Strategical Interests of Russia
The Russian groups lay great stress on the strategical interests of Russia. The separation of Latvia, they say, would greatly prejudice these. The frontiers of Russia, after Latvia’s separation, would strategically be so disadvantageous that it would be difficult to defend them successfully. The former frontiers, with Latvia included, were on the contrary very favourable. Yet Russia did not and could not defend them. There is no doubt that if, in 1914, the Germans had, instead of throwing themselves on France, directed their forces to the East, they would have occupied without much difficulty the whole territory of Latvia; and Russia would have been deprived anyhow of the advantages of strategical frontiers and bases for her fleet. This hypothesis has been fully proved by the events that followed. In the spring of 1915, the German forces, relatively weak, easily succeeded in seizing the South of Courland, with the very important base for their navy at Libau, and took up positions on the River Venta. An attempt was then made to draw the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich, to the necessity of a vigorous defence of Courland in view of her military, political and economic importance. It was then that the Grand Duke, not sharing the opinion of the Russian groups on the strategical importance of Latvia, made his famous retort, “I don’t give a damn for your Courland!”—words which to-day still resound in the ears of every Lett. And in the summer of 1915, a few German detachments were seen occupying, almost without any resistance on the part of the Russians, the greater part of Courland. It is easy to believe in the little importance of the German forces and in Courland’s weak defence when one learns that mere patrols of cavalry took possession of whole towns almost without firing a shot. Seeing this, two sections of Lettish reservists who had been ordered to retreat, begged to be allowed to defend Mitau, and the permission was granted to them. These heroic soldiers offered to the Germans such a violent and unexpected resistance that the latter hesitated for a long time before coming nearer to the town.
In the autumn of 1915, the front was established on the line of the River Daugava (Dwina). The Russian Political Conference will perhaps say that this is precisely the strategic line which they contemplate. If that is so, it is fresh proof that in the hands of Russia strategical advantages have no importance. We know from the words publicly pronounced by the commander of an army on the Riga front, Radko-Dmitrieff, that Riga would have fallen in the autumn of 1915 but for the bravery of the Lettish troops, raised, as it is known, by Lettish patriots, after heated argument with the Russian bureaucracy. In the main, it was not the Russians so much as the Letts who defended the Riga front. It is enough to recollect the long siege which they sustained without respite on the “island of death,” near Ixküle, and the famous breach made by them in the German front near Mangoul, a breach which unfortunately led to nothing, owing to the lack of Russian troops to support them. Let us quote the characteristic and significant words spoken by the Kaiser after an inspection of the Riga front: “Riga will fall into my hands like a ripe fruit when eight stars have died out on that front.” He meant by this the eight detachments of the Lettish army.
The 2nd September, 1917, the Germans broke through the Riga front, and at least two Russian divisions would have been made prisoners if it had not been for the stubborn resistance of certain Lettish regiments, which were then annihilated. After this struggle they existed only in name, a glorious name with which the Bolsheviki continued to frighten their Russian adversaries.[3]
By this we can see that favourable strategical positions, in unskilful hands, become rather a snare than an advantage. The fact is that you cannot get immediate advantage out of a favourable strategical line if you have not the wish, the will, and the capacity to profit by it. Russia lacked both the goodwill and the capacity; they were absent in the Commander-in-Chief as well as in that moujik deserter from Riazan who replied to all exhortations: “Why should I fight? I’m not going to fish in that sea.”
The world-war has proved that patriotic spirit in an army and an understanding of duty are no less indispensable than the technique, favourable positions, etc. Will Russia be able to make her Grand Dukes and moujiks believe that their feeling of duty must extend to the strategic frontiers of the Baltic Sea, in a foreign land? We doubt it. Therefore, Russia’s defence will not be prejudiced if the strategical points aimed towards the West fall into stronger and surer hands than hers.
And the question of Russia’s defence must be examined from another point of view. Against whom is Russia preparing her defence in the West? Against Latvia? It would be a grave insult to Russia to pretend that Latvia, with her two million and a half inhabitants, could dream of an aggressive act against Russia, which, counting only the Great-Russians, possesses 65 million inhabitants. Against Esthonia then, with her million and a half inhabitants? Against Lithuania, with her six million inhabitants? To put these questions is to answer them. Against Poland or Ukraine? But in that case the strategical positions of the Baltic Sea have nothing to do with it. Against a coalition of all these States? This is questionable, for strong and adequate as a defensive coalition of all these States might be regarded, an offensive coalition on their part against Russia is obviously unlikely and futile, for in the latter case there could be neither community of interest nor a common object in aggression.
There remains the hypothesis of M. Mandelstam (Memorandum on the Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations, p. 57), that the territory of Latvia may serve as a very favourable point of disembarkation for armies attacking Russia. If M. Mandelstam has Germany in view as a potential adversary, one can set him at ease by telling him that all the interests of Latvia are directed against Germany, and to suspect her of a future alliance with Germany is simply inadmissible. In the case of an aggressive tendency on the part of Germany, Latvia will have to defend herself, and one can suppose that she will do it more successfully than Russia, which could not thus be other than much obliged to her, in view of Latvia’s carrying out for her a task which had proved beyond Russia’s power.
Russia’s defence will thus in no way be prejudiced by the shores of the Baltic not being guarded by herself but by a more watchful sentry, of whom one could not expect any aggressive tendency, but who would nevertheless oppose himself, in the name of his own interests, to any aggression coming either from the West or East.
The Lettish people claims the realisation of its natural right to an independent existence and free development. Within the boundaries of Russia this was and will be impossible. Consequently, the Lettish people is right in demanding its constitution as an independent State, and this all the more because the interests of the Russian people will not suffer by it.