In addition to the numbers given, there were then about sixty ships building, including eight battleships and armoured cruisers, seven protected and unarmoured cruisers, and forty-five destroyers and submarines, whilst the preliminaries to laying down were well advanced in the case of a further twenty-two ships; these, as enumerated in the current year’s naval estimates, included five battleships and armoured cruisers, three protected and unarmoured cruisers, and fourteen destroyers, submarines and fleet auxiliaries. The sea-going and fighting efficiency of all these warships was in advance of their prototype in many important respects in matériel.
Shipbuilding output has thus been well maintained in the dockyards, and there, as in the private yards doing Admiralty work, the delay in beginning new vessels is now at a minimum. The whole machinery of administration in this respect has been accelerated. The period of construction of large armoured warships remained at two years, notwithstanding the great increase in the size and displacement of the latest types. Admiral Jellicoe was a frequent visitor at the works of contractors, and by this means was enabled to assist and encourage those responsible in realizing the best results and to infuse them with his characteristic enthusiasm for the efficiency of the Service.
“The repairs and maintenance of the Fleet have been well looked after by Sir John Jellicoe,” wrote the critic of Engineering, “who has realized throughout the importance of liberal financial provision to enable the prompt and proper execution of repairs. The total number of men employed (shipbuilding and repairs, etc.) in the home dockyards has considerably increased during his period of office. Sir John, having at one time been associated with the building of warships in private yards, has devoted much attention to improving and extending the resources of the dockyards for shipbuilding and repair work. A recent important innovation in dockyard and port equipment is the adoption of large floating-docks for Dreadnoughts and floating-cranes to serve them, a policy which recognizes inter alia the importance of the quality of mobility in docks and cranes. The equipment of temporary bases in time of war becomes easy of arrangement when floating-docks and floating-cranes lie fully equipped and ready for use and transfer. Two such docks, capable of lifting 32,000 tons—one for Portsmouth and one for the Medway—are now under construction, whilst contracts for two large floating-cranes, capable of lifting 100 tons at a radius of 125 feet, and 150 tons at about 90 feet, will very shortly be placed.
“Sir John Jellicoe has been a strong Controller and his severance from the Admiralty is a matter of personal regret, which is not by any means confined to the members of the Board and the heads of departments. No Controller has been more popular; none has commanded greater respect as an administrator.”
It has been stated that during this period Sir John Jellicoe would sometimes work for fifteen or sixteen hours a day, when business pressed. He never “fussed” or gave the impression of “rush,” and he neither worried nor drove his subordinates.
His words were few, but to the point. And he has never been known to make a request or give an order twice.
It was during the period Jellicoe began to carry on the good work Fisher had started at the Admiralty that the Emperor of Germany wrote a remarkable letter to the late Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord in 1908. At the time it was declared by Tweedmouth to be confidential and purely personal, but the contents have at last become more or less public.
This letter, in the light of latter-day events, is particularly interesting. It was quoted for the first time by The Morning Post, and it throws a strong light on the Kaiser’s real character. One can imagine the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Fisher—whom the German Naval Party feared so keenly—describing it in his frank fashion as an infernal piece of bluff.
“During my last pleasant visit to your hospitable shores,” the Emperor wrote, “I tried to make your authorities understand what the drift of the German Naval policy is. But I am afraid that my explanations have been misunderstood or not believed, because I see the ‘German Danger’ and the ‘German Challenge to British Naval Supremacy’ constantly quoted in the different articles. This phrase, if not repudiated or corrected, sown broadcast over the country and daily dinned into British ears, might in the end create most deplorable results.
“It is absolutely nonsensical and untrue that the German Naval Bill is to provide a Navy meant as a ‘challenge to British Naval Supremacy.’ The German Fleet is built against nobody at all. It is solely built for Germany’s needs in relation with that country’s rapidly growing trade.