[12] The author’s own observations of the topography of the field correspond, in the main, with the description given above. The Bistritz, however, is not such a formidable obstacle as one might infer from the description quoted. At the village of Sadowa it is a mere ditch, not much larger than some of the acequias in Colorado or Utah. It is perhaps eight feet wide and three feet in depth. It could hardly have been an obstacle to infantry. Its muddy bottom and marshy banks doubtless rendered it a considerable obstacle for artillery, but the eight villages through which it flows, within the limits of the battle field, certainly could have furnished abundant material for any number of small bridges required for crossing it. In the vicinity of Nechanitz, the Bistritz, having received the waters of a tributary creek, becomes a true obstacle, as it spreads out to a width of about thirty yards, and the banks are swampy. It should be remarked that at the time of the author’s visit to Königgrätz, there had been very heavy rains, and the condition of the stream was probably the same as on the day of the battle.
[13] A sketch of these operations is given in the appendices.
[14] The strength of the Union army at Gettysburg was 78,043. The Confederate army numbered about 70,000. The Union army lost 3,072 killed, and 14,497 wounded. The Confederates lost 2,592 killed, and 12,709 wounded. In comparing the losses of Gettysburg with those of Königgrätz, no account is here taken of the “missing” in either the Union or the Confederate losses; though the missing (exclusive of prisoners) are figured in with the killed and wounded of the Prussian and Austrian armies. The figures in regard to Gettysburg are taken from the tables (compiled from official records) in “Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.” The figures in regard to Königgrätz are taken from the Prussian Official History.
[15] See [page 70.]
[16] Although the above comment coincides in its main features with the criticism of Hozier on the same subject, it is based upon the author’s own observation of the views of the field afforded from the church tower of Chlum, and from Von Benedek’s position near Lipa.
[17] For example, the formation of Sedgwick’s division at Antietam, Meade’s at Fredericksburg, Pickett’s at Gettysburg, and Sheridan’s at Chattanooga.
[18] See the interesting comments of General J. D. Cox on the assaults in column at Kenesaw Mountain, p. 129, Vol. IX., (“Atlanta”), Scribner’s “Army and Navy in the Civil War.”
[19] The following remarks of Captain F. N. Maude, R. E., on “The Tactics of the American War” sustain the views expressed above, and are interesting as showing an able English military critic’s appreciation of the advanced tactical development of the American armies:
“It is curious to note how little attention has been devoted to the study of the fighting of this most bloody of modern wars; and yet it would seem that the records of these campaigns fought out to the bitter end by men of our own Anglo-Saxon races, would be a far more likely source of information, from which to deduce the theory of an attack formation specially designed to meet our needs, than the histories of struggles between French and Germans, or Russians and Turks. Von Moltke is reported to have said that ‘nothing was to be learnt from the struggle of two armed mobs.’ If that is really the case, which we venture to doubt exceedingly, the great strategist must ere this have been sorry he ever spoke, for, armed mobs or not, both Southern and Northern troops bore, and bore victoriously, a per centage of loss before which even the best disciplined troops in Germany, the Prussian Guard Corps, failed to make headway. It is of no relevance to the argument to say that the breech-loader was not then in use. When a man is hard hit himself, or sees his comrade rolled over, it never enters his head to consider whether the hit was scored by muzzle-loader or breech-loader; the fact itself, that he or the other man is down, is the only one he concerns himself with, and when the percentage of hits in a given time rises high enough, the attack collapses equally, no matter against what weapon it may be delivered.
“Actually, though the armament was inferior, the per centage of hits was frequently far higher than in breech-loading campaigns. There is no action on record during recent years in which the losses rose so high, and in so short a time, as in the American fights.”