A voyage round the world in the years MDCCXL, I, II, III, IV

by Baron George Anson Anson

CHAPTER IX

OBSERVATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FACILITATING THE
PASSAGE OF OUR FUTURE CRUISERS ROUND CAPE HORN

The improper season of the year in which we attempted to double Cape Horn, and to which is to be imputed the disappointment (recited in the foregoing chapter) of falling in with Terra del Fuego, when we reckoned ourselves above a hundred leagues to the westward of that whole coast, and consequently well advanced into the Pacifick Ocean; this unseasonable navigation, I say, to which we were necessitated by our too late departure from England, was the fatal source of all the misfortunes we afterwards encountered. For from hence proceeded the separation of our ships, the destruction of our people, the ruin of our project on Baldivia, and of all our other views on the Spanish places, and the reduction of our squadron from the formidable condition in which it passed Streights Le Maire to a couple of shattered half-manned cruisers and a sloop, so far disabled that in many climates they scarcely durst have put to sea. To prevent, therefore, as much as in me lies, all ships hereafter bound to the South Seas from suffering the same calamities, I think it my duty to insert in this place such directions and observations as either my own experience and reflection, or the conversation of the most skilful navigators on board the squadron, could furnish me with, in relation to the most eligible manner of doubling Cape Horn, whether in regard to the season of the year, the course proper to be steered, or the places of refreshment both on the east and west side of South America.

And first, with regard to the proper place for refreshment on the east side of South America. For this purpose the island of St. Catherine's has been usually recommended by former writers, and on their faith we put in there, as has been formerly mentioned. But the treatment we met with, and the small store of refreshments we could procure there, are sufficient reasons to render all ships for the future cautious how they trust themselves in the government of Don Jose Sylva de Paz, for they may certainly depend on having their strength, condition, and designs betrayed to the Spaniards, as far as the knowledge the governor can procure of these particulars will give him leave. And as this treacherous conduct is inspired by the views of private gain in the illicit commerce carried on to the river of Plate, rather than by any national affection which the Portuguese bear the Spaniards, the same perfidy may perhaps be expected from most of the governors of the Brazil coast, since these smuggling engagements are doubtless very extensive and general. And though the governors should themselves detest so faithless a procedure, yet as ships are perpetually passing from some or other of the Brazil ports to the river of Plate, the Spaniards could scarcely fail of receiving, by this means, casual intelligence of any British ships upon the coast, which, however imperfect such intelligence might be, would prove of dangerous import to the views and interests of those cruisers who were thus discovered.

For the Spanish trade in the South Seas running all in one track from north to south, with very little deviation to the eastward or westward, it is in the power of two or three cruisers, properly stationed in different parts of this track, to possess themselves of every ship that puts to sea; but this is only so long as they can continue concealed from the neighbouring coast, for the instant an enemy is known to be in those seas, all navigation is prohibited, and consequently all captures are at an end, since the Spaniards, well apprized of these advantages of the enemy, send expresses along the coast and lay a general embargo on all their trade; a measure which they prudentially foresee will not only prevent their vessels being taken, but will soon lay any cruisers who have not strength sufficient to attempt their places under necessity of returning home. Hence then appears the great importance of concealing all expeditions of this kind, and hence, too, it follows how extremely prejudicial that intelligence may prove which is given by the Portuguese governors to the Spaniards in relation to the designs of ships touching at the ports of Brazil.

However, notwithstanding the inconveniences we have mentioned of touching on the coast of Brazil, it will often-times happen that ships bound round Cape Horn will be obliged to call there for a supply of wood and water, and other refreshments. In this case, St. Catherine's is the last place I would recommend, both as the proper animals for a live stock at sea, as hogs, sheep, and fowls, cannot be procured there (for want of which we found ourselves greatly distressed, by being reduced to live almost entirely on salt provisions), and also because, from its being nearer the river of Plate than many of their other settlements, the inducements and conveniences of betraying us are much stronger. The place I would recommend is Rio Janeiro, where two of our squadron put in after they were separated from us in passing Cape Horn, for here, as I have been informed by one of the gentlemen on board those ships, any quantity of hogs and poultry may be procured; and this place being more distant from the river of Plate, the difficulty of intelligence is somewhat inhanced, and consequently the chance of continuing there undiscovered in some degree augmented. Other measures, which may effectually obviate all these embarrassments, shall be considered more at large hereafter.

I next proceed to the consideration of the proper course to be steered for doubling Cape Horn. And here, I think, I am sufficiently authorised by our own fatal experience, and by a careful comparison and examination of the journals of former navigators, to give this piece of advice, which in prudence I think ought never to be departed from: that is, that all ships bound to the South Seas, instead of passing through Streights Le Maire, should constantly pass to the eastward of Staten-land, and should be invariably bent on running to the southward, as far as the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, before they endeavour to stand to the westward; and that when they are got into that latitude they should then make sure of sufficient westing before they once think of steering to the northward.

But as directions diametrically opposite to these have been formerly given by other writers, it is incumbent on me to produce my reasons for each part of this maxim. And first, as to the passing to the eastward of Staten-land. Those who have attended to the risque we ran in passing Streights Le Maire, the danger we were in of being driven upon Staten-land by the current, when, though we happily escaped being put on shore, we were yet carried to the eastward of that island; those who reflect on this, and the like accidents which have happened to other ships, will surely not esteem it prudent to pass through Streights Le Maire, and run the risque of shipwreck, and after all find themselves no farther to the westward (the only reason hitherto given for this practice) than they might have been in the same time by a secure navigation in an open sea.

And next as to the directions I have given for running into the latitude of 61 or 62 south, before any endeavour is made to stand to the westward. The reasons for this precept are, that in all probability the violence of the currents will be hereby avoided, and the weather will prove less tempestuous and uncertain. This last circumstance we ourselves experienced most remarkably, for after we had unexpectedly fallen in with the land, as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, we stood away to the southward to run clear of it, and were no sooner advanced into sixty degrees or upwards but we met with much better weather and smoother water than in any other part of the whole passage. The air indeed was very cold and sharp, and we had strong gales, but they were steady and uniform, and we had at the same time sunshine and a clear sky; whereas in the lower latitudes the winds every now and then intermitted, as it were, to recover new strength, and then returned suddenly in the most violent gusts, threatening at each blast the loss of our masts, which must have ended in our certain destruction. And that the currents in this high latitude would be of much less efficacy than nearer the land seems to be evinced from these considerations, that all currents run with greater violence near the shore than at sea, and that at great distances from shore they are scarcely perceptible. Indeed the reason of this seems sufficiently obvious, if we consider that constant currents are, in all probability, produced by constant winds, the wind driving before it, though with a slow and imperceptible motion, a large body of water, which being accumulated upon any coast that it meets with, must escape along the shore by the endeavours of its surface to reduce itself to the same level with the rest of the ocean. And it is reasonable to suppose that those violent gusts of wind which we experienced near the shore, so very different from what we found in the latitude of sixty degrees and upwards, may be owing to a similar cause, for a westerly wind almost perpetually prevails in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. And this current of air being interrupted by those immense hills called the Andes, and by the mountains on Terra del Fuego, which together bar up the whole country to the southward as far as Cape Horn, a part of it only can force its way over the tops of those prodigious precipices, whilst the rest must naturally follow the direction of the coast, and must range down the land to the southward, and sweep with an impetuous and irregular blast round Cape Horn and the southermost part of Terra del Fuego. However, not to rely on these speculations, we may, I believe, establish as incontestible these matters of fact, that both the rapidity of the currents and the violence of the western gales are less sensible in the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees than nearer the shore of Terra del Fuego.