The Turkish Empire, Its Growth and Decay

by Baron G. Shaw-Lefevre Eversley

The first of the wars thus referred to was that with Russia, then under the rule of Peter the Great. He was ambitious of extending his Empire by the acquisition of the Crimea, and of thus getting access to the Black Sea. It was only after the defeat of Charles XII, the King of Sweden, at the battle of Pultowa in 1709, and the consequent conquest of Livonia, that his hands were free for aggression elsewhere. Russia was already in possession of the important fortress of Azoff, on the north-east shore of the sea of that name. The Czar had also fortified Taganrog and other places threatening the Crimea. The Porte was alarmed by these manifest preparations for war. The relations of the two Governments were also embittered by the fact that the Swedish King, Charles XII, after his defeat at Pultowa, sought refuge in Turkey, and that the Sultan accorded a generous hospitality to him, and with great magnanimity refused the demand of Peter for his extradition. It followed that, in 1711, the Porte anticipated the undoubted hostile intention of the Czar, and declared war against Russia. An army was sent by the Sultan across the River Pruth into Moldavia, under command of Grand Vizier Baltadji. This pasha had risen to his post from the humble position of woodcutter at the palace, through the intrigues of his wife, who had been a slave in the Sultan’s harem. The Czar, on his part, had collected his forces in the south of Poland and marched into Moldavia. The two armies met on the River Pruth. The Russian army, already greatly reduced in number by want of food and disease, numbered no more than twenty-four thousand men. The Ottomans, who had been reinforced by a large body of Tartars, under the Khan of the Crimea, were at least five times more numerous. The Czar Peter, unaware that the Ottomans had crossed the Danube, advanced rashly on the right bank of the Pruth, and was posted between that river and an extensive marsh not far from Zurawna. The position was dominated by hills, which the Grand Vizier occupied in force, and his numerous and powerful guns swept the position of the Russians, cut off their access to the river, and completely hemmed them in. Their plight is best described in a letter which the Czar wrote to the Russian Senate at Moscow from his camp at this point:—

I announce to you that, deceived by false intelligence and without blame on my part, I find myself shut up in my camp by a Turkish army. Our supplies are cut off, and we momentarily expect to be destroyed or taken prisoners, unless Heaven should come to our aid in some unexpected manner. Should it happen to me to be taken prisoner by the Turks you will no longer consider me as your Czar and Sovereign, nor will you pay any attention to any orders that may be brought to you from me, not even if you recognize my handwriting; but you will wait for my coming in person. If I am to perish here, and you receive well confirmed intelligence of my death, you will then proceed to choose as my successor him who is most worthy among you.

There can be no doubt that the Russian army was completely at the mercy of the Ottomans, and might have been entirely destroyed or captured. It was saved from either fate by the Czar’s wife, Catherine. She was the daughter of a peasant, married in the first instance to a dragoon in the Russian army, and later the mistress of Prince Menschikoff. Peter, smitten by her beauty and wit had recently married her, and she was with him on this campaign. This lady, with great presence of mind, collected what money she could, to the value of a few thousand roubles, and sent it and her jewellery with a letter to the Kiaya of the Grand Vizier, suggesting a suspension of hostilities with a view to terms of agreement. In this way relations were established between the two generals, and a treaty of peace was agreed to. Its terms were very humiliating to Russia. Azoff and its surrounding district were to be surrendered to the Porte. Taganrog and some other fortresses were to be dismantled. The Russian army was to withdraw from Poland. The King of Sweden was to be allowed safe conduct through Russia to his own country. There was to be no Russian ambassador in the future at Constantinople. In return for these great concessions the Russian army was to be permitted to retreat without molestation.

The preamble to the treaty contained the following remarkable admission of the predicament in which the Czar and his army were placed:—

By the grace of God, the victorious Mussulman army has closely hemmed the Czar of Muscovy with all his troops in the neighbourhood of the River Pruth, and the Czar has asked for peace, and it is at his request that the following articles are drawn up and granted.

It was also declared in the treaty by the Grand Vizier “that he made the peace by virtue of full powers vested in him, and that he entreated the Sultan to ratify the treaty, and overlook the previous evil conduct of the Czar.”

The signing of the treaty of the Pruth was vehemently opposed by the King of Sweden, who was in the Ottoman camp, and by the Khan of the Crimea. They doubtless had good reasons of their own for wishing the war with Russia to be prolonged. It was due to their intrigues at Constantinople that violent opposition was roused to the ratification of the treaty. Baltadji found on his return that, instead of being received with acclamation for having recovered Azoff and other territory, of which the Porte had been deprived a few years previously, he was dismissed from his office with disgrace. The Kiaya Osman and the Reis Effendi Omer, who were believed to be largely responsible for the treaty, were put to death by order of the Sultan.

The Porte refused to ratify the treaty, and preparations were made for a renewal of the war with Russia. But wiser counsels ultimately prevailed, largely through the advice of the British Ambassador, Sir R. Sutton; and two years later, after long negotiation, another treaty was concluded with the Czar, which embodied all the terms of that effected by Baltadji which had been so much objected to.

Many historians have found fault with Baltadji for having neglected the opportunity of destroying or capturing the Russian army and the Czar Peter himself, and for having allowed them to escape by concluding the treaty. It has been suggested that he was bribed by the Empress Catherine. It is, however, inconceivable that one in the high position of Grand Vizier, where there were such immense opportunities for enrichment, could have sold himself and his country for so small a price. It is more probable that the presents of the Empress were made to the subordinate of the Grand Vizier for the purpose of opening negotiations with him. It is also more reasonable to conclude that Baltadji was convinced that no better terms could be obtained by a prolongation of the war. The destruction of the Russian army or its capture, together with the Czar, would have roused the Russian people to a great effort to avenge such a disaster. It is significant that the Sultan, while putting to death the Kiaya and Reis Effendi, spared the life of Baltadji, who was mainly responsible, and simply dismissed him from the office of Grand Vizier. This seems to indicate that the Sultan had given authority in advance to Baltadji, as stated in the treaty, to agree to terms such as were actually obtained. It seems to be unlikely that Sultan Achmet desired to extend his Empire beyond the territory of Azoff into the heart of Russia. What better terms, then, could have been obtained by prolonging the war?