Paris, Feb. 11, 1870.
When I went to see Daru yesterday he opened the conversation by telling me that he had received a letter from La Valette, from which he learned that Count Bismarck had refused to consent to your suggestion that Prussia should disarm. Three reasons were, Count Daru said, given by Count Bismarck, none of which appeared to have any weight.
The first was that he could not even mention the subject to the King. This device had, Daru said, been resorted to by Count Bismarck in the affair of Luxemburg; in fact, it seemed to be the usual mode which the Count took of avoiding any discussion which he did not like; it was however the duty of Ministers to bring wholesome proposals before their Sovereign, whether the proposals were palatable or not. In fact, Daru seemed to think that if Count Bismarck himself desired to disarm, he would be able to obtain the consent of the King.
The second argument was that the neighbours of Prussia need not be uneasy at her military strength, because she was not a conquering Power. This, Count Daru thought, might have been said with reason, if Prussia had made no acquisition since 1815; but to say so now, he declared, to be simply preposterous. Prussia had shown herself to be a particularly ambitious Power, and her ambition had been already extremely successful. For his own part, he rather admired than blamed her desire to aggrandise herself, but he could not be expected to listen seriously to an assertion that her power was no cause of alarm because she was not a conquering nation.
Count Bismarck's third argument was that Prussia was not nearly so ready for war as France—that, in fact, she had only 300,000 men under arms, while France had upwards of 400,000. This, also, Count Daru thought, simply ridiculous. Prussia could, he said, at any moment, without an act of the Legislature, without a law, without even a Royal Decree, by a simple order of the Minister of War, call an immense force into the field, a force, too, of trained men, at a moment's notice. There was nothing in France like this.
Daru went on to say that Count Bismarck's arguments did not at all mend the matter. France must act as if Prussia had simply refused to disarm. How was this state of things to be dealt with?
'I have determined,' said Daru, 'to disarm, whether Prussia does so or not. In fact, I have resolved to ask the Emperor at once to sanction a considerable reduction of the French army. I cannot make this reduction as large as I should have done, if I had more satisfactory accounts of the intentions of Prussia. All I can propose, is to reduce the annual French contingent from 100,000 men to 90,000. As our men serve nine years, this will eventually effect a reduction of 90,000 men—a real absolute reduction. I shall thus give a pledge to Europe of pacific intentions, and set a good example to Prussia. I shall probably add great weight to the party in Germany which demands to be relieved from military burdens, and, I trust, enlist public opinion everywhere on my side. I shall also furnish Lord Clarendon with a powerful argument, if, as I sincerely hope, he will persevere in his endeavours to work upon Prussia. I beg you to give my warmest thanks to him for what he has already done, and to express to him my anxious hope that he will not acquiesce in a first refusal from Prussia.'
Daru went on to say that it appeared that Count Bismarck had been so little aware that your suggestion had been made in concert with France that he had particularly requested that the French Government might not be made acquainted with it. He begged me to express particularly to you his gratitude for the care you had taken not to compromise the French Government.
He concluded by saying that he could not at the moment say for certain that the reduction would be made in the French army, because the Emperor's sanction had not yet been given. He was afraid His Majesty would not relish the proposal, but he felt confident that His Majesty would accept the advice of his Ministers.
I told him that my personal opinion was that the best chance of obtaining a disarmament in Prussia was to set a good example and leave public opinion in Germany to work without foreign aid. Demands from abroad for disarmament seemed to me likely to irritate the King in Prussia, and to give him and the military party grounds for an appeal to national patriotism against foreign dictation. I thought that the effect of the disarmament of France in strengthening the feeling in Germany against military burdens would be very great if it were not counteracted by appeals which might wound German susceptibilities.
Daru seemed to agree generally with me, but not to be willing to say anything which would pledge him to abstain from calling officially upon Prussia to disarm, if it suited the home policy of the Ministry to do so.
Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons.
Feb. 12, 1870.
Daru seems to have taken Bismarck's refusal better than I expected. We have not, however, got the definitive answer which is to come through Bernstorff, and as Bismarck kept a copy of my letter I have little doubt that he will show it to the King, though he pretended to be afraid of doing so.
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Count Daru may be sure that I shall not let the subject drop, though I shall wish to proceed in it as I think most prudent. I have only mentioned it to Gladstone among my colleagues, and of course, to the Queen, who takes the warmest interest in the matter. I had a letter from her yesterday, expressing a hope that the French Government would not at present make any official démarches re disarmament, as she is sure, from her knowledge of the King's character, that it would do more harm than good. I am quite of the same opinion and think it would arouse German susceptibility, which is quite as great as the French, whereas we want to make German opinion act in our behalf.
Nothing is more likely to bring over Germany than France partially disarming without reference to Prussia, and I sincerely hope that this project of Daru's will be carried out. The Germans will be flattered by it as a proof of confidence, and it will furnish them with a fresh weapon against their war Budget.
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Lord Clarendon's statement that he meant to persevere in his efforts afforded much gratification to Count Daru. With regard to Lord Clarendon's desire that the matter should be kept as secret as possible, he explained that he had confined the knowledge of it as much as possible to himself, Lord Lyons and La Valette, but that of course he had been obliged to mention it to the Emperor and to Ollivier, and he 'seemed to be rather afraid that neither of these important persons would be perfectly secret.'[16]
Bismarck's reply to Lord Clarendon did not afford much ground for hope.