But though I am satisfied from both our own experience, and the relations of other navigators, of the importance of the precept I here insist on, that of running into the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, before any endeavours are made to stand to the westward, yet I would advise no ships hereafter to trust so far to this management as to neglect another most essential maxim, which is the making this passage in the height of summer—that is, in the months of December and January; and the more distant the time of passing is taken from this season, the more disastrous it may be reasonably expected to prove. Indeed, if the mere violence of the western winds be considered, the time of our passage, which was about the equinox, was perhaps the most unfavourable of the whole year; but then it must be remembered that independent of the winds there are in the depth of winter many other inconveniences to be apprehended which are almost insuperable, for the severity of the cold and the shortness of the days would render it impracticable at that season to run so far to the southward as is here recommended; and the same reasons would greatly augment the alarms of sailing in the neighbourhood of an unknown shore, dreadful in its appearance in the midst of summer, and would make a winter navigation on this coast to be, of all others, the most dismaying and terrible. As I would therefore advise all ships to make their passage in December and January, if possible, so I would warn them never to attempt the doubling Cape Horn, from the eastward, after the month of March.

And now, as to the remaining consideration, that is, the properest port for cruisers to refresh at on their first arrival in the South Seas. On this head there is scarcely any choice, the island of Juan Fernandes being the only place that can be prudently recommended for this purpose. For though there are many ports on the western side of Patagonia, between the Streights of Magellan and the Spanish settlements, where ships might ride in great safety, might recruit their wood and water, and might procure some few refreshments, yet that coast is in itself so dangerous from its numerous rocks and breakers, and from the violence of the western winds which blow constantly full upon it, that it is by no means adviseable to fall in with that land, at least till the roads, channels, and anchorage, in each part of it are accurately surveyed, and both the perils and shelter it abounds with are more distinctly known.

Thus having given the best directions in my power for the success of our cruisers who may be hereafter bound to the South Seas, it might be expected that I should again resume the thread of my narration. Yet as both in the preceding and subsequent parts of this work I have thought it my duty not only to recite all such facts, and to inculcate such maxims as had the least appearance of proving beneficial to future navigators, but also occasionally to recommend such measures to the public as I conceive are adapted to promote the same laudable purpose, I cannot desist from the present subject without beseeching those to whom the conduct of our naval affairs is committed to endeavour to remove the many perplexities and embarrassments with which the navigation to the South Seas is at present necessarily encumbered. An effort of this kind could not fail of proving highly honourable to themselves, and extremely beneficial to their country. For it seems to be sufficiently evident, that whatever improvements navigation shall receive, either by the invention of methods that shall render its practice less hazardous, or by the more accurate delineation of the coasts, roads, and ports already known, or by the discovery of new nations, or new species of commerce; it seems, I say, sufficiently evident, that by whatever means navigation is promoted, the conveniences hence arising must ultimately redound to the emolument of Great Britain. Since as our fleets are at present superior to those of the whole world united, it must be a matchless degree of supineness or mean-spiritedness if we permitted any of the advantages which new discoveries, or a more extended navigation, may produce to mankind to be ravished from us.

