[Footnote B: History of Christian Doctrine, by William G. T. Shedd; Vol. I, p. 52.]
It is hoped that enough is said here to establish the fact that the conception of God as "pure being," "immaterial," "without form," "or parts or passions," as held by orthodox Christianity, has its origin in Pagan philosophy, not in Jewish nor Christian revelation.
Of Jesus Christ Being Both Premise and Argument against Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophical Argument."
And now as to the whole question of God being "existence," "pure being," "most simple," "not compound;" also his "immutability," as set forth in Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophical argument." What of it? This of it: Whatever "simplicity," "immutability," or other quality that is ascribed to God, must be in harmony with what Jesus Christ is: I meet Mr. V.'s "philosophical argument" as I meet his scriptural argument. I appeal to the being and nature of Jesus Christ, as a refutation of his philosophical conclusions. Is Jesus Christ God? "Yes," must be my friend's answer. Very well, this is my premise. Jesus is God in his own right and person, and he is a revelation of what God the Father is. He is not only a revelation of the being of God, but of the kind of being God is. And now I test Mr. V.'s argument by the revelation of what God is, as revealed in the person and nature of the Son of God. While I am doing so, let it be remembered that Jesus is now and will ever be what he was at the time of his glorious ascension from the midst of his disciples on Mount Olivet—God, possessed of all power in heaven and in earth, a glorious personage of flesh and bone and spirit. And now, is Jesus Christ without form? No; he is in form like man. Is Jesus Christ illimitable? Not as to his glorious body; that has limitations, dimensions, proportions. Is Jesus Christ without parts? Not as to his person; his body is made up of limbs, trunk, head; and parenthetically I may remark, a whole without parts is inconceivable. Then it follows that God's "infinity," so far as it is spoken of in scripture, does not refer to his person, but evidently to the attributes of his mind—to his intelligence, wisdom, power, patience, mercy, and whatsoever other qualities of mind or spirit he may possess. If it is argued that it is illogical and unphilosophical to regard God in his person as finite, but infinite in faculties, that is finite in one respect and infinite in another, my answer is that it is a conception of God made necessary by what the divine wisdom has revealed concerning himself, and it is becoming in man to accept with humility what God has been pleased to reveal concerning his own nature, being assured that in God's infinite knowledge he knows himself, and that which he reveals concerning himself is to be trusted far beyond man's philosophical conception of him.
But to resume our inquiry: Is Jesus Christ immutable, unchangeable? Is he Plato's "that which always is and has no becoming?" or Mr. Van Der Donckt's "necessary Being * * * that cannot change with regard to his existence, nor can he change with regard to his mode of existence," and therefore could never be anything other than he was from eternity? It is inconceivable how any being can be a son and not have a beginning as such. Whatever of eternity may be ascribed to the existence of the Lord Jesus, he must have had a beginning as a son; that term implies a relation, let it be brought about how it may, and that relation must have had a beginning. While there may never have been a time when Jesus was not in respect of his existence as an Intelligence, there must have been a time when he was not as "Son." So that he doubtless became "Son," hence changed his relation from not Son to Son; hence changed in his relations, in his mode of existence. We know there was a time when he was not man, that is, not man of flesh and bone made of the materials of this world; and he became man; another change. There was a time when he was mortal man, by which I mean, man subject to death; and he became, and is now, immortal man; another change. There was a time when all power in heaven and in earth was "given" to him; (Matt. 28:18) hence, there must have been a time when he did not possess it; hence another change, a change from the condition of holding some power to that of possessing all power. These facts attested by Holy Writ are against Mr. V.'s doctrine of God's "immutability," so far at least as relates to the impossibility of changing his mode of existence. And if Mr. V.'s doctrine of the "immutability" of God means that God cannot change in his relations, then I put these facts in the career of the Lord Jesus against his argument, and say that not only did Jesus pass through these changes of conditions and relations, but that God the Father could, and very likely did, pass through similar relations and changes. Else of what significance are the following passages?
The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do; for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise (St. John 5:19).
The Prophet Joseph Smith quoting the substance of St. John 5:26, also says:
"As the Father hath power in himself, even so hath the Son power"—to do what? Why, what the Father did. The answer is obvious—in a manner to lay down his body and take it up again. "Jesus, what are you going to do?" "To lay down my body as my Father did, and take it up again." Do you believe it? If you do not believe it, you do not believe the Bible.[A]
[Footnote A: Millennial Star, Vol. 23: p. 247.]
It is the accepted doctrine of the orthodox Christian creeds that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is as the Father is—(Creed of St. Athanasius) that is, of the same nature and essence. Very well, then; as God, the Father, begot Jesus, the Son, may not the Son in time also beget a son or sons? Or, after ascribing to the Son the same nature and the same power as is ascribed to the Father, will our orthodox friends insist upon limiting the Son by denying him productive virtue, and contend that Jesus must endure without the exercise of it? If the existence of the Son was essential to the perfection of God, the Father—and it cannot be thought of in any other light—may it not be, since the Son is of the same nature as the Father, that the fact of fatherhood is necessary to the perfection of the Son? To deny him the power of attaining it would be to limit his power, which may not be done even according to orthodox Christian doctrine. Is it not likely, nay, would it not be so? that the same cause or impulse, or necessity, or what influence or consideration soever it was that led God, the Father, to beget a Son, create a world, and provide for its redemption, would impel the Son, since he is of the same nature as the Father, to do these same things? And where was the beginning of such proceedings? and where will be the end of them?