Orders were received in the afternoon that the British bombardment would increase greatly in intensity at 5 30 p.m., and would continue so until 6 p.m. For this first half-hour, the guns would be concentrated on the enemy’s barbed wire. At 6 p.m. they would “lift,” i.e., increase their range on to the enemy’s fire trench and shell this solely for three minutes. At 6 3 the communication trenches would be bombarded for a minute, and the enemy’s main trench from 6 4 to 6 15. At 6 15 the guns would lift into the road, and would shell this intensely for half-an-hour, until 6 45. At 6 45 the artillery would form a barrage beyond the road.
At 5 30 promptly the bombardment became terrific. Shells whistled and shrieked overhead in enormous numbers. All the British artillery which was massed behind the line concentrated on the assaulting positions with rapid fire. There were also some French 75 batteries to help. Under this rain of shells B and D Companies moved up the communication trenches towards the fire trench from the supports, and A Company to the supports from the reserve line.
But while the British bombardment increased greatly in intensity, the German shelling, from being merely desultory, also became intense. High explosive shells, in salvoes of four, dropped upon the communication trenches, filling them, in many places, with earth and mud, and in some cases obliterating them. It became a task of extreme difficulty to move up to the firing line under this heavy fire. There were some dead and wounded in the trenches.
Sketch Map of Trenches
At 6 p.m. precisely C Company charged from the fire trench. The leading platoon was a composite one, made up from Nos. 9 and 12 for strength, and under the command of Second Lieutenant Parker; No. 10 Platoon under Second Lieutenant Craven followed at 100 yards’ distance, and No. 11 under Second Lieutenant Davies followed this. They had to climb the parapet, and, under a withering fire, form to the left flank slightly and then charge. They did this almost perfectly in line, and were in possession of the trench inside three minutes. Their losses were chiefly from rifle and machine gun fire. This must have been principally from the main trench, and not the advanced trench of the salient, since they found most of the Germans there sheltering in dugouts; these were dealt with by bombing parties. The bombers worked in two groups: (a) (right) 1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment under Lieutenant Taylor, and (b) 1/6th Scottish Rifles under Lieutenant Hay (left group). These bombing parties, supported by the various parties told off to them, did magnificent work, and penetrated right through the road to a much greater distance than ever the assaulting battalions reached.
Roughly it may be said that the centre of the attack was L 8 as marked on the map. The two leading platoons of C Company, with their left directing the whole attack, charged the German T-head sap directly in front, and taking that in the rush, swept to the German fire trench. On their left were the 1/6th Scottish Rifles also charging.
When the trench was won, comparatively easily, the Germans holding up their hands and pleading for mercy, the bombing parties extended outwards, down past Z 1, K 6, and Z 4. Their orders were to push ahead as far as possible, since the 7th Division, as detailed, would be attacking at the same time. Another party was to break off up towards the German main trench at X 7. The other main party of bombers went towards L 10 up the communication trench—which was also a firing trench facing M 4—at L 10 they split off, one towards L 9 and the other down the main German trench. These bombers actually went beyond the road so fast that their bayonet men could not keep up with them. They mostly ran along the top of the trench, with the German and British Artillery both bombarding the lines all this time very heavily indeed.
Red screens were used to show the furthermost points reached by the infantry, to enable the artillery to support. The bombing parties carried red flags, and a red rocket was to be fired when the infantry reached the houses on the road at L 11. (The artillery had set these houses on fire, and they afforded a good landmark.) But the artillery observers could see nothing because of the tremendous smoke and dust cloud, which hid the whole area from their view. All telephone communication was very soon smashed up, and messages had to be sent by relays of orderlies. Lieutenant Ord at L 8 was in charge of this.
The course of the battle becomes a little obscure. The next supporting Company was B, but Captain Peak, for some time reported missing, has lately been reported dead, and there is no connected account of what actually happened to this Company. At this period the German artillery redoubled in intensity on the deploying Companies, and whereas C Company had suffered chiefly from rifle and machine gun fire, B and D and A Companies suffered from shrapnel and high explosive. B Company seems to have reinforced C Company on the right. B Company men say they had to cross a deep ditch with barbed wire entanglements at the bottom. (This must have been the ditch marked in front of the German fire trench at Z 1). Here, they say, Captain Peak was killed on the barbed wire in front of the trench.