The exchange program, in Soviet eyes, is simply another operation in Communist political warfare. The people the Kremlin sends over here are, to a man, trained agents of Soviet policy. Some of them are spies, seeking information; all of them are trusted carriers of Communist propaganda. Their mission is not cultural, but political. Their aim is not to inform, but to mislead. Their assignment is not to convey a true image of the Soviet Union, but a false image. The Kremlin’s hope is that they will persuade the American people to forget the ugly aspects of Soviet life, and the danger that the Soviet system poses to American freedom.
It is a mistake to measure the success of this Communist operation by the extent to which it converts Americans to Communism. By that test, of course, the operation is almost a complete failure. But the Kremlin’s aim is not to make Americans approve of Communism, much as they would like that; it is to make us tolerant of Communism. The Kremlin knows that our willingness to make sacrifices to halt Communist expansion varies in direct ratio as we are hostile to Communism. They know that if Americans regard the Soviet Union as a dangerous, implacable enemy, Communism will not be able to conquer the world. The Communists’ purpose, then, is to show that Khrushchev does not have horns,—that he is fundamentally a nice fellow; that the Soviet people are—“ordinary people” just like ourselves; that Communism is just another political system.
It would not have made sense, midway in the Second World War, to promote a Nazi-American exchange program or to invite Hitler to make a state visit to the United States. Unless we cherish victory less today than we did then, we will be equally reluctant to treat Communist agents as friends and welcome guests. The exchange program is a Communist confidence game. Let us not be taken in by it. Let us remember that American confidence in the Soviet government is the very last thing we want.
Many people contend that a “normalization” of Soviet-American relations, as envisaged by the exchange program, is only a logical extension of granting diplomatic recognition to Communist governments. I agree. Accordingly, I think it would be wise for the United States to re-examine the question of its diplomatic relations with Communist regimes. We often hear that recognition permits us to gather information in Communist countries. I am unaware, however, of any advantage that our diplomatic mission in Moscow confers along these lines that does not doubly accrue to the Soviet Union from its diplomatic spy corps in Washington and other American cities. Espionage possibilities aside, I am quite certain that our entire approach to the Cold War would change for the better the moment we announced that the United States does not regard Mr. Khrushchev’s murderous claque as the legitimate rulers of the Russian people or of any other people. Not only would withdrawal of recognition stiffen the American people’s attitude toward Communism; it would also give heart to the enslaved peoples and help them to overthrow their captors. Our present policy of not recognizing Red China is eminently right, and the reasons behind that policy apply equally to the Soviet Union and its European satellites. If our objective is to win the Cold War, we will start now by denying our moral support to the very regimes we mean to defeat.
DISARMAMENT
For many years, our policy-makers have paid lip-service to the idea of disarmament. This seems to be one of the ways, in modern diplomacy, of proving your virtue. Recently, however—under strong Communist propaganda pressure—we have acted as though we mean this talk to be taken seriously. I cite our government’s momentous decision to suspend nuclear tests.
Students of history have always recognized that armament races are a symptom of international friction—not a cause of it. Peace has never been achieved, and it will not in our time, by rival nations suddenly deciding to turn their swords into plowshares. No nation in its right mind will give up the means of defending itself without first making sure that hostile powers are no longer in a position to threaten it.
The Communist leaders are, of course, in their right minds. They would not dream of adopting a policy that would leave them, on balance, relatively weaker than before they adopted such a policy. They might preach general disarmament for propaganda purposes. They also might seriously promote mutual disarmament in certain weapons in the knowledge that their superior strength in other weapons would leave them, on balance, decisively stronger than the West. Thus, in the light of the West’s weakness in conventional weapons, it might make sense for the Communists to seek disarmament in the nuclear field; if all nuclear weapons suddenly ceased to exist, much of the world would immediately be laid open to conquest by the masses of Russian and Chinese manpower.
American leaders have not shown a comparable solicitude for our security needs. After the Second World War, the United States had a conventional military establishment rivaling the Soviet Union’s, and an absolute monopoly in nuclear power. The former weapon we hastily and irresponsibly dismantled. The latter we failed to exploit politically, and then we proceeded to fritter away our lead by belated entry into the hydrogen bomb and guided missile fields. The result is that we are out-classed in the conventional means for waging land warfare; regarding nuclear weapons, we are approaching the point, if it has not already been reached, where Communist power is equal to our own.
To the impending physical parity in nuclear weapons must be added a psychological factor assiduously cultivated by Communist propaganda. The horrors of all-out warfare are said to be so great that no nation would consider resorting to nuclear weapons unless under direct attack by those same weapons. Now the moment our leaders really accept this, strategic nuclear weapons will be neutralized and Communist armies will be able to launch limited wars without fear of retaliation by our Strategic Air Command. I fear they are coming to accept it, and thus that a military and psychological situation is fast developing in which aggressive Communist forces will be free to maneuver under the umbrella of nuclear terror.