[4] Derrécagaix and the Prussian Official History both condemn Von Clausewitz’s delay. Adams, however, finds an excuse for it. He says: “The first question that arises is, should Clausewitz have occupied Trautenau? Mondl was up, in all probability, and he would have been deeply engaged before Grossmann [commanding the right column] came up, against orders. He could not have been acquainted with the situation, for Bonin himself was not, and it is difficult, therefore, to attach blame to him. The cause of Grossmann’s delay is said to have been the hilly character of the road. Mondl, on the other hand, reaching Hohenbrück about 7:30, seems to have halted there to form. The Austrian official account states that he had occupied the heights since 9:15, and before this he had reached Hohenbrück at 7:45. When he had formed—that is to say, waited to mass his brigade before deploying—the position must have been taken up by him between 8:30 and 9:15. Had Clausewitz advanced, it would have taken three-quarters of an hour to debouch in force south of Trautenau, so that he would have had to continue his march without halting to cross the Aupa, and push forward from Trautenau, contrary to orders, in order to engage Mondl on the very strong ground he by that time had fully occupied.
“Probably the latter was informed ... that no immediate danger was impending, or he would not have waited leisurely to form. The first duty of the advance, on coming into collision with the enemy, is to occupy rapidly such localities as may prove of use in the impending action.”
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the heights were unoccupied when Von Clausewitz arrived at Parschnitz; and it was his duty, as well as that of Mondl, on coming into collision with the enemy, to occupy rapidly such localities as might have proved of use in the impending action. As to engaging Mondl “on the very strong ground he by that time had fully occupied,” it is sufficient to state that he had only a brigade, while Von Clausewitz had a division. A subordinate commander assumes a grave responsibility when he violates or exceeds his orders; but it is hardly to be expected that an able division commander will fetter himself by observing the strict letter of an order, when he knows, and his superior does not know, that the condition of affairs in his front is such as to offer an opportunity for a successful and valuable stroke, even though that stroke be not contemplated in the orders of his chief. Von Alvensleben understood matters better when he marched without orders to assist Von Fransecky at Königgrätz. If a division commander were never expected to act upon his own responsibility when a movement is urged by his own common sense, it is evident that the position of general of division could be filled by a man of very limited abilities.
[5] “While this was going on a staff-officer ... of General Beauregard’s headquarters ... came up to General Bragg and said, ‘The General directs that the pursuit be stopped; the victory is sufficiently complete; it is needless to expose our men to the fire of the gun-boats.’ General Bragg said, ‘My God! was a victory ever sufficiently complete?’”—Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. I., p. 605.
[6] The above criticism on the delay of Frederick Charles is based mainly on the comments of Major Adams, in his “Great Campaigns in Europe.” Hozier, who, in the main, follows the Prussian Staff History of the war, has nothing but praise for the Prince. The absence of adverse criticism on the action of Frederick Charles in the Prussian Official History is, perhaps, explained by the high military and social position of that general. Adams seems to think that a forward movement by Frederick Charles would have caused Clam-Gallas to abandon Münchengrätz at once, and does not seem to consider that if the Austro-Saxons had not been dislodged, Clam-Gallas would have had the Prussian communications by the throat, while covering his own, and that this advantage might have compensated him for his separation from Von Benedek. It may be urged in objection to these comments, that Frederick Charles did not know the exact condition of affairs in his front at the time. To this it may be replied that ability to appreciate a strategical advantage, and power to form a correct estimate of the enemy’s dispositions, are a test of a general’s merits as a strategist. McClellan is not excused for believing that, when Lee was attacking his right at Gaines’ Mill, the enemy was in strong force between the Federal army and Richmond; and Hamley is not gentle in his comments on Napoleon’s failure to estimate correctly the force and dispositions of the Prussians at Jena; though, being an Englishman, he does not hesitate to adopt another standard of criticism when he finds it necessary to defend Wellington for his error in leaving at Hal 17,000 men so sorely needed at Waterloo.—[See Hamley’s “Operations of War,” p. 94 et seq., and p. 198].
[7] It should be remembered that, in addition to the four corps immediately opposed to the Crown Prince, the IIId and IId Austrian Corps were at Von Benedek’s disposal; the latter being scarcely more than two marches distant from Josephstadt.
[8] At the battle of Königgrätz, Frederick Charles had 123,918 men. His losses at Gitschin aggregated 2,612 men. It seems, therefore, that 130,000 men is a high estimate of the maximum force which he would have been able to oppose to Von Benedek at Gitschin, had the latter made a junction with Clam-Gallas at that point.
[9] Col. C. B. Brackenbury, R. A., who accompanied the Austrian headquarters during the campaign, says that on one occasion he heard Von Benedek say, hotly, to his disputing staff, “For God’s sake do something!” and mentions the following incident: “After the battles of Nachod and Trautenau the second officer of the Intelligence Department examined all the prisoners, and obtained clear information of the whereabouts of all the columns of the Crown Prince, then struggling through the mountain passes. He wrote his report and took it to the officer who had been sent to Benedek to decide the strategy of the campaign. At that time several Austrian corps were close by. The General looked at the paper and had all the facts explained to him. He then dismissed the Captain, who, however, remained and said, probably in that tone of distrust which prevailed, ‘Now, Herr General, I have shown you that the Crown Prince can be beaten in detail if attacked by our great force within half a day’s march; may I ask what you propose to do with the Austrian army?’ The General replied, ‘I shall send it against Prince Frederick Charles.’ The Captain put his hands together in an attitude of supplication and said, ‘For God’s sake, sir, do not,’ but was ordered out of the room. I did not know this fact when Benedek said, the day after the defeat of Königgrätz, ‘Did you ever see such a fine army so thrown away?’”—“Field Works,” by Col. C. B. Brackenbury, R. A., p. 205 and note.
[10] Gitschin, Jung Buntzlau, and Libau are shown on [Map No. 6]. The positions of the other places here mentioned are, in reference to Gitschin, as follows: Aulibitz, nearly 4 miles east; Chotec, about 7 1/2 miles east; Konetzchlum, about 6 1/2 miles east-south-east; Milicowes, about 4 1/2 miles south-south-east; Podhrad, about 2 miles south-west; Robaus, about 2 miles east; Dworetz, near, and north of, Robaus.
[11] It is interesting to note the growth of great generals under the influence of their actual experience in war. The Frederick of Rossbach and Leuthen was very different from the Frederick of Mollwitz. In 1796 we find Napoleon calling a council of war before hazarding a second attempt upon Colli’s position at St. Michel, and showing, even in that vigorous and brilliant campaign, a hesitation never shown by the Napoleon of Ulm and Austerlitz. The Grant of Vicksburg was not the Grant of Shiloh; and Lee at Chancellorsville and Petersburg does not seem like the same commander who conducted the impotent campaign of 1861 in West Virginia. The old saying, “Great generals are born, not made,” is not altogether true. It would be more correct to say, “Great generals are born, and then made.”