About 11 p.m. there was a slackening of the German fire, both artillery and rifle. The German artillery fire had been directed chiefly against our supports and reserves, and was particularly violent at L 8. Some of our wounded had been collected there, and were looked after there all night by Sergeant-Major Farnworth.
By this time, in the front line, a machine gun had been placed in position about L 10. The trench junction there had been blocked by sandbags. It was at this point (L 10) that the Scottish Rifles were in touch with us. It was found impossible, because of lack of material, to block the further trench (X 7), and accordingly the line we held in the ditch was bent back to the right to protect that flank. The line was a bad one. There was a conference of Officers held by Major Nickson. Both flanks were in the air. We were not in touch with the 7th Division, and enfilade rifle fire was coming from the right flank, though fairly weak. The ditch was waterlogged, and too wide in places and clearly marked by the row of pollard willows. Spades and picks and sandbags were lacking. There were no bombs left, and no bombers. (There were two advanced bomb reserves of 1,000 bombs each near L 8, but no one knew where these were. The bombers sent to reinforce the original party were shelled heavily on the road to the reserve trenches, and out of 33 only five were unwounded.) Impossible to entrench ditch. Therefore proposed line about 20 yards back in the open. This meant beginning afresh without tools. Men too crowded in line. There were no Verey lights. Artillery support had ceased about 8 45 because of uncertainty as to the actual position of the attacking Battalions. Major Nickson sent back word to Major Foley explaining this and asking for instructions. In the meantime the German counter-attack began, and prevented instructions arriving.
It was about midnight when the Germans began to throw up flares in great numbers. They had been shelling L 10 and the (German) captured salient for some time before. Their counter-attack proper began by bombing at L 10 so severely that the machine gun there was damaged and put out of action, and the connection with the Cameronians broken. Almost at the same time, the Germans began to bomb down the right communication trench (X 7), and followed this by throwing bombs across the open. There was no means of replying, and no cover to be had anywhere in the ditch. To stay there would have meant the wiping out of those in the line; enfilade fire came from both flanks—on the right from the German main trench at K 7, and on the left from L 9; the Scottish Rifles in the German communication trench were enfiladed down the whole length by artillery and rifle fire. Orders were given, therefore, to retire from the position.
At the point Z (see map) a mixed body of men lined the shell craters and held up the Germans for about two hours, losing heavily. This point Z, which lay on the German side of their fire trench, was an absolute mass of wrecked dugouts. These men finally retired, in the mist of the morning, towards the sap south-west of L 8. In the retirement all the attacking Battalions were mixed up. The sap at L 8 was held by a composite company: 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires, 1/6th Scottish Rifles, 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, Grenadier Guards, 1/8th Liverpool Irish, but the Germans, probably because of their check at Z, did not push their counter-attack on to the British lines.
The attacking Battalions were withdrawn to the support trenches about 4 a.m. on the 16th, the men in the sap about 6 a.m., and the lines were taken over by the 1/8th K.L. Regiment (Irish).
Motor machine guns under Captain Hammond, D.S.O., to left of L 8, stayed up through the attack and for four days afterwards.
The casualties were heavy.
The Colonel was wounded at the beginning of the attack, when near L 8. Almost at the same time the Adjutant, Captain Norman, was severely wounded. He advanced with the leading platoon and was on the parapet of the German trench when he was wounded by, it is said, an officer hiding in a dugout.
In C Company, Second Lieutenant P. Parker, who was in command of the charging platoon was seriously wounded, Second Lieutenant Craven was wounded in the leg, and Second Lieutenant Davies, who, wounded slightly twice, would go on, was fatally wounded and died on the field.