It is the same in regard to economic relations. Germany, deprived of her colonies, and lacking sufficient resources in raw materials and rich markets, will necessarily direct the surplus of her economic energy towards Russia, which will easily become a German colony and submit entirely to German influence. In this respect, Germany had already arrived at considerable results before the war. She will work in the same direction, and after the signing of peace with still greater activity, which will assuredly lead to results hardly desirable from the political point of view. A Russia invaded by capital and technical forces from Germany, and a Germany with Russian raw materials and Russia’s market at her disposal, will be such great economic powers that each will separately appear a serious menace, and all the more so if in alliance.
But what is more clear and more important is the line of political partition between Germany and Russia. The political security of Europe used to be constantly under the menace of an alliance between Russia and Germany, an alliance which would have radically destroyed the balance of power. This menace was in no way artificial but perfectly real, and might have been realised at any moment. As we have tried to prove, it will inevitably reappear with the reconstitution of Russia. The vanquished two of this great war will not at once submit to their fate; both will be discontented and will cogitate ways of improving their situation. This alone is a sufficient basis for a rapprochement or an alliance. Russia will not resist for long the temptation of an alliance with Germany, of which the leaders beyond the Rhine are already openly talking. Consequently, it is necessary to separate Russia from Germany, that is, to prevent their direct union, and to that end it would be impossible to find a more adequate and easy means than the cordon sanitaire of the States named. Truth to tell, it would be necessary to invent this alliance if it did not force itself into being.
Conclusion
We have arrived at the end of this study and may now summarise.
The question of the organisation of the Lettish people in an independent State must be decided quickly and definitely. The restoration of anything whatever of the status quo ante, whether de facto, temporary or indefinite, would serve no purpose because it would not give to the Lettish people the juridical basis necessary to the reconstruction of a ruined life. This question must be solved independently of the will of the Russian people, because, in principle, the idea that the destiny of any people whatsoever depends on the will of another people, is inadmissible; because also it is impossible to foresee when the Russian people will be in a position to make its will freely known. In definitely deciding the destiny of Latvia, it is necessary to reject the project of an All-Russian Federation.
Such a federation is impossible. In accordance with the laws of historical continuity, it is impossible to pass from a centralised State to one of the most complicated and most delicate forms of State organisation. Besides, the peoples of Russia have no such community of intellectual, moral and economic interests as might become the solid foundation of a free co-existence in one and the same State. The All-Russian Federation will either divide itself into different States or change itself into a centralised State in which the natural rights of its different peoples will not be guaranteed. The only just solution of the question of Latvia is the recognition of that country as an independent State.
This is not only the natural right of the Lettish people. It has long been the object of its permanent and definite leanings, and these are in harmony with its well-recognised interests.
The interests of Russia will in no way suffer from the separation of Latvia; neither economically, for Latvia will certainly be a better intermediary between the West and the East than Russia was or would be; nor strategically, for Latvia will be a much more conscientious sentinel on the Baltic Sea than Russia was or would be.
It is impossible for Russia to claim to re-enter her former boundaries on the necessity of European balance of power, for, as a factor of equilibrium, Russia has been found wanting, and one can foresee her future complete submission to the economic and political influence of Germany, as well as to her civilisation.
On the other hand, the interests of a lasting peace demand the creation of a series of independent national States for the peoples inhabiting the shores of the Baltic Sea; and, between them, a defensive alliance for which there are sufficient grounds in the shape of common economic, political and intellectual interests. Such an alliance would play at the same time the rôle of the necessary line of demarcation between Russia and Germany. Moreover, it is the only natural solution of the problem of the Dominium maris Baltici, which has been an apple of discord for centuries and has often been the disturber of the world’s peace.