As, therefore, it appears that all our future expeditions to the South Seas must run a considerable risque of proving abortive whilst in our passage thither, we are under the necessity of touching at Brazil, the discovery of some place more to the southward, where ships might refresh and supply themselves with the necessary sea-stock for their voyage round Cape Horn, would be an expedient which would relieve us from this embarrassment, and would surely be a matter worthy of the attention of the public. Nor does this seem difficult to be effected. For we have already the imperfect knowledge of two places which might perhaps, on examination, prove extremely convenient for this purpose. One of them is Pepys's Island, in the latitude of 47° south, and laid down by Dr. Halley about eighty leagues to the eastward of Cape Blanco, on the coast of Patagonia; the other is Falkland's Isles, in the latitude of 51-½°, lying nearly south of Pepys's Island. The first of these was discovered by Captain Cowley in his voyage round the world in the year 1686, who represents it as a commodious place for ships to wood and water at, and says it is provided with a very good and capacious harbour, where a thousand sail of ships might ride at anchor in great safety; that it abounds with fowls, and that as the shore is either rocks or sands, it seems to promise great plenty of fish. The second place, or Falkland's Isles, has been seen by many ships, both French and English, being the land laid down by Frezier, in his chart of the extremity of South America, under the title of the New Islands. Woodes Rogers, who run along the N.E. coast of these isles in the year 1708, tells us that they extended about two degrees in length, and appeared with gentle descents from hill to hill, and seemed to be good ground, interspersed with woods, and not destitute of harbours. Either of these places, as they are islands at a considerable distance from the continent, may be supposed, from their latitude, to lie in a climate sufficiently temperate. It is true, they are too little known to be at present recommended as the most eligible places of refreshment for ships bound to the southward, but if the Admiralty should think it adviseable to order them to be surveyed, which may be done at a very small expence by a vessel fitted out on purpose, and if, on this examination, one or both of these places should appear proper for the purpose intended, it is scarcely to be conceived of what prodigious import a convenient station might prove, situated so far to the southward, and so near Cape Horn. The Duke and Duchess of Bristol were but thirty-five days from their losing sight of Falkland's Isles to their arrival at Juan Fernandes in the South Seas: and as the returning back is much facilitated by the western winds, I doubt not but a voyage might be made from Falkland's Isles to Juan Fernandes and back again in little more than two months. This, even in time of peace, might be of great consequence to this nation; and, in time of war, would make us masters of those seas.

And as all discoveries of this kind, though extremely honourable to those who direct and promote them, may yet be carried on at an inconsiderable expence, since small vessels are much the properest to be employed in this service: it were to be wished that the whole coast of Patagonia, Terra del Fuego, and Staten-land were carefully surveyed, and the numerous channels, roads, and harbours with which they abound were accurately examined. This might open to us facilities of passing into the Pacifick Ocean, which as yet we may be unacquainted with, and would render all that southern navigation infinitely securer than at present; particularly an exact draught of the west coast of Patagonia, from the Streights of Magellan to the Spanish settlements, might perhaps furnish us with better and more convenient ports for refreshment, and better situated for the purposes either of war or commerce, and above a fortnight's sail nearer to Falkland's Island than the island of Juan Fernandes. The discovery of this coast hath formerly been thought of such consequence by reason of its neighbourhood to the Araucos and other Chilian Indians, who are generally at war, or at least on ill terms, with their Spanish neighbours, that Sir John Narborough was purposely fitted out in the reign of King Charles II. to survey the Streights of Magellan, the neighbouring coast of Patagonia, and the Spanish ports on that frontier, with directions, if possible, to procure some intercourse with the Chilian Indians, and to establish a commerce and a lasting correspondence with them. His Majesty's views in employing Sir John Narborough in this expedition were not solely the advantage he might hope to receive from the alliance of those savages, in restraining and intimidating the crown of Spain; but he conceived that, independent of those motives, the immediate traffick with these Indians might prove extremely advantageous to the English nation. For it is well known that at the first discovery of Chili by the Spaniards, it abounded with vast quantities of gold, much beyond what it has at any time produced since it has been in their possession. And hence it has been generally believed that the richest mines are carefully concealed by the Indians, as well knowing that the discovery of them would only excite in the Spaniards a greater thirst for conquest and tyranny, and would render their own independence more precarious. But with respect to their commerce with the English, these reasons would no longer influence them; since it would be in our power to furnish them with arms and ammunition of all kinds, of which they are extremely desirous, together with many other conveniencies which their intercourse with the Spaniards has taught them to relish. They would then, in all probability, open their mines, and gladly embrace a traffick of such mutual convenience to both nations; for then their gold, instead of proving an incitement to enslave them, would procure them weapons to assert their liberty, to chastise their tyrants, and to secure themselves for ever from the Spanish yoke; whilst with our assistance, and under our protection, they might become a considerable people, and might secure to us that wealth which formerly by the House of Austria, and lately by the House of Bourbon, has been most mischievously lavished in the pursuit of universal monarchy.

