Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons.
Foreign Office, Feb. 19, 1870.
The day before yesterday, Bernstorff brought me Bismarck's answer to my letter, and I enclose a translation.
It is courteous, but the intention not to disarm is manifest. I have been detained so late at the Cabinet that I cannot write a letter for you to read to Daru, so I have marked Bismarck's letter, and you can extract the passages in the shape of a memorandum which you can leave with Daru in the strictest confidence. I should much like to hear what he will think of it, in order to shape my reply.
Bernstorff, who evidently spoke from a private letter of Bismarck's that he did not show me, laid much stress upon the active ill-will of Russia whenever the present Czar is gathered to his fathers—the present Cesarewitch and the Slav races are very hostile to Germany—(I believe this is true), and this hostility would be encouraged, according to Bismarck, if German means of resistance were weakened, it would invite coalition, under circumstances easily imaginable, between Austria, Russia, and France against Prussia—hypothetical cases of this kind are easily invented to support foregone conclusions, but there is a sort of opening as to a conference between Powers as to proportionate reductions and exchange of guarantees. I don't mean to lay much stress on this, nor should I think that it would be productive of a practical result, but you might allude to it as a sign that the negation is not absolute.
Pray, however, lose no time in correcting the error into which Daru has been led by La Valette as to an official despatch or a speech in Parliament from me. I cannot conceive how he made such a mistake, for I said nothing of the kind.
Bismarck's answer was of considerable length, and is quoted in full because it is a document of historical interest. It will be observed that it was in the main an amplification of the views expressed verbally to Lord Augustus Loftus a fortnight earlier, and that it contained specious arguments designed to impress upon Lord Clarendon the entirely unaggressive nature of Prussian policy. The belief, however, of Lord Clarendon and of the French Ministers, that Bismarck entertained no suspicion as to how the proposal originated, implies a simplicity on their part which he must have thoroughly enjoyed.
Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.
[Translation.] Berlin, Feb. 9, 1870.
Lord Augustus Loftus has read to me a private letter addressed to him by Lord Clarendon on the 2nd Inst. Its object is to discuss with me in a manner strictly private and confidential a plan for the partial disarmament of the Continental Powers. After a few friendly expressions concerning myself, which I cordially reciprocate, the English Statesman proceeds to enlarge upon the hardships and burdens imposed on the Nations of Europe by their excessive armaments;—He conceives that it would be much to Prussia's credit and well worthy of her great military renown if she were to co-operate in endeavouring to alleviate those burdens; he thinks that the King our August Master, sincerely attached as he is to his army, would not shrink from the adoption of such a measure, provided he were convinced of its justice;—he deems the present moment peculiarly fitted for making this overture, on account of the peaceful disposition of all the Powers and more especially of the Emperor Napoleon and of his present Government; and he states his readiness, provided he can count on our friendly assistance, to sound the Emperor and his Government with a view to eventually opening negotiations on the subject.
The English Ambassador has doubtless sent home a report of the Verbal answers which I gave to the above communication.—In order, however, to meet the confidence reposed in me by Lord Clarendon in a similar spirit, I feel called upon to address you in a manner equally confidential, and one which for that very reason admits of my speaking with the utmost frankness.
Lord Clarendon cannot doubt, as indeed the opening observations in his letter plainly shew, that I render full justice to the friendly feelings and intentions which he entertains towards Prussia and the North German Confederation.
I am convinced that no European State or Statesman exists who does not wish to see the feeling of confidence strengthened and Peace maintained; and further that no German Government would wish to impose upon its people the maintenance of an army in excess of that proportion for which the requirements of its safety imperatively call.
Were the question officially put to us whether the diminution of our military strength is compatible with the secure maintenance of our independence, we should not decline to share in any deliberations which might take place on the subject; and we should carefully sift the question whether the great neighbouring Military Powers are willing or able to give us guarantees such as would compensate Germany for the decrease in the amount of Security which She has hitherto owed to her armies.
