Another corps was covering the Ardennes and Luxembourg. (No. 7.)
The Prussians were besieging Landau. (No. 8.)
The Duke of Brunswick was covering the siege in the Vosges. (No. 9.)
General Wurmser was observing Strasbourg and the army of the Rhine. (No. 10.)
The French, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostile corps, had five principal masses in the camps of Lille, Douai, Guise, Sarre Louis, and Strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) A strong reserve, (g,) composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northern frontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy's line in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood, (i, k, l, m.)
This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel near Dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1 and 2, under the Duke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No. 3,) at Menin; next that of Clairfayt, (5,) before Maubeuge; finally, joining the army of the Moselle toward Sarre Louis, it beat the Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges, and, with the assistance of the army of the Rhine, (f,) drove Wurmser from the lines of Wissembourg.
The general principle was certainly well applied, and every similar operation will be praiseworthy. But, as the Austrians composed half the allied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points 4, 5, and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident that if the French had collected three of their large corps in order to move them against Benjouski at Thuin, (No. 6,) and then fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by the Charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the North Sea, and would have obtained immense results.
The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great importance that Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the English. Besides this, York's corps, encamped on the downs, might be cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable French masses for this object were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were good reasons for commencing operations by attacking the English. The principal undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate the strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of retreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined, by way of punishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the English as he might have done.
It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve along the whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had decisive results, because the attacks were made in front, and because, when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through, and the French reserve moving on to the different points in succession, none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the French had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse, had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed Benjouski, assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him vigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do at Ligny in 1815, the result would have been very different.
I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession and at decisive points.[[54]]