But now, to resume again our measuring of Mr. V.'s philosophy by Jesus Christ as God.
Is Jesus Christ without passions? No; his deathless love for his friends, so beautifully manifested by word and deed throughout his mortal life, together with his love for mankind, which led him to give his life for the world, as also his explicitly declared hatred of that which is sin and evil, forbid us thinking of him as without passions.[A] As in him dwelt "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," so in him necessarily are gathered all these qualities, attributes and perfections that go to the making of God. Does possession of these qualities, together with Messiah's mode of existence in the form and person of Jesus Christ, come in conflict with the notion of God's "simplicity," "immutability," and "eternity," as conceived by philosophers? So much the worse, then, for the faulty and merely human conceptions of those qualities, as relating to God. Better mistrust the accuracy of metaphysical reasoning; better throw aside Plato and his philosophy as untrustworthy, than to be moved ever so slightly from the great truth of revelation that Jesus, the Messiah, is God; and that such as he is, God is, as to essence, attributes, existence, and the mode of existence. Jesus Christ, then, once accepted as God, and the manifestation of God to men, is a complete answer to Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical argument for the absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality" or "immutability" of God.
[Footnote A: God is angry with the wicked every day (Ps 7:11.)]
More of Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophy."
I must not neglect Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophy" that forbids us believing that "several finite things" can "produce an infinite, or an illimitable, as there would always be a first and last." Also his "finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God." Also, his "many infinite beings are inconceivable; for, if there were several, they would have to differ from each other by some perfection." And his "from the moment one would have a perfection, the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a compound of infinite parts."
Can any one, can Mr. Van Der Donckt himself, be quite sure of all this? Who knows how the infinite is constituted? When men speak of the infinite, are they not treating of that which is beyond the comprehension of the mind of man, at least in his present state of limited intellectual powers; for whatever may be the heights to which the mind of man may rise, when freed from his present earth-bound conditions, here and now he must recognize his intellectual limitations: for, as in Christ's humiliation (i. e. in his earth-life) his judgement was taken away (Acts 8:33), that is, his divine, supreme, intellectual and spiritual powers were veiled—so with man, in this same world of trial and limitations. Whatever his power as an eternal Intelligence may have been, or what it may be hereafter, he is now compelled to admit that he sees but as through a glass darkly, and therefore imperfectly. Men, I hold, though they be philosophers, cannot comprehend the infinite, much less say how it is constituted. But let us reflect a little upon the several propositions Mr. V. submits to us:
1—"Several finite beings cannot produce the infinite."
So far as it is possible for the human intellect to conceive the infinite, the material universe is infinite, eternal, without beginning and without end. It is inconceivable that the universe could have had a beginning, could have been produced from nothing. "All the apparent proofs," remarks Herbert Spencer, "that something can come out of nothing, a wider knowledge has one by one cancelled. The comet that is suddenly discovered in the heavens and nightly waxes larger, is proved not to be a newly created body, but a body that was until lately beyond the range of vision. The cloud which in course of a few minutes forms in the sky, consists not of substance that has just begun to be, but of substance that previously existed in a more diffused and transparent form. And similarly with a crystal or precipitate in relation to the fluid depositing it" (First Prin., p. 177.) Mr. Spencer holds it "impossible to think of nothing becoming something," for the reason that "nothing" cannot become an object of consciousness (Ibid pp. 161-2.) In like manner, he holds that matter is indestructible, and hence, that the universe cannot be annihilated. "The doctrine that matter is indestructible has become a common-place," he remarks. "The seeming annihilations of matter turn out, on close observation, to be only changes of state. It is found that the evaporated water, though it has become invisible, may be brought by condensations to its original shape." The indestructibility of matter, Mr. Spencer holds to be a datum of consciousness, which he thus illustrates:
Conceive the space before you to be cleared of all bodies save one. Now imagine the remaining one not to be removed from its place, but to lapse into nothing while standing in that place. You fail. The place that was solid you cannot conceive becoming empty, save by the transfer of that which made it solid * * * However small the bulk to which we conceive a piece of matter reduced, it is impossible to conceive it reduced into nothing. While we can represent to ourselves the parts the matter as approximated, we cannot represent to ourselves the quantity of matter as made less. To do this would be to imagine some of the constituent parts compressed into nothing; which is no more possible than to imagine compression of the whole into nothing. Our inability to conceive matter becoming non-existent, is immediately consequent on the nature of thought. Thought consists in the establishment of relations. There can be no relation established, and therefore no thought framed, when one of the related terms is absent from consciousness. Hence, it is impossible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming something. (First Prin., p. 181.)
The material universe, then, is eternal, it always existed, and how many changes soever it may pass through, it will never be annihilated. Not one atom can be added to the sum total of its substance, nor one blotted out of existence—it is everywhere existing, and, so far as the mind of man can conceive "infinity," it is infinite. Yet we know that this whole is made up of a great variety of substances and objects which are finite; and our philosophers, for the most part, hold that matter is divisible into ultimate atoms. Not that such a fact has been demonstrated or is demonstrable; but granted the existence of matter, its existence as an aggregation of such ultimate things as atoms seems to be a necessary truth. I say necessary truth, because the mind of man cannot conceive to the contrary, and hence, science assumes matter to be composed of atoms. But atoms are things—material things; and in the mind must necessarily be thought of as having dimensions—an upper and lower part, also a hither and thither side; or if spherical then a circumference and diameter; in other words, atoms are finite, material things, and in the aggregate constitute the material universe, which, so far as the wit of man can conceive, is infinite; and hence, we may say the infinite universe is composed of finite atoms; or, several finite things—Mr. V.'s philosophy to the contrary notwithstanding—produce the infinite.