In a letter dated the 15th of March, enclosing a copy of the above resolution, Mr. Loring said: "I can hear of but one or two persons here who believe in the power of Congress over slavery in the States, viz., the Misses Grimké, Mr. Alanson St. Clair, and perhaps Mr. May and Mrs. Chapman. Several, however, and those influential persons (Mr. Garrison among them), think slavery unconstitutional, and believe it would be so pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States if the point should ever be made. In this opinion I can by no means agree."
The "unfortunate resolution," he continued, was offered by a "silly officious person" at a moment of much haste and confusion just as the meeting was breaking up, and had been approved without proper consideration by the committee whose duty it was to revise all resolutions. "It seems, however, to have been understood by those who voted for it as applying only to free coloured persons whose rights might be infringed by Southern laws or to slaves in the District of Columbia; and the pledge given to try the question of slavery in the United States Courts seems to have arisen from the notion that the question of the accordance of slavery with the Constitution might be incidentally raised and determined even in a case in which the party whose rights are to be vindicated is free."
In conclusion Mr. Loring said that this question would assume an important aspect at the future meetings of the Antislavery Society, and earnestly hoped wise and honest counsel would prevail. He thought it would be sufficient ground for dissolving the Union were the United States Supreme Court to assume power over slavery in the several States. "The honesty and common sense of the nation," he wrote, "would revolt against such a doctrine and against those who should maintain it."
In his reply, dated the 29th of March, Judge Jay congratulated Mr. Loring on the service he had rendered the cause of abolition by procuring the passage of the resolutions from the board of managers. "In the fulness of our zeal," he wrote, "we are all liable occasionally to stray beyond the line of propriety, and it evinces more devotion to duty to acknowledge and correct errors than to avoid committing them."
At the fifth annual meeting of the American Antislavery Society, held at the Broadway Tabernacle on the 2d of May, 1838, Alvan Stewart of Utica, N. Y., offered a resolution, vigorously supported by himself and others, to the following effect:
"That the clause of the second article of the constitution of this society be struck out which admits 'that each State in which slavery exists has, by the Constitution of the United States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to its abolition in said State.'"
This motion was equivalent to a declaration on the part of the society that Congress had the right, under the Constitution, to abolish slavery. Judge Jay had previously declared that Stewart's doctrine was false, untenable, and hurtful to the cause. The arguments by which it was supported he considered absurd. For two days of continued debate he exposed its fallacy and danger and was rewarded by the defeat of the resolution. But such attempts to change the original articles of belief upon which the society was founded gave him great uneasiness for the future. His feelings upon this subject were shown in a letter to the secretary of the Young Men's Antislavery Society who had invited him to preside at its convention:
"On uniting with the American Antislavery Society some years since I remarked, with the letter requesting that my name might be enrolled among its members, that I had attentively considered its constitution, and expressed my conviction that in joining the society I was acting consistently with my obligations as a Christian and a citizen. The great moral principles advanced in the constitution perfectly accorded, in my opinion, with the precepts of the Gospel, and the measures proposed, by which those principles were to be carried into practice, equally accorded with the obligations of the oath I had taken to support the Constitution of the United States. I embarked in the antislavery cause with a firm determination to support the principles and measures avowed by the society at the hazard of obloquy, persecution, and, if necessary, even life itself; and never in advocating the cause to sacrifice truth and principle to expediency. How far I have acted up to this determination others must judge. I am not myself conscious of having departed from it.
"The constitution of the society contains an express admission that 'each State in which slavery exists has, by the Constitution of the United States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to its abolition;' and the object of the society in regard to slavery in the States is declared to be to effect its abolition by 'arguments addressed to the understandings and consciences of our fellow-citizens.' Notwithstanding these explicit declarations we were accused of aiming to effect our object by inducing Congress to invade the rights of the States by abolishing slavery within their limits; and it was justly argued that such an attempt was unconstitutional, and would, if successful, lead to civil war and a severance of the Union. So gross and unfounded were the calumnies circulated against us, that it was deemed expedient by the executive committee of the society, of which I was one, to publish an address to the public, pledging our individual characters and responsibility as to the real objects and principles entertained by our association. This address bore my signature among others, and contained, as nearly as I can recollect, the following passage: 'We hold that Congress has no more right to abolish slavery in the States in which it exists than it has to abolish slavery in the French West India Islands; consequently we desire no national legislation on the subject.' We were justified in giving this pledge by the declaration of the convention which formed the society, by the constitution of the society itself, by the constitutions of the several State societies, and by the uniform language of antislavery publications. Few persons have been more conversant with the writings of abolitionists than myself; yet I can truly aver that until the appearance of Mr. Stewart's extraordinary argument I was not aware that there was a man or woman belonging to an antislavery society who entertained a different opinion. This gentleman, holding the responsible station of chairman of the executive committee of the State society, avowing in its constitution the inability of Congress to abolish slavery in the States, published an article in the official paper of the society, asserting the constitutional power of Congress immediately to emancipate every slave in the United States, declaring that abolitionists had 'but one thing to do'—which was to petition Congress to exercise this power; thus repudiating the moral means they had prescribed for themselves, viz., 'arguments addressed to the understandings and consciences of our fellow-citizens'; and virtually recommending the employment of force, the power of the general government as the sole agent in effecting the abolition of slavery.
"I had supposed that sentiments so utterly at variance with the solemn asseverations of abolitionists, so repugnant to the constitutional pledges of their societies, would have excited universal indignation; but I was mistaken. After the publication of these sentiments, Mr. Stewart was selected as one of the orators of the American Society at their ensuing anniversary. At the annual meeting in May last he moved to purge from the constitution the concession I have quoted, thus giving the society the constitutional right of discharging what he had proclaimed the sole duty of abolitionists, that of petitioning Congress to abolish slavery in the States; and in supporting his motion he ridiculed the idea of effecting our object by addresses to the understanding and consciences of slaveholders. On taking the question a majority of the society was in favour of expunging; and the admission respecting the power of Congress still stands in the constitution only because it required a vote of two thirds to cancel it. Mr. Stewart was afterwards elected a manager of the society. A State society since organized has by a formal vote refused to insert the usual admission into its constitution, and another previously organized has since stricken it from its constitution.