernment, reduced to a ruinous state, the consequent wonderful decrease of revenue, hath obliged the Company, to absorb and dry up that channel of Indian private fortunes; which, till within these two years, used to convey into Britain, by foreign Company’s bills, &c. at least 700,000 l. per annum, in numerical specie, or what is equivalent. And as Britain hath, during the two years that this channel was dried up, been continuing that drain, which she could barely support, when aided by that private fortune influx, it is plain that, within these two years, she must have diminished the standing stock of her numerical circulation, at least, 1,400,000 l. And one year, more of only an equally decreased degree of influx, will diminish her circulating stock 2,100,000 l. and so on. But a total deprivation of the influx received, for some years past, from Indian dominion, will, annually, double the diminution of circulating stock.
And, from this view, the nation may draw the following just inferences: first, the mighty value and importance, of this Indian dominion, to Britain; in point of financial aid; as well as in other weighty respects. Second, the mighty alteration of circumstances, in these Indian countries, since the time they became subjected to the dominion of the Company; as also, the present ruinous state of that dominion. And from these two inferences she may deduce, that conclusion which hath been just mentioned, that nothing less than the most speedy application of the most vigorous and effectual measures, can possibly save those countries from final ruin; and Britain from consequent bankruptcy, poverty, loss of credit, of commerce, navigation, naval power, &c.
I have, in this hasty production, sketched out the nature of the necessary measures; but the application of these measures depends entirely upon the nation’s exerting her own attention. I am far from meaning to work upon the passions, I apply only to the reason and understanding of men; for had not respect to decorum, and to the dignity of government, restrained me, I might, on this subject, have thrown out many things, that must have excited discontent and indignation. Nevertheless the importance and urgency of the case obliges me to add, (and, without this, all I have said can avail nothing,) that unless the nation shall exert herself most vigorously in this her own dearest concern, she must not look for any such effectual measures, as will suffice to prevent these disasters.
For the nation must consider, that her present administration consists of the very men who transacted, and (by their truly reverberating eccho) confirmed, to the Company, the second[[2]] grant of the Dewanny: knowing that this Dewanny was nothing other than the sovereignty of a mighty dominion, dependent upon the Crown, and Nation, of Britain: and, consequently that, by subjecting the numerous inhabitants of those countries to the dominion of a few merchants, incapable of administring any sort of government, they were consigning over to tyranny and anarchy, intolerable oppression and ruin, many millions of men, who were, to all intents and purposes, subjects of Britain. And they are the men who, during the four years that elapsed since that grant, have furnished the force to support this tyranny and anarchy: and, in spite of——enacting a farce, wherein the Directors were compelled to perform the same part in Europe, that the native Nabobs have exhibited in India. It cannot, therefore, be expected that they will, willingly, change their plan of conduct: seeing that, besides their former motives, they have the additional one of obstinacy; or shame of standing self-condemned, for past mismanagement, should they now alter their measures. It is rather to be supposed that they will continue the cloke of the Company; together with the Directorial farce: and that, to support the broken credit of the Company, (broken by collusive management,) they will, through eccho, grant her a power, to force her paper upon the public, for its money. As also that, under the pretext of honouring the nation with some share in the charge of this sovereignty, (under the Company, but no share in the profits,) they will gradually thrust her shoulders under that whole load, which, as the Company must manage it, will soon become intolerable. And, by the aid of these fresh reinforcements, they will juggle it and bungle it, and bungle it and juggle it on, for one, or possibly two, years longer: and then Nation and Company will both tumble together, into the pit of bankruptcy, perdition, and despair.
But shall the nation, with eyes open, suffer the pilot to crowd stemlings on the rocks, which have already grazed the ship’s bottom? No, we must about ship, and call another hand to the helm. Matters, it is to be hoped, are not yet past remedy; the channel is obvious; if the nation will but put to her hand. His Majesty can have no real interest but what is common with that of his people: and, however the views of the Crown may, in some cases, differ a little from these of the people; in this particular case they must both exactly concur. He will, here, hearken to the voice of his people: and a little popular heat will force into administration something of that patriotic ambition, fire, spirit, and enterprize, which alone can save this nation from dreadful impending misfortunes.
But if the nation, sunk in the bed of slavish sloth, inebriated with the transforming Circean cap, enervated and emasculated by the lewd embraces of sensual pleasure, shall slight and disregard her own dearest concerns: like the prodigal debauchee, who chides from him the faithful friend that attempts recalling him to sober reflection; and implicitly confides in the management of a steward, who hath already wasted the better part of his fair patrimony: then let the nation, some two or three years hence, recollect, that she was advised of her danger, by a hasty production, issued about the middle of January, 1773: though not thought of, until that most disinterested of all possible ministers had, by way of remedying all evils, dispatched his Secret Committee to the India House: there to inspect the Company’s private œconomy: a thing, with which neither law, justice, government, nor nation hath any thing to do; and which, unless in cases of bankruptcy, is sacred to the meanest individual. As if, from the Company’s books of accounts, it was possible to discover the cause of abuse in the government of those Indian dominions: or, as if schemes of saving to the Company, one shilling per ton, freight of her cargoes: or, three pence per pound, in warehouse room, would retrieve the, almost ruined, Interest of Britain in India.
FINIS.
Footnotes
[1]. As it is impossible to exactly ascertain the annual amount of this private remittance made through various channels, it will no doubt be alledged, that we have exaggerated this article; and yet we have certain ground to affirm, that it is greatly underrated. Sure I am, if we can suppose that the amount of such remittance made from 1757 to 1770 hath been in any degree equal to that of the two following years, (which is ascertained,) and we have no reason to suppose that there hath been any considerable difference, the sum assigned by us will be greatly under mark. For no sooner did the English Company, in 1770, open her treasury, to receive money for remittance to Britain, than there was poured in at her three capital settlements above 1,400,000 l. for which bills were granted, presented, and accepted by the Company, and nearly two thirds of this sum was borrowed in Bengal. And in 1771 she hath borrowed in Bengal alone, under the promise of remittance, a sum perhaps exceeding the whole loan of the former year; though the bills have been postponed by her agents in Bengal, on account of the Company’s inability to answer them. Such was the remittance of British private fortunes for these two years, through the channel of the English Company alone: and we have good reason to suppose, that there may have been some made through other channels. And these enormous sums, borrowed by the Company, as sovereign, for the expence of Bengal, in these two years, will serve to show the mighty alteration of affairs in that country since 1765.
[2]. We must make a wide difference betwixt the first and second grants of this Dewanny, (as it is termed.) The first grant was made for only two years, at a time when the then ministry were in a great measure unacquainted with the nature of the thing which they granted: having been deceived by base art: nor did this ministry, in the course of their administration, exert any manner of ministerial influence over the Directors. But far different were the lights, as well as the conduct of that ministry which, on the expiration of the first two years, renewed that grant for the long term of five years.