| INTERNAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BOKHARA, KHIVA, AND KHOKAND |
| EXTERNAL RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, PERSIA, CHINA, AND RUSSIA. |
(a.) Internal Relations.
From what I have said in the previous pages upon the subject of the recent history of Khiva and Khokand, one may form a tolerably good idea of the terms upon which the different Khanats live with each other. I will, nevertheless, here collect a few facts to render it easier to appreciate the whole situation.
Let us begin with Bokhara. This Khanat, which, even previously to the introduction of Islamism, played a capital part, has, notwithstanding all the revolutions that have since occurred, always preserved its superiority, and it is regarded at the present day as the cradle of the civilisation of Central Asia. Khokand and Khiva, as well as the other small Khanats to the south, and even Afghanistan itself, have never ceased to recognise its spiritual supremacy. They praise and extol the Mollahs as well as the Islamite learning: of the 'noble Bokhara;' but their love of it extends only thus far, for all attempts made by the Emirs of [{431}] Bokhara to make use of their spiritual influence to increase their political power have failed of success, not only in the Khanats but even in the respective cities. Near-sighted politicians might infer, from the wars carried on by the Emir Nasrullah with Khiva and Khokand, that Bokhara, from apprehension of a Russian invasion, is disposed to organise an alliance by means gentle or foul. But this is not the case. Bokhara had never any such plans. The campaigns of the Emir are but predatory expeditions; and I am firmly convinced that should Russia proceed actively to carry out her designs on Central Asia, the three Khanats, so far from giving each other any mutual support in the moment of peril, would by their dissensions furnish the common enemy with the very best arms against themselves. Khiva and Khokand are then to be regarded as the constant enemies of Bokhara: still Bokhara does not look for any serious danger in those quarters, and the only rival that she really fears in Central Asia is one that is day by day becoming more formidable to her--Afghanistan.
That this fear reached its highest point during the victorious march of Dost Mohammed Khan towards the Oxus, need scarcely be mentioned. Emir Nasrullah was well aware that he should never be forgiven by the aged Afghan for his infamous jest played upon him, or rather his son, when the latter sought his hospitality in Bokhara; [Footnote 158] and as it was affirmed that Dost Mohammed had been reconciled with the English, and had become even an English mercenary, the apprehension of the Emir was still further increased by the [{432}] suspicion that he was but a tool in the hands of the English to avenge the bloody deaths of Conolly and Stoddart. Dark, indeed, must the pictures have been of the future destiny of his Khanat, that the Tartar tyrant carried with him into his grave. Not less was the apprehension entertained by his son and successor, the reigning Emir, on his accession. Mozaffar-ed-din was in Khokand when the intelligence reached him of the death of Dost Mohammed. The messenger received a present of 1000 Tenghe; the very same day a festival was improvised, and in the evening the Emir, to complete the number of his legal wives, took to his bed his fourth spouse, the youngest daughter of Khudayar Khan. The great dread has, indeed, passed away, but a feeling of 'respect' continues still to exist; for in Bokhara it is very well known that the Afghans, as fruit of the alliance with England, can now dispose of some thousands of well-drilled regular troops.
[Footnote 158: See Ferrier's 'History of the Afghans,' p. 336.]
Conscious of the superiority of the Afghans, and its own inability to cope with them, it is the policy of Bokhara to do them as much harm as possible by their intrigues. As the Afghans have allied themselves with England it is not difficult to decry them throughout Turkestan as apostates from Islam, and consequently during the last few years the commercial intercourse with Kabul has much diminished. As before mentioned, the Tekke and Salor stand constantly in the pay of Bokhara. At the siege of Herat it was a matter of great surprise to the aged Dost that, in spite of all the presents which he made to them, the Turkomans continued to molest him, and to carry off prisoners even from his own army. He had quite forgotten his real enemies--the gold pieces of Bokhara; for the sympathies of the Turkomans are ever with those that pay best. Thus far of the internal policy of Bokhara.
Khiva has been much enfeebled by the continual wars it has had to maintain with its own tributaries--who are ever ready to renew the contest--the Yomuts, Tchaudors, and Kasaks. The superiority of numbers is on the side of Bokhara; and if the Emir has hitherto been unable to conquer Khiva, the sole cause is the bravery of the Özbeg population. Allahkuli was, as I heard, the first who sent an ambassador to Bokhara and Khokand (probably it was at the suggestion of Conolly), in order to organise a system of mutual aid and defensive alliance against that power of Russia which was ever on the increase. Not only did Bokhara decline to enter into such alliance, but it even evinced a disposition to enter into relations with Russia. Khokand, on the other hand, as well as Shehri Sebz, and Hissar (cities which were then at war with the Emir), declared their readiness to adhere to the proposition of Khiva. But this union never assumed any other form but that of a wish, never was carried into effect; and how difficult its realisation would be is best shown by an ancient Arab proverb, adopted by the Central Asiatics as descriptive of their own national character, and which is to the following effect: 'In Roum are blessings, in Damascus beneficence, in Bagdad science; but in Turkestan nought but rancour and animosity.' [Footnote 159]
[Footnote 159: 'El bereket fi Rum el muruvet fi Sham el ilm fi Bagdad, el togz ve adavet fi Mavera ül-nehr.']