It is true, Sir John Narborough did not succeed in opening this commerce, which, in appearance, promised so many advantages to this nation. However, his disappointment was merely accidental, and his transactions upon that coast (besides the many valuable improvements he furnished to geography and navigation) are rather an encouragement for future trials of this kind than any objection against them; his principal misfortune being the losing company of a small bark which attended him, and having some of his people trepanned at Baldivia. However, it appeared, by the precautions and fears of the Spaniards, that they were fully convinced of the practicability of the scheme he was sent to execute, and extremely alarmed with the apprehension of its consequences. It is said that his Majesty King Charles the Second was so far prepossessed with the belief of the emoluments which might redound to the publick from this expedition, and was so eager to be informed of the event of it, that having intelligence of Sir John Narborough's passing through the Downs on his return, he had not patience to attend his arrival at court, but went himself in his barge to Gravesend to meet him.

To facilitate as much as possible any attempts of this kind which may be hereafter undertaken, I prepared a chart of that part of the world, as far as it is hitherto known, which I flatter myself is, in some respects, much correcter than any which has been yet published. To evince which, it may be necessary to mention what materials I have principally made use of, and what changes I have introduced different from other authors.

The two most celebrated charts hitherto published of the southermost part of South America, are those of Dr. Halley, in his general chart of the magnetic variation, and of Frezier in his voyage to the South Seas. But besides these, there is a chart of the Streights of Magellan, and of some part of the adjacent coast, by Sir John Narborough above-mentioned, which is doubtless infinitely exacter in that part than Frezier's, and in some respects superior to Halley's, particularly in what relates to the longitudes of the different parts of those streights. The coast from Cape Blanco to Terra del Fuego, and thence to Streights Le Maire, we were in some measure capable of correcting by our own observations, as we ranged that shore generally in sight of land. The position of the land to the northward of the Streights of Magellan, on the west side, is doubtless laid down but very imperfectly; and yet I believe it to be much nearer the truth than what has hitherto been done, as it is drawn from the information of some of the Wager's crew who were shipwrecked on that shore and afterwards coasted it down, and as it agrees pretty nearly with the description of some Spanish manuscripts I have seen. The channel dividing Terra del Fuego is drawn from Frezier; but Sir Francis Drake, who first discovered Cape Horn, and the S.W. part of Terra del Fuego, observed that whole coast to be divided by a great number of inlets, all which he conceived did communicate with the Streights of Magellan. And I doubt not that whenever this country is thoroughly examined this circumstance will be verified, and Terra del Fuego will be found to consist of several islands.

And having mentioned Frezier so often, I must not omit warning all future navigators against relying on the longitude of Streights Le Maire, or of any part of that coast, laid down in his chart, the whole being from 8 to 10 degrees too far to the eastward, if any faith can be given to the concurrent evidences of a great number of journals, verified in some particulars by astronomical observation. For instance, Sir John Narborough places Cape Virgin Mary in 65° 42' of west longitude from the Lizard, that is in about 71-½° from London. And the ships of our squadron, who took their departure from St. Catherine's (where the longitude was rectified by an observation of the eclipse of the moon), found Cape Virgin Mary to be from 70-½° to 72-½° from London, according to their different reckonings; and since there were no circumstances in our run that could render it considerably erroneous, it cannot be esteemed in less than 71 degrees of west longitude; whereas Frezier lays it down in less than 66 degrees from Paris, that is, little more than 63 degrees from London, which is doubtless 8 degrees short of its true quantity. Again, our squadron found Cape Virgin Mary and Streights Le Maire to be not more than 2-½° different in longitude, which in Frezier are distant near 4 degrees, so that not only the longitude of Cape St. Bartholomew is laid down in him near 10 degrees too little, but the coast from the Streights of Magellan to Streights Le Maire is enlarged to near double its real extent.