William Jay and the Constitutional Movement for the Abolition of Slavery

by Bayard Tuckerman

"From this state of facts it is apparent that the pledges given to the public in our constitution, and in the address of the executive committee to which I have referred, that abolitionists admitted that Congress had no right to interfere with slavery in the States, that hence arguments were the only means they intended to use for its abolition, have been flagrantly falsified. So far as I was concerned, and unquestionably many more, the pledge was given in good faith, and however others may belie it, I mean honestly to abide by it. In my opinion, Congress has no more right to pass a general emancipation law than to direct how Broadway shall be paved; and without intending to impeach the motives of others, I must take the liberty to say that I would regard such a law as a most wicked and detestable act of usurpation—an act that would inevitably and properly sever the Union and necessarily result in bloodshed and national calamity.

"It seems to me, moreover, inconsistent with Christian sincerity and plain dealing for our societies to profess in their constitution a belief in great and important principles, and to promise to regulate their measures in accordance with those principles, and at the same time to retain in communion with them and elevate to office men who openly repudiate and ridicule those principles and avow a wish to introduce a course of action utterly repugnant.

"On discovering from the proceedings of last May that the American Society and its auxiliaries no longer considered their avowed principles binding on their members, but that they might be treated with insult and ridicule without incurring a loss of either confidence or office, and that in the bosom of the society opinions were entertained utterly at variance with public and solemn professions, and in their practical consequences hostile to the welfare of the country and inconsistent with the oath I had taken to support the Constitution of the United States, I deemed it my duty no longer to share in the responsibilities of their measures. I have not since taken part in the meeting of any antislavery society, and the recklessness with which the pledge given by myself and other officers of the society has been falsified, warns me to be cautious how I again become identified with the promises and declarations of these associations. These considerations induce me very respectfully to decline your kind invitation.

"My attachment to the cause of abolition, and to the principles avowed in the constitution of the American Society, was never stronger than at this moment; and I shall ever regard it a duty and a privilege to labour for the abolition of slavery in every manner consistent with propriety and my moral and political obligations.

"Although my confidence in the integrity and singleness of purpose of antislavery societies is weakened, I have not the most distant wish to interrupt their harmony or impede their usefulness. I have thus, sir, frankly but with much pain stated my sentiments. These sentiments I have no desire to conceal or to obtrude upon others; and you are at liberty to suppress this letter or make any use of it you may think proper."

The annual meeting of the Connecticut Antislavery Society was held at New Haven in May, 1840, commencing on the 20th. The society considered this meeting to be of vital importance to the prosperity of the cause in that State on account of the Legislature being in session there at that time, many of the members of which were expected to attend.

In April Judge Jay received an invitation from the Committee of Arrangements to deliver an address on the "Action of the Federal Government in Behalf of Slavery," on which subject the Committee felt convinced that Judge Jay could "give the society as well as our legislators some valuable information."

Other engagements compelled Judge Jay to decline the invitation. In his letter to the Committee of Arrangements informing them of his inability to comply with their request, Judge Jay assured them that the interest he had theretofore professed to feel in the antislavery cause had suffered no diminution; and his conviction of the truth of the great principles set forth in the constitution of the American Society had, if possible, grown stronger from continued reflection and observation; but as to the singleness of purpose and the efficiency and integrity of the present antislavery organization his opinion had undergone a change.

"In joining the organization," he wrote, "I had good cause to believe that I would not be called upon to co-operate with men who condemned any of its avowed principles, or with men who would seek to render it an instrument for promoting other objects than the abolition of slavery.

"One of the principles laid down in the constitution of the American Society, and a most important one as limiting its operations, is that by the Constitution of the United States Congress has no right to legislate for the abolition of slavery in the several States in which it exists. Yet a gentleman was in 1838 chosen by the society one of its officers after having both in print and in the presence of the society denied this doctrine and contended that it was the duty of abolitionists to petition Congress to pass a law for the immediate emancipation of all the slaves in the United States. The expulsion of this gentleman from the society was in my opinion required by the respect it owed itself, and by the good faith it owed both to the public and to its members. The course pursued was an emphatic declaration on the part of the society that its professed principles, however useful they might be in conciliating public confidence and in acquiring funds, were by no means binding on its members. Having sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, and regarding the proposed mode of emancipation a most palpable violation of it, and seeing that the avowed principles of the society were in fact no security for its conformity to them in its conduct, I then determined never again to take a part in its meetings or in those of its auxiliaries. Subsequent events have given me no cause to regret this determination.