But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position, that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point, is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from each other, as was the case with the allied armies in the Seven Years' War; or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its sides, like the Rhine, the Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent the enemy from using his forces simultaneously. In case of great numerical inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the extremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you.
It was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisive points of a theater of war, requires two things:—1st, that the principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's, to attack them in succession; 2d, that the best direction of movement be adopted,—that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points already known, and afterward upon secondary points.
To illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, I will give a sketch of the operations of the French at the close of 1793. ([See Plate III.])
It will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on the frontier of France from the Rhine to the North Sea.
The Duke of York was attacking Dunkirk. (No. 1.)
Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2.)
The Prince of Orange was occupying an intermediate position at Menin. (No. 3.)
The Prince of Coburg, with the main army, was attacking Maubeuge, and was guarding the space between that place and the Scheldt by strong detachments. (No. 4.)
Clairfayt was covering the siege. (No. 5.)
Benjouski was covering Charleroi and the Meuse, toward Thuin and Charleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (No. 6.)