Let us first consider the proposals of the Russian Political Conference:—“The question of the Russian borderland peoples must be postponed until it can be decided with the co-operation of the Russian people, for the questions relating to the future status of the nationalities included within the borders of ancient Russia cannot be solved outside the Russian people and without their consent.” That is what the Russian Political Conference proposed in its note of the 6th March, 1919—the solution of the problem must be postponed as long as the Russian people is not in a position to make its will fully known and to take part in the settlement of these questions.
Evidently perceiving how impossible this proposal is, the Russian Political Conference is considering a compromise, and proposes “to apply in the meantime, before a definite settlement is arrived at, a provisional régime in accordance with the present necessities” of the States that have separated themselves from Russia, but “no definite solution should intervene.” In other words, the Russian Political Conference proposes to recognise the de facto governments of the States detached from Russia on the condition that, in an undetermined future, the Russian people, expressing its will by the voice of the Constituent Assembly or by other means, shall say the final and decisive word.
Practical Consequences of the Postponing of the Question
It is supremely clear that this compromise of the Russian Political Conference would not give any practical solution, either at the present time or in the near future. The proof of this is in Latvia’s desperate struggles on two fronts—against the Bolsheviki who have thrown themselves on her, and against the German army of occupation which has no wish at all to surrender the territory. In such circumstances, of what importance would be the recognition of the de facto situation? Moral help is indispensable; besides, it is necessary to have a solid juridical basis, recognised by the Powers, in order to exact from the Bolsheviki and the Germans, not another de facto situation in the place of the one they have caused, but the substitution of Right for their illegal tyranny. Without this, the success of the struggle against the Bolsheviki and the Germans would become impossible, or at least more complicated. Consequently, arms and munitions become indispensable. Were they supplied by the governments backing up the Letts, means for the equipment and maintenance of the army would yet be lacking. These means cannot be obtained if the country does not provide its own finances, which in turn cannot be established until the State is judicially recognised. Strong in such a recognition, the Lettish army, for instance, would long since have occupied Riga and delivered it from the Bolshevist tyranny, but it simply dared not do it because of the lack of revictualling for the inhabitants. Assuredly, who would risk delivering goods on credit without knowing who is legally responsible for the debts? To be successful in the struggle it would be indispensable to restore the means of transport, the communications destroyed by the Bolsheviki, and to replace the rolling stock carried away by the Germans. But who would concern himself with that and invest his capital in such an enterprise if there is no one judicially responsible, and if one does not know to whom the country is to belong and who is to rule it in the future?
The recognition of the present situation would in no way help the Lettish people to hasten its resurrection, so that it represents no progress towards the practical solution of the question in dispute.
It is doubtful whether the Russian People will soon be in a Position to participate in the Solution of these Questions
Of necessity, one could come to an agreement on this point if it were possible to foresee that such a situation would not last too long, but would soon disappear in the presence of durable and well-defined juridical relations. But this cannot be foreseen by anybody if the Lettish question is made dependent on the Russian people. Who would venture to affirm that the Russian people will soon be in a position to manifest freely its will and share in the settlement of these questions?
Admiral Koltchak, for instance, has obtained, on certain conditions accepted by him, the promise of support from the Allied and Associated Powers, and he is backed up by the Russian Political Conference. But he is as yet only in Siberia; much time will elapse before he reaches the Volga, and from there Moscow is yet far; but after all Moscow is not the whole of Russia. Meanwhile, in the South, the Bolsheviki have decided, it appears, to give final battle to Admiral Koltchak. Even supposing that Admiral Koltchak wins the most brilliant of victories, much time will pass before tranquillity returns to the country, before he succeeds in re-establishing the administrative machinery, and a Constituent Assembly is elected in which the “Russian people will be in a position to make its will known freely.”
Even leaving these arguments aside, can one be sure that the government of Admiral Koltchak and the Constituent Assembly convened by him will be recognised as authoritative and as the expression of the free will of the Russian people? It is evident that in no case will this happen without the hottest opposition. Kerensky and his above-named colleagues, the Paris Section of the Union for Russian Regeneration, and the Russian Republican League in their declaration (Humanité, 21st May, 1919) say, evidently aiming at the party of Koltchak, “It is necessary that the governments of the free peoples declare openly that they will never recognise, in Russia, any government whatsoever which is a dictatorship of one man or of a group and does not acknowledge the principle of popular sovereignty nor take the essential measures for its realisation.” In another direction, the Russian National and Democratic Union (Bloc), comprising the various leagues set up for the regeneration of Russia, protests violently against the conditions imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers on Admiral Koltchak and accepted by him (Patrie, 15th June, 1919). So the future opposition to the future Russian government is already there, and even makes an appeal for support to all the free peoples. But who can say definitely that with this support either Kerensky or Koltchak will be in a position to get the upper hand?
And again, should the government of Lvov-Kerensky, or simply that of the latter alone, be recognised as enjoying legal continuity?