No wonder the Manchoo Government repudiated this pretty arrangement, fleet and all, when it arrived in China. There is, however, another reason to account for the ignominious failure of the "Vampyres,"—ignominious because they had neither right nor justification to be placed in the position of mercenaries, or to be subjected to dismissal by a barbarous court. The Imperialists were willing enough to receive a fleet upon any terms when the success of the Ti-ping revolution was certain unless foreigners interfered; but when the "Vampyres" did arrive, the dread of the avenging Ti-ping no longer existed. By English troops and English officers in command of Chinese disciplined legions, the revolutionists had been driven back from Shanghae and Ningpo, and were still retreating before the shock of foreign arms. Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne came too late. They could not become the slaves of the Manchoo, neither could they constitute themselves his tyrants, and consequently Prince Kung repudiated all his obligations with characteristic treachery.
When the flotilla reached China the Imperial Government endeavoured to place it under the command of the provincial authorities, and by this determination they effected its dissolution. Captain Osborne refused to lower himself into the position occupied by British officers in the neighbourhood of Shanghae and Ningpo—that of filibusters, subordinate to the local authorities—but the Tartars had the best of the argument, for the precedent existed in the terms upon which the military had taken service with them; they were therefore justified in applying the same reasoning to make the navy of England subservient to their inferior officials. Prince Kung and his colleagues were decided upon this point and the repudiation of other guarantees; Captain Osborne remained equally firm; consequently Mr. Lay lost his lucrative appointment as Inspector General of Chinese customs, Captain Osborne did not become a Manchoo Admiral, and the naval force of no nationality was sold, while the officers and men had to go back to where they came from.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer's magniloquent benediction, in which he prophesied of "the day when its leaders would come back rich in professional fame, and bringing also with them fresh glory to their country," vanished and disappeared in thin air, thanks to the failure of the attempt to "spread peace" with rifled artillery. Mr. Lay, since his tardy appreciation of the Manchoo, in "Our Interests in China," thus describes the state of affairs which led to the failure of his regenerating scheme:—
"When I left China, the Emperor's Government, under the pressure of necessity,[34] and with the beneficial terror established by the allied foray to Pekin in 1860 fresh in their recollection, was in the best of moods, willing to be guided," &c. "What did I find on my return? The face of things was entirely changed. There was the old insolent demeanour, the nonsensical language of exclusion, the open mockery of all treaties, the declared determination to yield nothing that could be evaded. In short, all the ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had been frittered away, and we were thrust back into the position we occupied before the war—one of helpless remonstrance and impotent menace."
A pretty state of affairs truly! Re-established, too, by British politicians, who, by supporting the Manchoos, have perpetuated a system which the Ti-pings would have altered for ever.
Time has already proved the truth of the above assertion by Mr. Lay; time will yet prove the bitter hatred the present dynasty of China entertains towards Great Britain, the nation which has frequently chastised them, forced them to break their own laws and receive the obnoxious opium, humbled them before their people and compelled them to eat the fruit of humility, and worse than all, originated the once irresistible Ti-ping revolution by the importation of Christianity. They would not be men did they forget the blows (not always justifiable) they have received; they would not be Manchoo did they forget to revenge themselves when able.
Financially considered, this Anglo-Manchoo expedition was rather a serious matter for the British Government. The only authentic estimate of the expenditure which is at present available shows that the portion consequent merely on the return of the flotilla when its services were rejected, amounted to 213,000 taels, or £71,000, which was advanced in the first instance from the Manchoo customs and subsequently refunded by England when receiving the quarterly payment of the Indemnity.
Here is what Captain Osborne says:—
"Dire necessity made Pekin accept our aid in a form likely to be beneficial to China and England. Reason or argument had nothing to do with it, so far as the mandarins were concerned. Most unexpectedly to them, our authorities repulsed the rebellion, without taking any guarantees from Pekin for future behaviour. The mandarins were at once rampant; they are not such fools as to spend their revenue in maintaining order, if we Englishmen will do it for nothing. The fear of rebellion is past. Lay, I, and the force may return to England."