The items are not taken in the order of their relative importance, but for convenience of argument.
There is the service of all the auxiliary vessels of the Fleet for supplying coal, ammunition, stores, provisions, water, materials for repairs, &c., and also the multitudes of fast mercantile vessels we require as Scouts; and there is also the nature of the employment of the armed mercantile cruisers to be settled. All these points have been carefully considered in the past, but in all and every one of them there is that most deadly of all deadly drawbacks to fighting readiness, the leaving certain things to be dealt with “when the time comes.” The time will come like the Day of Judgment! There won’t be time for doing anything, not even for repentance! We must go to the very utmost limit of preparedness, not one little item must be left to be dealt with “when the time comes.” We want all these vessels, without any exception whatever, to be as ready for a sudden emergency as is now the main Fighting Fleet! So therefore, day by day, we must know by name each vessel for every service, and the orders for every captain of every single one of this multitude of mercantile auxiliaries must be prepared, and he (each several captain) must thoroughly understand these orders beforehand; they must be explained to him by “one who knows,” and when that captain leaves England for his next trade voyage (and his ship is therefore no longer available), then the operation must be repeated with the captain of the substituted vessel! It must be laid down where every ship is to load, what route she is to follow, what eventualities she has to guard against! All, and together, must be detailed and day by day kept perfect!
Again, who are the officers at every port superintending the imparting of this information every day of the year, to the daily fresh captains of daily fresh ships, replacing others daily, going on their usual trade voyages? Who is the Flag Officer in supreme charge of all these superintending Port Officers? What are the names of the retired Commissioned or Warrant Officers who may be allocated to take passage in all the more important auxiliary vessels? such, for instance, and above all, as the Ammunition and Repair ships, so as to ensure the proper control and distribution of the cargo, as well as the efficient and prompt action of the ship herself, to be at the right place at the right time. Every Commander-in-Chief must know in minute detail every particular about every one of these vessels that are coming to him. He must know it now. He must know it day by day! He must have his own agent at home to look after his interests and to be responsible to him (the Commander-in-Chief) for the completeness of all the arrangements,—if not complete, then this agent must report the Superintending Port Officers for their incompetency.
All this scheme above sketched out may involve immense labour and great expense, but it has got to be done! Not a bit of use having the Fleet at all, if you don’t feed it, and also feed it well!
Quite as a separate service, apart from all that has been mentioned above, is the dissemination of intelligence and its suppression.
We must not (as has been hitherto accepted) permit the splendid costly fighting vessels of the Fleet to be criminally wasted by being sent here and there as messengers! Fast unarmoured mercantile steamers must constitute the squadrons of the Sea Intelligence Department, and instead of our Admirals running after information with costly armoured cruisers, we must run after the Admirals with the information, with easily obtainable cheap (because non-fighting), fast mercantile vessels.
All this is but a brief review of what is in progress, and what has to be done, but there remains above all that daily consideration at the Admiralty, and by every Admiral in command, of what would have to be done that very day in case of war, with the most unexpected, as well as the most expected opponent!
A Retrospect (July, 1906).
The most striking fact to an outsider is the astonishing confidence and loyalty of the Navy in its rulers which has been exhibited during the last two years of relentless reorganisation.
Naval Officers, as a class, are conservative and dislike change, and as a rule are prepared to resist it. The manner in which the recent changes have been received, root and branch and sweeping as they were, shows, as nothing else can, the necessity for reforms. Compare the insignificant agitation (which has, however, now entirely collapsed), in the Navy over the vast and drastic reforms of the last two years with the agitation in the Army over the trifling matter of getting rid of two battalions of Guards!