SECT. VI.
XXII. But we should not conclude that this was all done by main force, without the intervention of art or stratagem. The same contrivances, the same artifices, which we read of in Machiavel, and which have been practised by the most crafty tyrants of these latter ages, were exerted in the early ones. Cast your eyes on Romulus, seeking for a specious pretence of justice for taking away the life of his brother, in order to remove this obstacle to his reigning without the danger of a rival, and in security: view his successor, Numa Pompilius also, who was a most consummate hypocrite, affecting exteriorly to appear religious and devout, and to pay a great respect to rites and ceremonies. He pretended to receive visions and revelations from the goddess Egeria, in order that the Roman people, looking upon him as a man favoured in an especial manner by heaven, should not only not dare to entertain thoughts of dethroning him, but permit him to aggrandize himself at his discretion; we have another example of the same sort of policy, in Tullius Hostilius, who succeeded Numa, and introduced with great art, those ostentatious outside appearances, which dazzle the eyes of the world, and are the most efficacious means to make majesty formidable and respectable; for he likewise sought out deceitful pretences, for making war on the neighbouring states: we see Tarquin the Proud also, availing himself of the stratagem of his son Sextus, who, under the pretence of being a fugitive from his father’s cruelty, fled to, and entreated refuge among the Gabians, on whom, after their receiving him kindly, he artfully prevailed to make him their generalissimo, veiled with an absolute power; in consequence of which, he was enabled to fell and betray them. He did so, and they became an easy prey to the Romans.
XXIII. Is not that famous precept of Machiavel’s, that with an enemy reduced to great straits or difficulties, you should take no middle course, but, according as you find it most for your interest, should either ruin him totally, or give him your hand to extricate him out of his danger; punctually conformable to the advice which Herennius gave to his son Pontius, who was general of the Samnites? When this general had shut up the Roman army within the Caudine Forks, he sent information of it to his father, and at the same time desired to have his advice, respecting how he should act by them. The old man answered, that he should generously open the pass, and let them go free, without any condition or limitation whatever, that might be injurious to, or affect either their lives, their liberty, or their honour. Pontius, and all the principal people of the republic who were with the army, believed, that Herennius had not well understood or considered the information that had been sent him, nor apprehended, that the whole Roman army were entirely at their mercy. They therefore sent other messengers or deputies, with instructions to inform him minutely, of the unhappy situation and state of the Roman army, whose lives, without remedy, were at their discretion and disposal. To this he answered, that they should cut all their throats, and not spare a single man of them. Two answers so diametrically opposite, made some of them suspect that the old man was not in his right senses; but notwithstanding this suspicion, as they had for many years respected him as the oracle and soul of the republic, the major part of them began to conjecture, and not without reason, that there was some mystery contained in these contradictory replies, which they did not comprehend, or were not aware of; and they therefore desired, that he would come to the camp and explain himself. He came accordingly, and told them his sentiments; which were, that they should adopt one or other of the extremes, and either gain their affections by an heroic act of generosity, or extirpate them totally, to prevent their ever being able to revenge themselves for whatever indignity they should impose on them. Pontius did not follow the advice of the old man, but took a middle way, which was, to spare their lives, but dismiss them with the loss of their honour, by obliging consuls, officers, and soldiers, to submit to the signal disgrace of passing under the yoke. The result of this was, what might easily have been foreseen and expected, the Romans, stung with the ignominy they had undergone, could not divert their thoughts from meditating revenge, which they after a while determined to take; and breaking through the stipulated conditions, they renewed the war with stronger army, and totally routed and overthrew the Samnites.
XXIV. We must allow, that the determination Pontius took was imprudent; but it does not follow from thence, that we should approve the advice of Herennius; for although the first was insecure, the other was cruel in extreme. He might have fallen upon other expedients, better suited and proportioned to the nature of the case; such as taking hostages, and before permitting the army to depart, obliging them to deliver into their possession, certain towns and districts as pledges, for the faithful performance of their engagements; but the supposing that the faith of stipulations or compacts, would have more influence upon a vain, proud, warlike people, than the indignation conceived for a gross affront offered to their honour, was very idle, and very silly confidence.
XXV. Neither, as I have already said, do I think there was any security in the extreme benign advice of Herennius; for with the Romans, ambition was more powerful than public faith, or the obligations of gratitude. A good testimony to this truth, was their behaviour to the Numantians, which was a true sample of the politics of those times.
SECT. VII.
XXVI. I say of those times, to avoid censuring the Romans singly; for in Greece also, the not performing a promise given, or even sworn to, when the observance of it clashed with the interest of the state, was so common, that a sovereign for having done it, was hardly looked upon to have impeached his character as a just prince, or an honest man.
XXVII. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, was one of the most celebrated princes of antiquity; and although he was an eminent warrior, placed his principal glory in being thought a lover of virtue and justice. To one who called the sovereign of Persia the great monarch, he answered sharply, he who is not better than me, is not a greater king than myself. He was exceedingly sober, patient of labour, and such a respecter of the Gods, that he would not permit even his enemies, who had taken refuge in the temples, to be forced from their sanctuary; and was besides, so averse to dress and finery, that there was scarce a soldier in his army, more humbly or simply cloathed than himself. But this saint of Paganism, made not the least scruple of violating the public faith, when by the violation he expected to derive some advantage to the state. By means of one of his emissaries he, in profound peace, surprized and seized on the city of Thebes; and although in Sparta, the justice of the action was somewhat disputed, as soon as it was shewn, that the keeping the place was of importance to the kingdom, they immediately consented to send a garrison to maintain the citadel. In his expedition to Egypt, he abandoned king Taco, in whose pay and service he and his Lacedæmonian troops were engaged, and joined the rebel Nectanebus, without making any other excuse for this treachery, than that he found it for the interest of his country.
XXVIII. Aristides, the Cato of the Athenians, who by way of eminence they called the Just, having caused his country to swear to a certain thing, and having in the name of it sworn to it himself likewise, persuaded them afterwards to violate the oath, because the observance of it would be productive of some inconvenience to them. Plutarch, who cites Theophrastus as his author, adds, that to serve his country he did many iniquitous things. Such were the just men of Greece, and such was their policy.