Lord Clarendon does His Majesty the King full justice when he infers that no considerations or feelings of a purely personal nature would deter him from adopting a measure which he had once recognized as right and proper, but Lord Clarendon will as readily understand that however willing we may be to enter into a strictly confidential interchange of ideas on this important question, we must reserve to ourselves the Right of making a careful estimate of the relative position of the Parties most deeply interested in the matter, and of judging whether the concessions which we ourselves might probably be expected to make stand in a fair and just proportion to those which it would be in the power of other Nations to make. Our very geographical position is itself wholly different from that of any other Continental Power, and does not of course admit of comparison with the insular position of Great Britain. We are environed on all sides by neighbours whose military strength is of such a nature as to form an important element in all political combinations. Each of the other three great Continental Powers is on the contrary so placed that at least on one of its frontiers it is not open to a serious attack, and France is so situated as to be practically secure from danger on three sides. These three Powers have of late years considerably increased their military strength and have done so in a proportion in excess of our own:—Austria and France have remodelled wholly their military systems, so as to be able to assail us at any moment with increased forces. The armies of Austria, France and Russia, have each an army which, when on a Peace footing, is superior in numbers to our own. Our system is moreover so to speak so thoroughly transparent, that any increase in our effective force can at once be appreciated; the amount of any addition or decrease which we may make in our military force can therefore be most accurately calculated.
The military systems of other Nations are of a different nature. Even in the case of nominal Reductions they admit of the maintenance or renewal of their full effective strength; they even admit of a material increase of force being made without attracting notice or at all events without entailing the possibility of proof.—With us on the other hand, the whole military system, which from its very nature is a matter of publicity, becomes more so owing to the nature of our Institutions.
Under these circumstances, and in the event of a discussion on measures of such great importance being actually opened, we must ask ourselves what guarantees can be given to us that our Position as regards other Powers will not be practically impaired by our signifying our adherence to a system, which however just and even-handed it might appear in its action, would in reality not deal with equal fairness with all the Parties concerned.
Any weakening of Prussia's Power, any disturbance of the balance of Power in Europe, can hardly be for the interest of England. It must be acknowledged that whilst, on the one hand, the state of preparation for War of the Great Powers gives rise to apprehension, as set forth in Lord Clarendon's letter, still that very state of preparation may on the other prove a practical guarantee that any attempt to assail or to disturb existing Rights will be firmly and effectively met.
Of this I conceive that the past year has afforded fresh proofs, and Lord Clarendon, intimately acquainted as he is with the Events of that Period, will be best able to judge of the truth of my Remark.
The maintenance of Peace has not been due merely and solely to pacific views entertained by Rulers personally, for the Power and readiness of neighbouring states has had great weight in affecting opinion and in determining Resolutions. The Inclinations of a Nation may be essentially peaceful, they may rest on a keen appreciation of its own interests, but they are nevertheless liable to be suddenly changed either by some unforeseen accident, or by fictitious agitation. Under such circumstances, neither the most powerful Monarch, nor the most influential Minister is able to estimate or to guarantee the duration of peaceful Inclinations.
I am persuaded that when you submit these Remarks for Lord Clarendon's consideration, he will not see in them a Refusal to enter into the Views which he has so happily and eloquently set forth, but rather as the expression of the very serious responsibility which rests with a Minister who is called upon to advise his Sovereign in a matter pregnant with such important consequences.
I can of course have no objection to your reading this letter to Lord Clarendon, I must however ask you to make the communication in the strictest confidence, in accordance with the character of thorough privacy with which Lord Clarendon, with Great Tact and to my entire Satisfaction, has invested the matter.
Bismarck's views, as set forth above, were communicated by Lord Lyons to Count Daru on February 22, and the latter remarked that, upon the whole, matters were rather better than he expected, as there was no categorical refusal to consider the question of disarmament. In his opinion, that question was a very simple one. The military forces of the great Continental Powers bore a certain proportion to each other; in order to maintain that proportion, very heavy burdens were imposed upon each country, but if, by common agreement, each reduced its army by a certain number of men, the same proportion would be preserved, while the burdens were alleviated. If, however, a minute discussion of guarantees and securities were began, very awkward topics might be brought forward. For instance, the right of Prussia to garrison Mayence, was, to say the least, doubtful, and the fortifications she was erecting on the North Sea might give rise to comment. At this stage of the conversation, Lord Lyons hastily intervened in order to point out the extreme disadvantage of mixing up Mayence and the North Sea with the question of disarmament, and Count Daru concluded by saying that he was quite content to leave the matter entirely in the hands of Lord Clarendon, as nobody else could manage it so well.