In my previous letter of to-day I have told you what M. de Freycinet said to me about the Suez Canal Convention. I had a long interview with him, but though I gave him plenty of opportunities, he did not say one other word about Egypt. This being the case, I thought it prudent to abstain, at all events at this first interview, from saying anything on my side. So far then I have not made known to him any part of the contents of your letter to Lord Salisbury of the 18th or of his telegraphic answer.
The fact is, that from what I have made out since I came back here, I am led to think that the French Government have now good reason to doubt whether they would get Bismarck's support if they raised the Egyptian question with a view to embarrass us. This being the case, they are very much hesitating to do so, and are on the look-out for signs of our impressions on the subject, and would interpret any appearance of unusual anxiety on our part, or any fresh offers of concessions from us, simply as indications that we still thought Germany might join against us. If the French Government are not pretty sure of help and sympathy from abroad, they will probably not stir in the matter.
In the meantime, however, the press has been strongly excited, probably by d'Aunay and Charmes. There is a very nasty article, principally about the financial part of the Egyptian question, in the Débuts this morning.
I shall perhaps be able to see my way more clearly in a day or two. In the meantime I am disposed to think the most prudent plan will be to be reserved and firm about Egypt, but not to display anxiety on the subject.
The idea of Lord Salisbury, speaking generally, was that a somewhat distant date of evacuation should be foreshadowed; that if evacuation, as was fully intended, should be carried out, some return should be expected for the expenditure of British blood and treasure, and that the Suez Canal difficulty should be settled without further delay. He considered that the negotiations should be carried on with the Porte (Sir Henry Drummond Wolff had already been despatched on this mission), and that confidential communications should be made to France and Germany.
Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh.
Paris, Oct. 26, 1886.
I shall be very anxious to know what line Waddington took on his return to his post, and particularly what, if anything, he said about Egypt.
Freycinet is the man chiefly responsible for the refusal of France to join in our expedition to Egypt, and this no doubt makes him very anxious to gain for himself the credit of some striking success in getting England out of that country. So far as I can make out here, the attempts that have been made to get the Powers to unite in calling for a general Conference upon Egyptian affairs have not met with much success. If Bismarck decidedly opposes attempts of this kind, they will no doubt be abandoned. The Press continue to urge strong measures against our continuing in Egypt, and is not measured in its language.
The autumn session is often fatal to French Ministers. I recollect Gambetta's saying to me not long before his own fall: 'En automne les feuilles tombent et les porte-feuilles aussi.'
It is more than likely that the instructions which M. Waddington received about this period were of a disagreeable nature. A well-known French Ambassador once remarked to me some years later, that the London Embassy was no very desirable post from the French diplomatist's point of view. 'We are sent there with the mission of getting the English out of Egypt, and the thing cannot be done!'