D Company, coming up the now very badly damaged communication and fire trench, was sent to reinforce the line in the left of the centre of the attacking line across the sap and the fire trench, and then along the edge of the communication trench towards L 10. Both B and D Companies moved to support in lines of platoons, through a gap in the trench, under extremely heavy artillery fire.
Meanwhile the attack had swept on, past the German trench, up along the German communication trenches. There were a great number of casualties from rifle fire from the German main trench and enfilading machine gun fire from somewhere about X 7 or Z 2. But the attack swept on and must have carried the main trench, already bombed, but for being pulled up suddenly by uncut barbed wire, which lay concealed in the long grass on the German (east) side of the ditch which runs parallel to the German main trench, south-east from L 10. The attacking line was then within 30 yards of the trench. More enfilade fire came from one of the houses at L 11 on the road. This house must have had a good number of machine guns in it.
The position therefore about 7 p.m. was this:—
Barbed wire marked in red wavy line.
Red line marks approximate centre of attack.
The Scottish Rifles were attacking on our left with their right resting on the British sap head at L 8. Their advance was checked by uncut barbed wire which ran along the northern edge of the communication trench, very early on, and they lay in the open under galling and very heavy fire, losing heavily in attempting to cut it, but were compelled to advance along the communication trench. At 7 p.m. when the advance was checked, they were in this communication trench, which they were holding. Once a part of the German salient, it faced obliquely the British trench at M 4; it was also a fire trench, being very narrow, with numerous traverses and some dugouts about Z. The uncut wire here in front of this trench prevented any further advance by them. All their officers except one were casualties. The result of this forced change of front by them was the formation of an angle at L 10 in the line of attack, they themselves facing north, whilst the Loyal North Lancashires faced east or perhaps north-east.
The ditch in which C Company lay, now reinforced by D on the left and B on the right, with A coming up from reserve, was bordered by a row of pollard willows. On the left it was comparatively dry, with a slight protecting bank on the east (German) side; but the further it went to the right the more of a quagmire it became. In some places on the right it was thigh-deep in water. It ran parallel to the German trench along the road, at about 30 yards’ distance from it. It afforded comparative security after the advance because of the slight cover to be obtained in it, and because it was too near the German trench to allow artillery fire to be brought to bear. C Company had brought up one sandbag per man and one shovel to every three men, with 20 wirecutters to the Company, and B and A Companies had brought up three sandbags per man and a pick or a shovel carried slung with spun yarn, per man, but some of these were lost in the advance, and only a few men came up with them all.
The Battalion entrenched itself in this ditch line as best it could. It was rapidly going dark. A Company, as it came up, was sent to the right of the line to strengthen and extend it and to get into touch with the 7th Division, and several parties were sent out to the right to find them, but fruitlessly. Entrenching in a waterlogged ditch with the entrenching tool was slow work. At dusk the 1/4th King’s Own sent up a Company to reinforce, under the command of Captain Barrow; Major Nickson was in command of the front line. The Colonel had been wounded earlier in the evening, and Major Foley took over command and established his headquarters in the German fire trench opposite L 8.